Event Notification Report for October 17, 2024

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN SOIL DENSITY GAUGE

The following report was received via email from the Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE):

"On October 9, 2024, at 1549 EDT, the MDE emergency response center received a telephone report of a suspected stolen soil density gauge was captured by police. The report came from the Prince George's County Police to get guidance on the subject. MDE has called the Prince George's County Police contact person and are waiting for a response. Details about the gauge are not yet available.

"This report is based on 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(i) because soil density gauges have a typical activity of 9 mCi of Cs-137 and/or 44 mCi of Am-241.

"An investigation will be conducted and follow up reports are to be expected."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING SOURCE

The following information was received from the office of Alabama Radiation Control via email:

"This report is connected to NMED item 140245, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Event Notification Number 50082 [Damaged Moisture Density Gauge, May 2, 2014], and Alabama Incident number 14-14. Alabama Radiation Control received an email from Troxler Electronic Laboratories on October 9, 2024. The licensee returned the gauge involved in this incident to Troxler in July of 2022. The device was retrieved for service this month. The Troxler representative reported that the cesium-137 source was not present at servicing. The americium-241/beryllium source was present and is being prepared for disposal. We are investigating with the licensee, transportation department contacts, and others."

Model: CPN MC-3
Serial Number: M30129990
Activity: Nominal activity of 10 millicuries cesium-137 and 50 millicuries of americium-241/beryllium.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

NONCOMPLIANCE WITH TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR), a 10 MW reactor, is reporting an abnormal occurrence as required per Technical Specification (TS) 1.1 b and c. One of two redundant switches on the Fluxtrap irradiations reactivity safety trip device failed reactor pre-startup checks on October 14, 2024. This failure would have prevented the switch from sending a scram input to the reactor protection system. MURR TS 3.2.g.21 requires a 1/N logic of 2, meaning both switches must be operational during operation of the reactor.

"The faulty switch was last confirmed operating properly prior to reactor startup on October 7, 2024. MURR cannot positively state when the switch failed. This condition could have existed during operations at some point between October 7 and October 13, 2024.

"The second switch was verified to be operable. The faulty switch and its associated wiring were replaced, retested satisfactorily, and the reactor was returned to operation the evening of Monday, October 14, 2024 with authorization from the Facility Director.

"MURR will follow up with a written report to the NRC within 14 days as required by TS 6.6.c.

"NRC Project Manager has been notified."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

A causal investigation is in progress. Equipment age is the potential cause of the failure.

FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"A licensed employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access has been terminated.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

EN Revision Imported Date: 10/17/2024

EN Revision Text: FITNESS FOR DUTY

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

A non-licensed contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access has been terminated.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.