Event Notification Report for September 25, 2024

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SOURCES FAILED TO RETRACT

The following information was provided by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (the Department) via email:

"On September 16, 2024, at 1415 EDT, the Department was notified by Alpek Polyester (the licensee) that while performing semi-annual shutter checks the licensee discovered that two gauges (model: Berthold LB 300 IRL) had cables that were malfunctioning, and that the sources were unable to be retracted to the shielded and locked position. One gauge contains a 6 mCi (original activity) cobalt-60 source and the other contains a 2.5 mCi (original activity) cobalt-60 source. Currently the cobalt sources are 1.07 mCi and 0.044 mCi, respectively. These sources were placed into service on September 17, 2011. On September 17, 2024, the department on-call duty officer met the licensee's radiation safety officer at 0900 EDT to perform a visual inspection and radiation survey of the gauge. The highest radiation measured was 0.5 microR/hr. The licensee has contacted a licensed vendor to schedule the repair of the drive cables."

LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"Two tritium exit signs cannot be located at Bridger Coal Mine in Point of Rocks, Wyoming. The signs are believed to have been returned to the manufacturer following use, but there is no paperwork to confirm. Efforts to ascertain knowledge of the purchase or return of the devices from the manufacturer were fruitless. Bridger Coal Mine does not have intentions now, or in the future, to posses generally licensed devices."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

Each exit sign contained 7.5 curies of tritium.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST GAUGE

The following information was provided by the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control (BRC) via email and phone:

"On September 18, 2024, at 1345 EDT, BRC received call from the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO), that an employee noticed their soil moisture density gauge [containing 10 mCi of Cs-137 and 50 mCi of Am-241:Be] was missing from the back of their pick-up truck at 1215 while traveling between job sites. The employee left a job site at the intersection of Triton and Roma in Port Saint Lucie and noticed the gauge missing at the intersection of Kanner Hwy and I-95. The employee called their supervisor at 1230, who in turn called the RSO at 1330. The employee admitted that the gauge case was not chained to truck, but that the gauge was secure in the case which had two locks on it. The employee retraced their route several times, but could not locate the gauge.

"BRC will assign an inspector to respond."

Device Information:
Device type: soil moisture density gauge
Manufacturer: CPN
Model Number: MC-DR
Serial number: MD40107276

Florida incident number: FL24-092

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO GENERATOR TRIP

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"At 0720 EDT on September 23, 2024, James A. FitzPatrick was at 100 percent power when an automatic scram occurred as a result of a main turbine trip due to an automatic trip of the generator output breakers; the cause is still under investigation.

"The scram was not complex. The automatic scram inserted all control rods. A subsequent reactor pressure vessel (RPV) low water level resulted in a group 2 isolation and initiation of high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) systems. RCIC did inject, but HPCI did not inject, as expected, based on RPV water level recovery with the feedwater system. Reactor pressure is being maintained by main steam line bypass valves. The plant is stable in Mode 3 with the 'A' reactor feed pump maintaining RPV water level.

"The initiation of the reactor protection system (RPS) due to the automatic scram signal while critical is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The general containment Group 2 isolations and HPCI and RCIC system actuations are reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

The group 2 containment isolation affects multiple systems.

* * * UPDATE ON 9/23/2024 AT 1540 EDT FROM RYAN PERRY TO SAMUEL COLVARD * * *

"On 9/23/2024 at 1156 EDT Constellation communications provided a media statement to Oswego area news media contacts summarizing the events that had occurred at Nine Mile Point Unit 2 and FitzPatrick Unit 1. This is a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis)

AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TURBINE TRIP

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"On 9/23/2024 at 0720 EDT, with Unit 2 in mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically scrammed due to turbine stop valve closure on a turbine trip. The scram was not complex. Due to the reactor protection system (RPS) actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Following the scram, reactor water level dropped below level 2 (108.8 inches), starting high pressure core spray (HPCS) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC); both injected into the reactor. RCIC is being used with turbine bypass valves to remove decay heat. Due to the emergency core cooling systems HPCS and RCIC discharging into the reactor coolant system, this event is being reported a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), and an eight hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). In addition, with reactor water level below level 2 (108.8 inches), primary containment isolation signals actuated resulting in group 2 recirculation sample system isolation, group 3 traveling in-core probe (TIP) isolation valve isolation, group 6 and 7 reactor water cleanup isolation, group 8 containment isolations, and group 9 containment purge isolations. This event is being reported as an eight hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Operations responded using procedure N2-EOP-RPV (1-3) and stabilized the plant in mode 3. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector was informed. There was no impact on Unit 1."

* * * UPDATE ON 9/23/2024 AT 1550 EDT FROM RYAN LOOMIS TO IAN HOWARD * * *

"On 9/23/2024 at 1156 EDT Constellation communications provided a media statement to Oswego area news media contacts summarizing the events that had occurred at Nine Mile Point Unit 2 and FitzPatrick Unit 1. This is a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis), NRR EO (Felts), and IR MOC (Grant).

60-DAY NOTIFICATION OF INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"At 2127 EDT, on 8/01/2024, with Unit 1 in mode 1 at 98 percent power, a complete actuation of the 'A' train containment ventilation isolation (CVI) occurred. The 'A' train CVI resulted from the failure of a radiation monitor providing input to the isolation circuitry. The CVI removes containment purge from operation should it be in service and secures other radiation monitors which measure reactor coolant system leakage. In accordance with the station's procedures and technical specifications, a restoration from the CVI was made. Troubleshooting revealed that replacement of this obsolete radiation monitor was justified; a design change to perform this replacement is in progress.

"This report is being made under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in an invalid actuation of the 'A' train CVI.

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of the event."