Event Notification Report for September 19, 2024

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST EXIT SIGN

The following information was provided by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) via email:

"On September 9, 2024, during a routine inspection of the licensee, information for the exit sign was provided to the radiation safety officer (RSO). The inspectors asked for the sign's location and for the facility contact listed to be updated if necessary. After the inspection, follow up emails and searches of the facility led to the determination that the sign could not be located. The sign's manufacturer was contacted to confirm whether or not the sign might have been returned. SRB Technologies (the manufacturer) confirmed that the sign was not assigned a return number, and that paperwork for its return was not submitted. After additional follow up with the RSO, and final search of the facility, it was determined that the sign has been lost."

New Jersey Event Report ID number: To be determined.

Additional information: The lost exit sign contained approximately 9210 millicuries of tritium (H-3).

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE - STUCK OPEN GAUGE

The following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via email:

"On September 11, 2024, the Agency was contacted by a representative for the Exxon Mobile refinery in Channahon to advise of a fixed gauge containing 20 mCi of Cs-137 [sealed source] had a reportable equipment failure. Specifically, on September 10, 2024, during routine shutter checks, the handle that operates the shutter broke off, leaving the gauge in the open position. The gauge is mounted to a production vessel which is full of commodity. There were no exposures, and due to the vessel being in use, personnel exposure is not a concern. The manufacturer has been contacted for repairs. The licensee met the notification requirements. This report will be updated with the source serial number and verification of repair and replacement upon receipt."

Illinois Event Item Number: IL240021

AGREEMENT STATE - STUCK OPEN SHUTTER

The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via email:

"On September 11, 2024, the Department was notified by the licensee that the shutter on a Ronan model SA-1 gauge containing a 50 millicurie Cs-137 source, was found stuck in the open position during routine testing. Open is the normal position for the gauge. The licensee reported that there is no risk of additional radiation exposure to members of the general public or radiation workers due to this on/off mechanism failure. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident Number: I-10129

AGREEMENT STATE - STUCK OPEN SHUTTER

The following information was provided by the Tennessee Division of Radiological Health via email:

"On August 20, 2024, during a routine calibration of a Global Gauge SS3A, employees at Artazn, LLC were unable to get stable readings. A Global Gauge technician arrived on August 22, 2024, and discovered that the shutter on the gauge was partially stuck open even though operator panel was showing everything as normal. The maximum exposure to workers was calculated to be 3.7 mrem. The available device information is as follows:

"Manufacturer: Global Gauge
"Model: SS3A
"Serial Number: 8376LV
"Isotope: Am-241, 1000 millicuries

"Corrective actions or reports will be updated with a report within 30 days."

Tennessee Event Report ID Number: TN-24-068

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - Y-90 DOSE MISADMINISTRATION

The following is a summary of information that was provided by the New Mexico Radiation Control Program via phone and email:

At approximately 1830 MDT on September 10, 2024, the licensee's radiation safety officer discovered that on July 18, 2024, a dose of 0.2 Gbq of yttrium-90 was prescribed for delivery to a patient, but the patient received a reported dose of 0.25 Gbq. The cause for the discrepancy between the prescribed and delivered dose is unknown. The licensee has been instructed to provide a complete written report.

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP AND MANUAL SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"At 0127 EDT on 9/17/2024, with Unit 3 in mode 1 at 100% power, the reactor automatically tripped due to the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger outlet flow control valve failing open. A manual safeguards actuation was initiated due to the lowering pressurizer water level resulting from the reactor coolant system cooldown that was caused by the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger outlet flow control valve failing open. The trip was not complex, with all safety systems responding normally post-trip.

"Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger. Units 1, 2, and 4 are not affected.

"Due to the core makeup tank actuation, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A). The reactor protection system actuation while critical is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Additionally, this event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid containment isolation actuation and a valid passive residual heat removal heat exchanger actuation.

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

The failure of the control valve does not inhibit the residual heat removal system from functioning as it is passive. The reactor coolant system maximum allowable cooldown rate was exceeded (Technical Specification 3.4.3). The limit is 100 degrees F per hour above 350 degrees F. The maximum observed cooldown rate was 226 degrees F per hour. At time 0458 EDT, reactor coolant system temperature is 369.1 degrees F, reactor pressure is 900 psig. Currently, the plant is not cooling down but is making ready to place shutdown cooling online.

STEAM PROPAGATION DOOR INOPERABLE

The following information was provided by the licensee via email and phone:

"At 2005 EDT on 9/17/2024, it was discovered that steam propagation door DRCB/501 would not latch properly; thus making the door inoperable. Door DRCB/501 is required as a steam propagation barrier to protect both trains of engineered safety feature equipment from effects of a postulated steam line break. Due to this inoperability, the plant was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

"Steam propagation door DRCB/501 was repaired and maintained in the closed and latched position at 2032 EDT on 9/17/2024."

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION FOR OIL RELEASE

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"On September 18, 2024, Columbia Generating Station determined that lubricating oil was likely released into the plant service water system due to a failed heat exchanger on the reactor feed turbine alpha. Isolation of the heat exchanger from the plant service water system is in progress. The plant service water system returns water to a water basin that contains, at a minimum, 300,000 gallons of water. The water basin is connected to the Columbia River via a blowdown line. The blowdown line was secured at 0739 PDT on 9/18/2024. A visual inspection of the basin did not identify any oil sheen or film, but a sample downstream of the affected heat exchanger revealed an oily sheen in the sample bottle. It does not appear the oil released poses a threat to human health or the environment. However, there could have been a discharge of an unknown quantity of oil into the Columbia River, this matter is immediately reportable under Revised Code of Washington 90.56.280 to the U.S. Coast Guard National Response Center, Washington State Department of Ecology, and to the Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council per National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit section S3.F.2.b.i.

"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for notification of other government agencies concerning an event related to the health and safety of the public or protection of the environment. Notifications to off-site agencies were performed at 0850 PDT on 9/18/2024. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

United States Coast Guard National Response Center Incident Report #141183
Washington State Department of Ecology #733853

PART 21 REPORT - DEFECTIVE RELAY IDENTIFIED DURING PRE-INSTALLATION TESTING

The following information was provided by NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC (NextEra) via phone and email:

"NextEra makes the following notification under 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i) of a defect found in a Westinghouse relay, model NBFD31S, during pre-installation bench testing. Specifically, the relay was found to not function as required due to its internal plunger not operating properly. This malfunctioning caused the plunger to not fully extend and cause the normally open contacts to remain closed. Investigations completed by Westinghouse determined that the plunger would not function properly because its kickout spring was misaligned due to human error. This relay was procured from Westinghouse for safety related nuclear applications.

"NextEra has concluded that this defect constitutes a substantial safety hazard (SSH). A SSH exists because of the nature of the defect was such that the relay would not be able to perform its safety function if installed, and would result in a loss of redundancy in a safety related system, in this case, the reactor protection system.

"On September 17, 2024, the Point Beach Site Vice President was notified of the requirement to report this event under 10 CFR 21.21. This is a non-emergency notification required by 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i). A written notification in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3(ii) will be provided within 30 days.

"Since this defect was discovered prior to installation, in accordance with station requirements for bench testing, and the vendor has concluded that this event is an isolated case, there were no actual impacts on safety related equipment.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

Responsible corporate officer:
Michael Durbin
Site Vice President
(920) 755-7854