Event Notification Report for July 01, 2024

EN Revision Imported Date: 7/1/2024

EN Revision Text: INITIAL PART 21 REPORT - POTENTIAL DEFECT WITH CIRCUIT BREAKER

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"Pursuant to 10CFR 21.21 (a)(2), Paragon Energy Solutions, LLC is providing this interim notification of ongoing analysis for Part 21 reportability of a potential defect with a Schneider Electric Medium Voltage VR Type Circuit Breaker Part Number V5D4133Y000.

"On February 15, 2024, Paragon completed initial documentation of a potential defect with the subject circuit breaker in which Duke-Oconee had identified failure to close on demand or delayed operation to close with extended application of the remote closing signal. Since the primary safety function of the circuit breaker is to close and maintain continuity of power to downstream loads, failure to close could potentially contribute to a substantial safety hazard.

"This is the first reported instance of this failure mode, and Paragon suspects the issue to be related to aging of the circuit breaker's lubrication. Paragon requires more time to complete testing and analysis to confirm the failure mode and determine reportability.

"Date when evaluation is expected to be complete: 5/03/2024."

Affected licensee: Oconee. Paragon is currently evaluating the extent of condition as it pertains to other plants and equipment that may utilize the same or similar circuit breakers.

* * * UPDATE ON 05/02/24 FROM R. KNOTT TO T. HERRITY VIA EMAIL AND PHONE CALL * * *

Due to inconclusive results, the completion date of the testing is revised to 05/31/2024.

Notified R2DO (Miller) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors (email).

* * * UPDATE ON 5/31/2024 AT 1534 EDT FROM RICHARD KNOTT TO ERNEST WEST * * *

The following is a synopsis of the updated information received:

The only known affected licensee is Oconee. Paragon is evaluating if the issue pertains to other equipment or plants.

Paragon has conducted additional testing with the original equipment manufacturer, Schneider Electric, but will require more time to complete their evaluation. Evaluation is expected to be complete by 6/30/2024.

Other circuit breaker types that may be affected are:
5GSB2-250-1200 (uses KVR type element)
5GSB2-350-1200 (uses KVR type element)
5GSB3-350-1200 (uses KVR type element)
5GSB3-350-2000 (uses KVR type element)

Paragon recommends licensees with the breaker types listed above monitor for failure to close on demand or delayed. If any improper operation is found, report it to Paragon for evaluation.

Contact Information:
Richard Knott
Vice President Quality Assurance
Paragon Energy Solutions
817-284-0077
rknott@paragones.com

Notified R2DO (Franke) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors (email).

* * * UPDATE ON 6/29/2024 AT 1137 EDT FROM RICHARD KNOTT TO ERNEST WEST * * *

The following is a synopsis of the updated information received:

Paragon Energy Solutions has provided a new expected date for completion of their evaluation: 7/28/2024.
The only known affected licensee remains Oconee.

Notified R2DO (Suggs) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors (email).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT- STUCK SHUTTER

The following information was provided by the Nevada Division of Radiation Health via email and phone:

"On June 18, 2024, Nevada Goldmines - Elko, discovered a failed shutter while conducting required 6-month shutter checks on a Berthold LB 7440 fixed gauge in the open position. In place radiation surveys were conducted to verify safety until a contractor would be available to remove the gauge and move it to storage. All readings were normal. The licensee coordinated with Radiation Technology Inc., (RTI) to remove the gauge and move it to the authorized storage area pending decision to repair or dispose of the gauge.

"RTI conducted onsite leak checks and results were less than 0.005 microcuries. A second set of leak check samples were taken to be returned to RTI lab for verification. A radiation survey following deinstallation confirmed them to be background.

"The gauge was removed from service, plates placed over the open window to provide shielding, and the device with plates covering the window was placed in storage. Surveys of the storage area show increase in radiation consistent with adding a new gauge to the job box, with the highest radiation level being 79 microR/hour at 12 inches."

Gauge Information:
Model: Berthold LB 7440
Serial number: 3015
Activity: Cs-137 (150 Ci)

Nevada Item Number: NV240004

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST I-125 SEED

The following information was received from the Utah Department of Environmental Quality, Division of Waste Management and Radiation Control (the Department) via email:

"On June 24, 2024, the Department was notified that on June 4, 2024, an I-125 seed for breast localization was not recovered during routine tissue processing of the tissue sample at the grossing bench or within the histology lab. The seed was verified in the tissue sample at the time of removal from the patient through both survey of the patient and a radiograph of the tissue sample. The seed was most likely disposed of either in the biohazard waste or in the non-biohazard waste.

"Upon discovery of the lost source, a survey of the lab with a low energy gamma detector was performed in an attempt to locate the source. The source was not found.

"Exposure to the public is expected to be very low or minimal. The low energy X-rays associated with I-125 decay are likely to be attenuated due to overlying waste, minimal time around the waste, and the given low exposure rate associated with the source. The material is encapsulated."

Utah Event Report ID: 240004

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

SHUTDOWN REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 0159 EDT on 6-27-24, DC Cook Unit 2 commenced a controlled shutdown to address identified leakage through 2-QRV-251, CVCS [chemical and volume control system] charging pumps discharge flow control valve, valve packing. The leakage started at 2303 EDT on 6-26-24 and was determined to be greater than the 10 gallons per minute limit per technical specification 3.4.13 allowable leakage. The leakage was determined to not be repairable at power.

"Per 10CFR 50.72(b)(2) this is a 4 hour non-emergency report for Technical Specification required shutdown."

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
A normal shutdown is expected to be completed by 0900 EDT. There are no radiological releases. Unit 1 was not affected. There is no estimate for the time of the repairs.

AUTOMATIC START OF TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP

The following information was provided by the licensee email:

"On June 27, 2024, at 0804 [EDT], D.C. Cook Unit 2 had an automatic start of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFP) following a controlled down power and manual reactor trip at approximately 17 percent power. The automatic start of the TDAFP was due to a steam generator water level 'low low' signal following the reactor trip. The down power and trip were performed in accordance with normal shutdown procedures to comply with the required action C.1 of technical specification 3.4.13, 'reactor coolant system operational leakage.' Reference event notification number EN57194.

"An automatic start of the TDAFP is an eight hour report per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

"Unit 2 is being supplied by offsite power. All control rods fully inserted. Steam generators are being fed by both motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps. Decay heat is being removed via the steam dump system to the main condenser. Preliminary evaluation indicates plant systems functioned normally following the reactor trip. D.C. Cook Unit 2 remains in Mode 3 to repair the previously reported reactor coolant system leakage through valve 2-QRV-251, 'CVCS [chemical and volume control system] charging pumps discharge flow control' valve packing."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"On June 27, 2024, at 1037 EDT, the North Carolina State University (NCSU) PULSTAR reactor was shutdown due to channel failure of the N-16 detector. This channel is required during operations over 500 kW by TS 3.4a. The reactor was operating at 950 kW at the time of channel failure. The reactor operator promptly shutdown and secured the reactor. Due to the nature of an unscheduled shutdown, investigation as to the source of channel failure and remedy will be commenced. At this time, failure has been isolated to just the N-16 channel. As such, operations may continue with approval for restart by the director of the NCSU PULSTAR reactor at powers below 500 kW. To resume full operations, channel maintenance, required surveillances, and additional approval by the director of the NCSU PULSTAR reactor are required."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

The N-16 channel provides a reference power level indication while adjustments are being made to other power level channels.

CONCURRENT REPORT FOR FIRE IMPAIRMENT

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At approximately 2310 EDT on June 27th, the New Hanover County deputy fire marshal was notified that the site fire alarm system was impacted by multiple power surges from lightning. Specifically, the electric fire pump, while operational, could not communicate with the fire system. A fire watch was initiated and repairs to the system began. The electric fire pump communication was restored at approximately 0745 EDT on June 28th. The deputy fire marshal was notified of communication restoration. Because the New Hanover County deputy fire marshal was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(c)."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

The licensee plans to notify the NRC Region 2 office and the state of North Carolina concerning this event report.

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"At 1222 CDT on 06/30/24, South Texas Project notified the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) and the National Response Center regarding an oil spill of 280 gallons to the ground inside the protected area. This event was recorded as TECQ Event number: 20242394 and Incident Response Center incident number: 1403420.

"The spill occurred due to the overflow of an oily waste sump. The influent to the sump was stopped. The spill was confined to a 15 feet by 15 feet area on the ground and did not enter any waterway.

"This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a notification to another government agency. This was determined to be reportable as required by 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi).

"There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC resident inspector has been notified."