Event Notification Report for June 05, 2024

STUCK SHUTTER

The following is a summary of information obtained from the licensee via phone:

The assistant radiation safety officer (ARSO) received a notification from their Tilden Mine site that a Ohmart Vega (model SH-F1B-0) containing 1 mCi of Cs-137 had a stuck open shutter. The ARSO is evaluating whether to contact Vega to schedule a technician to service the shutter or to amend their NRC license to allow them to service the shutter. The nuclear gauge is in a location inaccessible to personnel and there is no additional exposure risk to personnel or the public.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following is a synopsis of information provided by the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control (BRC) via email and phone:

At 1138 EDT, the radiation safety officer reported that a Troxler gauge was run over by construction equipment. The initial report was that the source did not retract as a result of the damage. The BRC inspector should be prepared to conduct contamination surveys for source leakage and provide guidance on transporting the damaged gauge safely.

Gauge Information
Make: Troxler
Activity: 8 mCi Cs-137, 40 mCi Am-241:Be

Florida Incident No.: FL24-039

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

The gauge was successfully retracted by the BRC inspector and there was no additional personnel exposure from the damaged gauge.


* * * UPDATE ON 5/31/2024 AT 1146 EDT FROM MONROE COOPER TO ERNEST WEST * * *

"A [BRC] inspector responded. The source rod was successfully retracted, contamination swipes were performed on the gauge, and a survey was performed at the location of the accident; no elevated swipes or readings were observed. The gauge was maintained by licensee who will be transporting it to Troxler for evaluation."

Notified R1DO (DeFrancisco) and NMSS Events via email

AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"At 0051 EDT on June 3, 2024, with Unit 3 in Mode 3 at 0 percent power, an actuation of the emergency feedwater system (EFW) occurred as main steam pressure was being lowered as part of reactor coolant system (RCS) cooldown for a planned shutdown. The reason for the EFW auto-start was lowering levels in the 3A and 3B steam generators following loss of the operating main feedwater pump. The main feedwater pump automatically tripped when main steam pressure was lowered below the automatic feedwater isolation system (AFIS) actuation setpoint before AFIS channels were taken to bypass. The 3A and 3B motor driven emergency feedwater pumps automatically started as designed when the 'low steam generator level' signal was received for the 3A and 3B steam generators.

"This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the EFW system.

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

EN Revision Imported Date: 6/6/2024

EN Revision Text: MANUAL REACTOR TRIP

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 1352 EDT, on June 4, 2024 with Unit 2 at 92 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a loss of condenser vacuum resulting from a circulating water pump trip. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post trip. Operations stabilized the plant in mode 3. Decay heat is being removed by steam discharge to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. St. Lucie Unit 1 was not affected and remains at 100 percent power.

"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER

The following information was provided by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection via email:

"While performing routine 6-month fixed gauge shutter checks, the licensee became aware of a shutter that was stuck partially open. The fixed gauge is located 20 feet above a platform and only accessible to licensee staff via scaffolding. No member of the public has access to this location.

"The shutter is currently in its normal open position. No maintenance activities are scheduled which would require closure of the shutter.

"The licensee has a contract with the manufacturer. They have scheduled them to assess this situation and make any necessary repairs."

Gauge information: Cs-137 sealed source in Ohmart/Vega holder SH-F2 (s/n 0361CG), max activity 300 mCi. Leak test conducted October 2023. No detectable leakage.

NJ Event ID Number: To Be Determined

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE.

The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via email:

"On May 30, 2024, the Department was notified by the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) that a Humboldt 5001 moisture density gauge was damaged at a temporary job site. The gauge contains a 40 millicurie americium-241 source and a 10 millicurie cesium-137 source. The RSO stated the technicians were standing next to the gauge waiting to perform a test when a drum compactor ran next to them and ran over the gauge. The gauge case was damaged. The cesium source operating rod was broken, but the cesium source remained fully shielded. The americium-241 source was still in its housing. Dose rates at the gauge were normal. No overexposures occurred due to the event. The gauge was returned to its storage location. The technicians contacted a service company to inspect and repair the gauge. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident Number: I-10108
Texas NMED Number: TX240016

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION EVENT

The following information was provided by the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control (BRC) via email and phone:

"On May 30, 2024, at 1710 [EDT], BRC received a notification from Cape Coral Fire [department] concerning a deceased individual's body 'exploding' while being cremated. The BRC received this notification because the deceased individual was known to have been receiving pancreatic cancer treatment. A notification was also received from the State watch office. The son of the deceased stated that he did not believe that the deceased had received treatment within the last two months, but he was unsure. Crematory staff stated that a large flame exited the bottom of the oven and they began to feel sick. A crematory employee stated that the body completed the cremation process in half the time expected. The Cape Coral Fire [department] responded. Background readings were observed at 3 micro R/hr and readings within the incident room registered at 10 micro R/hr. An inspector has been assigned by regional manager for immediate response."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

The contaminated areas have been isolated and locked until the inspector arrives.

Florida Incident Number: FL24-041

* * * UPDATE ON 5/31/2024 AT 1215 EDT FROM MONROE COOPER TO ERNEST WEST * * *

"The elevated [background] readings were identified as thorium in the bricks."

Notified R1DO (DeFrancisco) and NMSS Events via email.

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION DUE TO LOSS OF RPS POWER SUPPLY

The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email:

"On June 4, 2024, at 2141 PDT, with the unit in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor protection system (RPS) 'B' power supply unexpectedly de-energized which caused containment isolations to occur in reactor water clean up, equipment drains radioactive, floor drains radioactive, reactor recirculation, and traversing in-core probe systems. All actuations occurred as designed upon the partial loss of RPS power.

"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a major loss of emergency assessment capability due to the inability to assess primary containment identified and unidentified leakage rates. Emergency assessment capability was restored at 2204."

The NRC Senior Resident has been notified.

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 1648 EDT on 06/05/2024, with Unit 4 in Mode 1 at approximately 35 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to unexpected response of the turbine run back circuitry following a trip of main feedwater pump `C'. The trip was not complex, with all safety systems responding normally post-trip.

"Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam through the steam dumps to the main condenser and main feedwater is supplying the steam generators. Units 1, 2 and 3 are not affected.

"Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."