Event Notification Report for June 03, 2024

EN Revision Imported Date: 6/3/2024

EN Revision Text: INITIAL PART 21 REPORT - POTENTIAL DEFECT WITH CIRCUIT BREAKER

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"Pursuant to 10CFR 21.21 (a)(2), Paragon Energy Solutions, LLC is providing this interim notification of ongoing analysis for Part 21 reportability of a potential defect with a Schneider Electric Medium Voltage VR Type Circuit Breaker Part Number V5D4133Y000.

"On February 15, 2024, Paragon completed initial documentation of a potential defect with the subject circuit breaker in which Duke-Oconee had identified failure to close on demand or delayed operation to close with extended application of the remote closing signal. Since the primary safety function of the circuit breaker is to close and maintain continuity of power to downstream loads, failure to close could potentially contribute to a substantial safety hazard.

"This is the first reported instance of this failure mode, and Paragon suspects the issue to be related to aging of the circuit breaker's lubrication. Paragon requires more time to complete testing and analysis to confirm the failure mode and determine reportability.

"Date when evaluation is expected to be complete: 5/03/2024."

Affected licensee: Oconee. Paragon is currently evaluating the extent of condition as it pertains to other plants and equipment that may utilize the same or similar circuit breakers.

* * * UPDATE ON 05/02/24 FROM R. KNOTT TO T. HERRITY VIA EMAIL AND PHONE CALL * * *

Due to inconclusive results, the completion date of the testing is revised to 05/31/2024.

Notified R2DO (Miller) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors (email).

* * * UPDATE ON 5/31/2024 AT 1534 EDT FROM RICHARD KNOTT TO ERNEST WEST * * *

The following is a synopsis of the updated information received:

The only known affected licensee is Oconee. Paragon is evaluating if the issue pertains to other equipment or plants.

Paragon has conducted additional testing with the original equipment manufacturer, Schneider Electric, but will require more time to complete their evaluation. Evaluation is expected to be complete by 6/30/2024.

Other circuit breaker types that may be affected are:
5GSB2-250-1200 (uses KVR type element)
5GSB2-350-1200 (uses KVR type element)
5GSB3-350-1200 (uses KVR type element)
5GSB3-350-2000 (uses KVR type element)

Paragon recommends licensees with the breaker types listed above monitor for failure to close on demand or delayed. If any improper operation is found, report it to Paragon for evaluation.

Contact Information:
Richard Knott
Vice President Quality Assurance
Paragon Energy Solutions
817-284-0077
rknott@paragones.com

Notified R2DO (Franke) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors (email).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL EVENT

The following information was provided by Arizona Department of Health Services (the Department) via email:

"On May 23, 2024, the Department received notification from the licensee about a medical event involving Y-90 TheraSpheres that occurred on May 22, 2024. A patient was prescribed a dose of 1.304 GBq but was delivered 0.931 GBq, a percent dose delivered of 71.4 percent. The Department has requested additional information and continues to investigate the event.

"Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Arizona incident number: 24-007

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

MEDICAL TRANSPORT WITH CONTAMINATION

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At approximately 0430 [EDT] on May 30, 2024, conversion operators were performing a deionized (DI) water flush on the conversion line 3 decanter following completion of the acid wash. The DI water valve required closing on the conversion line 3 decanter platform to complete the evolution. In the process of completing this step on the decanter platform, an operator inadvertently stepped on a catch pan containing a small quantity of nitric acid. When the operator stepped on the pan, it flipped over causing nitric acid to splash onto the operator's leg. The nitric acid is added either manually to a bucket or by connecting a hose to the decanter system to perform the acid wash step. The nitric acid supply line for acid wash additions is isolated by a spring-loaded valve, and a catch pan is located underneath this segment of nitric acid piping to collect residual liquid drips and protect the decanter platform floor from corrosion.

"The operator was wearing the required personal protective equipment for the DI water flushing evolution.

"The operator immediately reported the exposure to a nearby coworker and was instructed to rinse the exposed skin. The skin area was rinsed for approximately twenty minutes.

"The incident commander and medical first responders from the Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility (CFFF) emergency brigade provided initial medical treatment. Health physics (HP) surveys detected contamination on the exposed area of the employee's skin. Direct survey results were 2700 dpm/100 cm squared alpha for the inner right thigh/knee area, 2000 dpm/100 cm squared for the inner right ankle and 800 dpm/100 cm squared alpha for the left hand. All smear survey results of the exposed skin area were below clean area limits (less than 200 dpm/100 cm squared). As a precaution to ensure comprehensive evaluation and treatment for nitric acid exposure to the skin, the operator was transported by ambulance to an offsite medical facility. Per procedure the employee's leg was wrapped in plastic, and the employee was accompanied by a CFFF HP technician for evaluation. Contamination surveys were performed in the ambulance and at the offsite medical facility and all results were below clean area limits indicating no spread of contamination during care for the employee. All potentially contaminated materials associated with the transport were collected and returned to the CFFF for disposal.

"All Conversion lines were inspected for extent of condition with pans or pales containing nitric acid. Containers with acid were emptied and valves in the vicinity of each decanter in conversion were inspected for leaks.

"The event did not exceed the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 as analyzed in the integrated safety analysis.

"This event did not impact safety equipment.

"A causal analysis and corrective actions will be documented in the corrective action program.

NRC Regional staff was notified.

EN Revision Imported Date: 6/7/2024

EN Revision Text: FITNESS FOR DUTY (FFD) REPORT

The following information was provided by the licensee via email and phone:

"On May 30, 2024, at 1200 CDT, South Texas Project (STP) FFD management identified from industry operating experience (OE) a programmatic failure, degradation, or discovered a vulnerability of the fitness for duty (FFD) program that may permit undetected drug or alcohol use or abuse by individuals within a protected area, or by individuals who are assigned to perform duties that require them to be subject to the FFD program. A review of the personnel in-processed and placed into the follow-up program by STP and external utilities since the implementation of the Illuminate software (07/31/2023) was completed. The issue affecting individuals placed into the follow-up program by external utilities was bound to in-processing of individuals [between] 02/22/2024 and 04/09/2024. One other individual processed in November of 2023, was also affected by this event. This event did not impact STP personnel that were either placed or had an existing record in the follow-up program. Compensatory measures were implemented and an extent of condition review was completed.

"This is a 24-hour reportable event per 10 CFR 26.719(b)(4)."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP

The following information was provided by the licensee via email and phone:

"On May 30, 2024, at 1949 EDT, Unit 1 automatically tripped from 100 percent power due to an electrical fault on the 'B' unit auxiliary transformer. The unit has been stabilized in mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. The reactor trip was uncomplicated and all control rods fully inserted into the core. This reactor protection system actuation is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Decay heat is being removed by the condenser steam dump system and Unit 1 is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or personnel."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"Surry Unit 1 reactor automatically tripped at 1708 EDT on 6/2/24 due to a turbine trip [with the reactor operating at greater than 10 percent reactor power].

"The turbine control system is currently under investigation. Reactor coolant temperature is being maintained via main steam dumps with main feedwater supplying the steam generators.

"All systems operated as required. The trip was uncomplicated and all control rods fully inserted into the core. There was no emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or auxiliary feedwater system actuation. Offsite power remains available. There is no impact to Surry Unit 2.

"This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for 4-hour notification of reactor protection system activation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

"There were no radiation releases, personnel injuries, or contamination events due to this event."