Event Notification Report for March 11, 2024

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER

The following was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via email:

"On March 11, 2024, the Department was notified by the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) that an event at the facility resulted in molten metal being spewed out from the furnace. Some of the molten metal landed on the housing cover of a Berthold LB 300 gauge containing a 2.5 curie (original activity 3 years ago) source. The licensee was able to remove the cover and inspected the gauge. The licensee found that some of the molten metal had leaked on to the shutter operator for the gauge, preventing the shutter from closing. The RSO stated they were able to remove the gauge from the vessel and place in a storage area. The RSO stated the room has been locked and posted to prevent inadvertent entry. The RSO stated they had performed radiation surveys outside the storage room and readings obtained were less than 2 millirem per hour. The RSO stated no individual received any radiation exposure that would have exceeded any limit. The RSO stated they have contacted a service provider to repair the gauge. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident No.: 10094

Texas NMED No.: TX240009

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING SOURCE

The following information was received from the Wisconsin Department of Health Services (the State) via email:

"On March 11, 2024, a contracted service provider was on-site to dispose of 6 sources housed in a Kevex Model 6700 Analyst. It is a 2000 Series Spectrometer, Serial Number A011E, Bench Number 5026. The Analyst [device], has been in the possession of the scrap facility for at least a decade but was never utilized. The device was identified in November 2023, as a device which contained radioactive material. At that point the State was notified, and plans were initiated to dispose of the material. The State was unable to determine who previously possessed the device, or to whom it was initially distributed.

"The device should have contained 3 Cd-109 pellets of 7 mCi each, and 3 Am-241 pellets of 7 mCi, each. The source serial number indicated on the labeling is 4047, Model 0202. The assay date was December 1, 1992. When the service provider disassembled the device to reach the source housing, no sources were present within the device. The service provider performed confirmatory surveys to ensure that no sources were present. Apparently, the sources were removed prior to the scrap yard receiving the device.

"Without knowing the provenance of the device, it is unclear whether the sources were ever properly disposed of, therefore, it is being reported as missing material."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"On March 11, 2024, at 1337 EDT, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 35 percent power performing power ascension activities, the reactor was manually tripped due to the 'A' reactor feed pump (RFP) tripping on low suction pressure. Due to the power level at the time, the 'B' RFP had not been placed in service. Closure of containment isolation valves (CIVs) in multiple systems and actuation of high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) occurred as a result of reaching the actuation setpoint on reactor water level as designed. The trip was not complex, with all safety systems responding normally post-trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. The 'B' RFP was placed in service and is controlling reactor water level. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using turbine bypass valves. Unit 2 is not affected.

"Due to the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) discharging into the reactor, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A). Also, the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Additionally, it is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of CIVs, RCIC and HPCI.

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC resident inspector has been notified."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

The cause of the 'A' RFP is under investigation. The reactor electric plant remains in a normal lineup with both emergency diesel generators available. There were no temperature or pressure technical specification limits approached.