Event Notification Report for March 08, 2024

AGREEMENT STATE - STUCK SHUTTER

The following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via phone and email:

"The radiation safety officer (RSO) for INspec Ethylene Oxide and Specialities (INEOS), IL-01337-01, contacted the Agency on 2/28/24, to advise that a fixed gauge was found to have a shutter stuck in the `open' position. The impacted gauge is a Ronan Engineering model X90-SA1-F37, serial number M7388 containing 40 mCi of Cs-137. The device shutter is normally in the `open' position and was only found to be `stuck' during the routine six-month shutter checks. It had likely been in this condition for at least six months. The product vessel that it faces is full of commodity and will remain full for the foreseeable future. Aside from being full of commodity, the vessel is also equipped with locking mechanisms preventing any personnel access.

"Agency staff will be on site in the coming weeks."

NMED Item Number: IL240006

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following summary of information was provided by the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control [the Bureau] via email:

On March 1, 2024, at 1121 EST, the Bureau received a call from Universal Engineering Scientists to report that a Troxler gauge (Model: 3430P, Serial: 86000, 8 mCi Cs-137, 40 mCi Am-241:Be) was run over on a work site. The Cs-137 source rod was extended 12 inches into the ground. The licensee radiation safety officer (RSO) responded and determined that the source rod could not to be retracted. The gauge was placed in a container and shielded for transport to a storage facility in Port St. Lucie where it will be held for evaluation.

The Bureau inspector has been notified and will respond.

Florida Incident No.: FL24-015

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"On March 6, 2024, at 1635 PST, with Columbia Generating Station operating at 100 percent power in Mode 1, there was a malfunction in the halogenation/dehalogenation system. This system is used for continuous control of the biological growth in the circulating water and plant service water systems as well as to prevent discharge of halogens to the Columbia River during continuous blowdown. The result of this malfunction was exceeding the established limits of 0.1 milligrams/liter (mg/L) for total residual halogen (TRH) in the station's national pollutant discharge elimination system (NPDES) permit. At the time of discovery, the local indication for TRH was 3.20 mg/L. This was confirmed via a local grab sample. This maximum daily effluent limit is the highest allowable daily discharge, measured during a calendar day. The station NPDES permit requires notification to the Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council (EFSEC).

"The automatic isolation function of the system failed to isolate the continuous blowdown line as did the emergency trip push button. The system was manually secured, and the continuous blowdown line to the Columbia River was isolated. The cause of the issue is under investigation.

"Notification was made to EFSEC on March 6, 2024, at 2303 PST. This event is being reported as a four hour report made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) due to a "News Release or Notification of Other Government Agency" related to protection of the environment.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION VIOLATION

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"On March 7, 2024, at 1142 PST, an operator trainee operating the reactor under the direction of a licensed operator initiated a planned manual scram. Following the planned manual scram, the licensed operator did not switch the console switch to 'off' or remove the key from the console. The reactor did not meet the definition of 'reactor secured' and thus the staffing requirements of technical specification 6.1.3 were still required to be met. The licensed operator then left the control room, securing the door on their way out. At 1200 PST, a licensed senior reactor operator (SRO) entered the control room and found the key in the console with the switch in the 'operate' position. This SRO placed the switch in the 'off' position, secured the key, logged the action, and notified the Director. Throughout the duration of the event, all control rods were fully inserted."

Project Manager (Wertz) will be contacted. Oregon Department of Energy and the Oregon Radiation Protection Services will be notified.