Event Notification Report for February 20, 2024

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST SOURCE

The following information was received from the Georgia Radioactive Material Program via email:

"On or about 9/21/23, a Filtec model FT-50C, containing 100 mCi of Am-241, was mistakenly placed into a scrap dumpster on-site by an employee of Shasta Beverages, Inc. The gauge was taken off-site in the scrap dumpster by a scrap collection company. The scrap company is unsure of which of two locations the dumpster was taken, a recycling facility or a scrap yard. This report serves as initial notification and will be followed up with additional information."

Georgia Incident Number: 78

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

DAMAGED DENSITY GAUGE

The following is a synopsis of information provided by the licensee via phone call:

At about 0830 CST, 02/12/24, a Troxler Density Gauge was damaged by a bulldozer at a construction site in Kansas City, MO near the corner of 101st Street & Lister Road. The rod was broken off, but the sources were shielded and appeared to be intact and undamaged. Testing samples for leakage were taken and results are pending.

Source information: Serial Number 77-18042,cesium (Cs-137), 8 mCi (0.306 GBq). Serial Number 78-13106, americium-beryllium (Am-241Be), 40 mCi (1.48 GBq).

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE - MISSING MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following synopsis of information was provided the State of New Mexico via phone:

Sometime during the overnight hours between 02/10/24 and 02/11/24, a rollover accident occurred on Interstate 25 within Albuquerque, NM. Following the accident, an Instrotek moisture density gauge (serial number 4578) containing 11 mCi of cesium (Cs-137) and 44 mCi of americium-beryllium (Am-241Be) could not be located at the scene.

Local law enforcement responded to the accident and filed a report. The driver was transported to a hospital and was in stable condition.

More information will be provided as it is obtained.

* * * UPDATE ON 2/13/24 AT 1038 EST FROM VICTOR DIAZ TO ADAM KOZIOL * * *

The licensee provided a follow-up report on this incident. The driver of the vehicle is still in the hospital and was unable to confirm the presence of the gauge in the truck prior to the accident. Based on the gauge and other test equipment missing at the crash site, the licensee suspects that it may have been stolen prior to the accident. The last confirmed location of the gauge was at Isleta Resort and Casino (Pueblo of Isleta, Federal Reservation).

Notified R4DO (Vossmar), ILTAB (email), NMSS Events (email), and CNSNS (email)

* * * UPDATE ON 02/13/24 AT 1812 EST FROM VICTOR DIAZ TO NATALIE STARFISH * * *

The following update was provided by the New Mexico Radiation Control Bureau (the Bureau) via email:

"The licensee reported on 02/13/24 at 1603 MST, the density moisture gauge was recovered. The licensee will provide a written report to the Bureau at their earliest opportunity.

"The damage was to the transportation box, the gauge is being leak tested, and the gauge handle was still in the locked [safe] position."

Notified R4DO (Vossmar), and NMSS Events Notification, ILTAB (MacDonald), CNSNS (Mexico) via email.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE - SHUTTER STUCK OPEN

The following information was provided by the Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection (DEP) via email:

"On January 18, 2024, the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) was completing shutter checks and leak tests on a Berthold fixed gauge, model number: LB-300 W, serial number 1744-11-14 containing sealed source number P-2608-100 with 8 millicuries of Co-60. During the checks, the shutter's shear pin broke, and the RSO was unable to close the shutter. The vessel that this gauge is on is not entered very often and is not readily accessible. A licensed contractor will be on site on February 13 - 14, 2024, to repair the gauge. If they are not able to repair the gauge on-site, the gauge will be placed in storage until it can be sent for repair. The DEP has been in contact with the licensee."

PA event report ID: PA240004

AUTOMATIC TURBINE TRIP/REACTOR TRIP

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 0247 CST on 2/15/2024, Callaway Plant was in mode 1 at approximately 100 percent power when a turbine trip and reactor trip occurred. All safety systems responded as expected with the exception of an indication issue on the feedwater isolation valves, which were confirmed closed. A valid feedwater isolation signal and auxiliary feedwater actuation signal were also received as a result of the reactor trip. The plant is being maintained stable in mode 3.

"All control rods fully inserted from the reactor trip signal and decay heat is being removed via the auxiliary feedwater system and steam dumps.

"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."

ACTUATION OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR SYSTEM

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 2224 EST on February 15, 2024, with both units 1 and 2 in mode 1 at 100 percent power, an actuation of the emergency diesel generator (EDG) system on 1A-A, 1B-B, and 2B-B EDGs occurred while removing clearances. The 2A-A EDG did not start because it was still under a clearance. The reason for the emergency diesel generator system auto-start was clearance removal sequencing errors. The emergency diesel generator system automatically started as designed when the common emergency start signal was received.

"This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the emergency diesel generator system.

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP AND AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 0048 CST on February 16, 2024, with Unit 2 in mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a loss of 2A 125V DC distribution panel. The trip was complex due to the loss of components associated with A-train DC power.

"Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the atmospheric relief valves. Unit 1 is not affected.

"An automatic actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW) occurred due to low-low steam generator levels. The AFW auto-start is an expected response with low-low steam generator levels from the reactor trip. AFW is still currently controlling steam generator levels.

"Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the AFW System.

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT DEGRADED

The following information was provided by the licensee via email and phone call:

"At 0837 EST, on 02/17/2024, during a refueling outage at 0 percent power while performing local leak rate testing (LLRT) on the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) isolation valves, which is part of the containment boundary, it was determined that the Unit 1 primary containment leakage rate did not meet 10 CFR 50 Appendix J requirements specified in Technical Specification 5.5.12. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

FITNESS FOR DUTY

The following is a synopsis of information was provided by the licensee via email and phone call:

A non-licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive during a random fitness for duty test. The supervisor's access to the plant has been terminated.

AUTOMATIC START OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"At approximately 2325 EST on February 18, 2024, with Unit 1 in Mode 5 at 0 percent power and Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, emergency diesel generator 2 automatically started due to the unexpected loss of AC power to emergency bus E2 during a planned transfer of E2 DC control power from normal to alternate for the 1B-1 battery. In addition, the unexpected loss of AC power to E2 resulted in Unit 1 primary containment isolation system (PCIS) partial Group 2 (i.e., drywell equipment and floor drain, residual heat removal (RHR), discharge to radioactive waste, and RHR process sample), Group 6 (i.e., containment atmosphere control/dilution, containment atmosphere monitoring, and post accident sampling systems), and partial Group 10 (i.e., air isolation to the drywell) isolations.

"Emergency diesel generator 2 automatically started and re-energized the E2 bus as designed when the loss of E2 signal was received. The PCIS actuations were as expected for the outage plant line up on Unit 1 at the time. The cause of the loss of electrical power to emergency bus E2 is under investigation at this time.

"This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of emergency diesel generator 2 and PCIS.

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."


The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

This event will be entered into the plant's corrective action program.

EN Revision Imported Date: 2/20/2024

EN Revision Text: AUTOMATIC START OF 'B' EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"On February 19, 2024, at 0236 EST, with VC Summer Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, an actuation of the `B' emergency diesel generator (EDG) occurred. The reason for the `B' EDG auto-start was the trip of 1 `DB' normal incoming breaker. The `B' EDG automatically started as designed when the undervoltage signal was received. The `B' emergency feedwater pump started due to the undervoltage signal and ran for approximately 1 minute and was secured by operations per procedure. Other plant equipment and systems also responded as expected. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the `B' EDG and a valid actuation of the `B' emergency feedwater pump. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

"The `A' Emergency Diesel Generator was tagged out for maintenance earlier in the shift, but maintenance has not started. The plan is to restore the `A' emergency diesel generator to an operable status and investigate the cause of the 1 `DB' normal incoming breaker trip."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

This event resulted in the plant entering a 12 hour limiting condition for operation (LCO) in accordance with technical specification (TS) 3.8.1.1.C. due to having one operable EDG and a loss of offsite power.

LOSS OF REACTOR BUILDING VENTILATION

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 1045 EST, on 2/19/2024, during a maintenance activity, a loss of all reactor building ventilation occurred on Unit 2. With no flow past the ventilation radiation monitors, the radiation monitors were inoperable to support their ability to perform primary and secondary containment isolation functions or start the standby gas treatment system. Reactor building ventilation was restored within 15 minutes. Due to this inoperability, the radiation monitor system was in a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

"The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified."