Event Notification Report for February 16, 2024
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/15/2024 - 02/16/2024
Part 21
Event Number: 57034
Rep Org: Alpha-Omega Services
Licensee: Alpha- Omega Services
Region: 4
City: Bellflower State: CA
County:
License #: PXB6.18
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Troy Hedger
HQ OPS Officer: Karen Cotton-Gross
Licensee: Alpha- Omega Services
Region: 4
City: Bellflower State: CA
County:
License #: PXB6.18
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Troy Hedger
HQ OPS Officer: Karen Cotton-Gross
Notification Date: 03/18/2024
Notification Time: 13:15 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2024
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 03/18/2024
Notification Time: 13:15 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2024
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 03/18/2024
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - Defects And Noncompliance
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - Defects And Noncompliance
Person (Organization):
Gepford, Heather (R4DO)
Part 21 Materials, - (EMAIL)
Ford, Monica (R1DO)
Gepford, Heather (R4DO)
Part 21 Materials, - (EMAIL)
Ford, Monica (R1DO)
PART 21 - FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH TESTING REQUIREMENTS
The following is a summary of the information provided by Alpha -Omega Services (AOS) via email:
During shipment of an Alpha Omega Services (AOS)-100A-0003 cask, a metallic seal was used instead of an elastomeric seal. The failure to comply, discovered February 16, 2024, is that the testing requirements for the metallic seal were not properly followed. The shipment arrived without incident.
The storage location of the active unit is Merritt Island, FL. The failure to comply is an isolated incident affecting one AOS-100A package which is certified and is currently in service. The remaining units are not in service.
AOS has initiated a corrective action plan that will identify the issue, begin the internal investigation process to determine the cause, and identify any additional corrective actions. This investigation is currently in progress.
The following is a summary of the information provided by Alpha -Omega Services (AOS) via email:
During shipment of an Alpha Omega Services (AOS)-100A-0003 cask, a metallic seal was used instead of an elastomeric seal. The failure to comply, discovered February 16, 2024, is that the testing requirements for the metallic seal were not properly followed. The shipment arrived without incident.
The storage location of the active unit is Merritt Island, FL. The failure to comply is an isolated incident affecting one AOS-100A package which is certified and is currently in service. The remaining units are not in service.
AOS has initiated a corrective action plan that will identify the issue, begin the internal investigation process to determine the cause, and identify any additional corrective actions. This investigation is currently in progress.
Agreement State
Event Number: 56979
Rep Org: Virginia Rad Materials Program
Licensee: Zannino Engineering
Region: 1
City: Chester State: VA
County: Chesterfield
License #: 087-448-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Sheila Nelson
HQ OPS Officer: Thomas Herrity
Licensee: Zannino Engineering
Region: 1
City: Chester State: VA
County: Chesterfield
License #: 087-448-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Sheila Nelson
HQ OPS Officer: Thomas Herrity
Notification Date: 02/19/2024
Notification Time: 14:16 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2024
Event Time: 17:43 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/19/2024
Notification Time: 14:16 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2024
Event Time: 17:43 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/19/2024
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Bickett, Carey (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Bickett, Carey (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED TROXLER GAUGE
The following was received from the the Virginia Office of Radiological Health, Radioactive Materials Program via email:
"At approximately 1743 EST, on 2/16/2024, the Virginia Office of Radiological Health was notified of an incident involving a portable nuclear gauge. At approximately 1600 EST, a Troxler gauge; Model 3430, containing 8 mCi of Cs-137 and 40 mCi of Am-241:Be, was struck by a dump truck on a building construction site located in Chester, VA. The authorized user notified the radiation safety officer (RSO) who arrived on site and then he notified the Virginia Emergency Management's Operations Center at approximately 1630 EST.
"Per the RSO, the gauge was sitting on soil with the source in the retracted, shielded position when it was run over by a dump truck. The source remained in the shielded position, but the handle was bent slightly. He did not attempt to turn it on or extend the rod for any reason. He obtained survey readings of 2.5 mR/h at 12 inches and 0.1 mR/h at 3 feet from the gauge. The gauge was placed in its transportation box, secured in the back of a pickup truck, and transported back to the licensee's office for secure storage. The gauge will be sent to the manufacturer for assessment.
"The Radioactive Materials Program will follow up with an investigation."
Virginia Report Number: VA240002
The following was received from the the Virginia Office of Radiological Health, Radioactive Materials Program via email:
"At approximately 1743 EST, on 2/16/2024, the Virginia Office of Radiological Health was notified of an incident involving a portable nuclear gauge. At approximately 1600 EST, a Troxler gauge; Model 3430, containing 8 mCi of Cs-137 and 40 mCi of Am-241:Be, was struck by a dump truck on a building construction site located in Chester, VA. The authorized user notified the radiation safety officer (RSO) who arrived on site and then he notified the Virginia Emergency Management's Operations Center at approximately 1630 EST.
"Per the RSO, the gauge was sitting on soil with the source in the retracted, shielded position when it was run over by a dump truck. The source remained in the shielded position, but the handle was bent slightly. He did not attempt to turn it on or extend the rod for any reason. He obtained survey readings of 2.5 mR/h at 12 inches and 0.1 mR/h at 3 feet from the gauge. The gauge was placed in its transportation box, secured in the back of a pickup truck, and transported back to the licensee's office for secure storage. The gauge will be sent to the manufacturer for assessment.
"The Radioactive Materials Program will follow up with an investigation."
Virginia Report Number: VA240002
Agreement State
Event Number: 56973
Rep Org: Texas Dept of State Health Services
Licensee: Uni of TX MD Anderson Cancer Center
Region: 4
City: Houston State: TX
County:
License #: L00466
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Arthur Tucker
HQ OPS Officer: Sam Colvard
Licensee: Uni of TX MD Anderson Cancer Center
Region: 4
City: Houston State: TX
County:
License #: L00466
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Arthur Tucker
HQ OPS Officer: Sam Colvard
Notification Date: 02/16/2024
Notification Time: 18:10 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2024
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/21/2024
Notification Time: 18:10 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2024
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/21/2024
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Vossmar, Patricia (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Vossmar, Patricia (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE - SHUTTER STUCK IN SHIELDED POSITION
The following information was provided by Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via email:
"On February 16, 2024, the Department was contacted by the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) that the source in a Mark 1 irradiator could not be raised or lowered. The device contains a 10,000-curie cesium-137 source (original activity manufactured 6/25/1986). The source problem was discovered when a researcher was attempting to irradiate a few mice and the source would not raise. The RSO stated they inspected the device and found a fuse that controlled the source's movement both up and down had failed. The RSO stated they had contacted a service company to repair the device. The source is in the fully shielded position. No individuals received any exposure due to this event. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas NMED number: TX240006
The following information was provided by Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via email:
"On February 16, 2024, the Department was contacted by the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) that the source in a Mark 1 irradiator could not be raised or lowered. The device contains a 10,000-curie cesium-137 source (original activity manufactured 6/25/1986). The source problem was discovered when a researcher was attempting to irradiate a few mice and the source would not raise. The RSO stated they inspected the device and found a fuse that controlled the source's movement both up and down had failed. The RSO stated they had contacted a service company to repair the device. The source is in the fully shielded position. No individuals received any exposure due to this event. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas NMED number: TX240006
Power Reactor
Event Number: 56971
Facility: Farley
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: Josh Pritchett
HQ OPS Officer: Bill Gott
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: Josh Pritchett
HQ OPS Officer: Bill Gott
Notification Date: 02/16/2024
Notification Time: 05:34 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2024
Event Time: 05:34 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/16/2024
Notification Time: 05:34 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2024
Event Time: 05:34 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/16/2024
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
Person (Organization):
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP AND AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 0048 CST on February 16, 2024, with Unit 2 in mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a loss of 2A 125V DC distribution panel. The trip was complex due to the loss of components associated with A-train DC power.
"Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the atmospheric relief valves. Unit 1 is not affected.
"An automatic actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW) occurred due to low-low steam generator levels. The AFW auto-start is an expected response with low-low steam generator levels from the reactor trip. AFW is still currently controlling steam generator levels.
"Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the AFW System.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 0048 CST on February 16, 2024, with Unit 2 in mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a loss of 2A 125V DC distribution panel. The trip was complex due to the loss of components associated with A-train DC power.
"Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the atmospheric relief valves. Unit 1 is not affected.
"An automatic actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW) occurred due to low-low steam generator levels. The AFW auto-start is an expected response with low-low steam generator levels from the reactor trip. AFW is still currently controlling steam generator levels.
"Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the AFW System.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."