Event Notification Report for January 29, 2024
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/28/2024 - 01/29/2024
Power Reactor
Event Number: 56936
Facility: Peach Bottom
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Eli Digon
HQ OPS Officer: Natalie Starfish
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Eli Digon
HQ OPS Officer: Natalie Starfish
Notification Date: 01/29/2024
Notification Time: 13:32 [ET]
Event Date: 01/29/2024
Event Time: 12:02 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/01/2024
Notification Time: 13:32 [ET]
Event Date: 01/29/2024
Event Time: 12:02 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/01/2024
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
Person (Organization):
Dentel, Glenn (R1DO)
Dentel, Glenn (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
EN Revision Imported Date: 2/1/2024
EN Revision Text: AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At approximately 1202 EST on 01/29/24, unit 2 experienced a reactor scram caused by a main turbine trip. Investigation is still ongoing."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
All control rods were fully inserted. The licensee indicated that the turbine trip may have been caused by a power load imbalance, however the cause of the incident is under investigation. The scram was not complex.
Decay heat is currently being removed thru bypass valves dumping to the main condenser. Initially unit 2 lost the use of the bypass valves due to lack of condenser vacuum. Unit 2 used the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system in the condenser storage tank (CST) to CST mode to remove decay heat. Residual heat removal was used to keep the torus cool. Condenser vacuum was regained and unit 2 is back to removing decay heat with the turbine bypass valves.
There was no impact to unit 3.
The licensee confirmed there was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * *UPDATE ON 01/29/24 AT 1935 EST FROM PAUL BOKUS TO NATALIE STARFISH* * *
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
Licensee adds 8-hour non-emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) specified system actuation report to original 4-hour non-emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS Actuation report.
"At approximately 1202 EST on 01/29/24, unit 2 experienced a reactor scram by a main turbine trip. All control rods inserted. Reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC) was manually initiated for level control. HPCI was manually initiated for pressure control. Primary containment isolation system (PCIS) Group II and III isolations occurred [specified system actuation]. Investigation is ongoing."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
EN Revision Text: AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At approximately 1202 EST on 01/29/24, unit 2 experienced a reactor scram caused by a main turbine trip. Investigation is still ongoing."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
All control rods were fully inserted. The licensee indicated that the turbine trip may have been caused by a power load imbalance, however the cause of the incident is under investigation. The scram was not complex.
Decay heat is currently being removed thru bypass valves dumping to the main condenser. Initially unit 2 lost the use of the bypass valves due to lack of condenser vacuum. Unit 2 used the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system in the condenser storage tank (CST) to CST mode to remove decay heat. Residual heat removal was used to keep the torus cool. Condenser vacuum was regained and unit 2 is back to removing decay heat with the turbine bypass valves.
There was no impact to unit 3.
The licensee confirmed there was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * *UPDATE ON 01/29/24 AT 1935 EST FROM PAUL BOKUS TO NATALIE STARFISH* * *
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
Licensee adds 8-hour non-emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) specified system actuation report to original 4-hour non-emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS Actuation report.
"At approximately 1202 EST on 01/29/24, unit 2 experienced a reactor scram by a main turbine trip. All control rods inserted. Reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC) was manually initiated for level control. HPCI was manually initiated for pressure control. Primary containment isolation system (PCIS) Group II and III isolations occurred [specified system actuation]. Investigation is ongoing."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 56938
Facility: Grand Gulf
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: Joshua Hubbard
HQ OPS Officer: Natalie Starfish
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: Joshua Hubbard
HQ OPS Officer: Natalie Starfish
Notification Date: 01/29/2024
Notification Time: 16:56 [ET]
Event Date: 01/29/2024
Event Time: 10:05 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/29/2024
Notification Time: 16:56 [ET]
Event Date: 01/29/2024
Event Time: 10:05 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/29/2024
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
Person (Organization):
Agrawal, Ami (R4DO)
Agrawal, Ami (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY FAILURE
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 1005 CST on January 29, 2024, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station was conducting surveillance testing on the high pressure core spray system. During testing, the 1E22F012 minimum flow valve failed to return to the full closed position. The valve went from full open indication to dual indication.
"The event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition which could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.
"Troubleshooting is in progress.
"The NRC Senior Resident has been notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
All off-site power is available. No other systems are out of service and there are no compensatory measures taken. There is no increase to plant risk.
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 1005 CST on January 29, 2024, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station was conducting surveillance testing on the high pressure core spray system. During testing, the 1E22F012 minimum flow valve failed to return to the full closed position. The valve went from full open indication to dual indication.
"The event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition which could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.
"Troubleshooting is in progress.
"The NRC Senior Resident has been notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
All off-site power is available. No other systems are out of service and there are no compensatory measures taken. There is no increase to plant risk.