Event Notification Report for December 20, 2023
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/19/2023 - 12/20/2023
Power Reactor
Event Number: 56896
Facility: Hatch
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: David Hutto
HQ OPS Officer: Dan Livermore
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: David Hutto
HQ OPS Officer: Dan Livermore
Notification Date: 12/18/2023
Notification Time: 07:40 [ET]
Event Date: 12/18/2023
Event Time: 02:23 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/18/2023
Notification Time: 07:40 [ET]
Event Date: 12/18/2023
Event Time: 02:23 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/18/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
Person (Organization):
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM INOPERABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee email:
"At 0223 EST, on 12/18/2023, while Unit 2 was at 100 percent power in mode 1, the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) outboard steam isolation valve closed resulting in the HPCI system being declared inoperable. The cause of the outboard steam isolation valve closing is under investigation. HPCI does not have a redundant system, therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The safety function was restored at 0512, on 12/18/23, and HPCI has been declared operable. Reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) and low pressure emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) were operable during this time.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following information was provided by the licensee email:
"At 0223 EST, on 12/18/2023, while Unit 2 was at 100 percent power in mode 1, the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) outboard steam isolation valve closed resulting in the HPCI system being declared inoperable. The cause of the outboard steam isolation valve closing is under investigation. HPCI does not have a redundant system, therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The safety function was restored at 0512, on 12/18/23, and HPCI has been declared operable. Reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) and low pressure emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) were operable during this time.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 56897
Facility: Hatch
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: David Hutto
HQ OPS Officer: Ian Howard
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: David Hutto
HQ OPS Officer: Ian Howard
Notification Date: 12/18/2023
Notification Time: 13:34 [ET]
Event Date: 11/01/2023
Event Time: 20:11 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/18/2023
Notification Time: 13:34 [ET]
Event Date: 11/01/2023
Event Time: 20:11 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/18/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - Invalid Specif System Actuation
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - Invalid Specif System Actuation
Person (Organization):
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 100 | Power Operation |
60 DAY NOTIFICATION FOR AN INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
The following information was provided by the licensee via email and phone:
"At 2011 EDT on 11/01/23, with Unit 2 in Mode 3 at 0 percent power, Unit 2 received multiple spurious actuations. These actuations consisted of a partial group 1 and a partial group 5 primary containment isolation and a partial secondary containment isolation. The partial Group 1 isolation resulted in the closure of two main steam isolation valves (MSIVs); all other MSIVs were already closed. The partial group 5 isolation auto closed one of the reactor water cleanup (RWCU) isolation valves. The partial secondary containment isolation resulted in the closure of the inboard refueling floor and reactor building secondary containment isolation valves (SCIVs).
"Additionally, at 2238 EDT, Unit 2 again received multiple spurious actuations. These actuations consisted of a partial group 5 primary containment isolation and a partial secondary containment isolation. The partial group 5 isolation auto closed one of the RWCU isolation valves The partial secondary containment isolation resulted in the closure of the inboard refueling floor and reactor building SCIVs.
"And again, at 2354 EDT, Unit 2 received spurious actuations which consisted of a partial secondary containment isolation which resulted in the closure of the inboard refueling floor and reactor building SCIVs.
"The spurious actuations seen on 11/1/23 are triggered at -35 inches reactor water level (RWL) for group 5 and secondary containment isolations and at -101 inches RWL for group 1 isolations. It was determined that a combination of the RWL fluctuating above and below the wide range instrument reference leg tap, the reactor vessel pressure being lowered, and reactor core isolation cooling introducing colder water conditions near the reference leg tap of the wide range instrument caused the spurious actuations. Using multiple RWL indications for each of the instances mentioned above, the actuations were confirmed to be spurious as RWL was being controlled in a band of +55 inches to +85 inches at the time of the actuations.
"This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in an invalid actuation of a partial group 1, a partial group 5, and partial secondary containment logic."
The NRC Resident has been notified.
The following information was provided by the licensee via email and phone:
"At 2011 EDT on 11/01/23, with Unit 2 in Mode 3 at 0 percent power, Unit 2 received multiple spurious actuations. These actuations consisted of a partial group 1 and a partial group 5 primary containment isolation and a partial secondary containment isolation. The partial Group 1 isolation resulted in the closure of two main steam isolation valves (MSIVs); all other MSIVs were already closed. The partial group 5 isolation auto closed one of the reactor water cleanup (RWCU) isolation valves. The partial secondary containment isolation resulted in the closure of the inboard refueling floor and reactor building secondary containment isolation valves (SCIVs).
"Additionally, at 2238 EDT, Unit 2 again received multiple spurious actuations. These actuations consisted of a partial group 5 primary containment isolation and a partial secondary containment isolation. The partial group 5 isolation auto closed one of the RWCU isolation valves The partial secondary containment isolation resulted in the closure of the inboard refueling floor and reactor building SCIVs.
"And again, at 2354 EDT, Unit 2 received spurious actuations which consisted of a partial secondary containment isolation which resulted in the closure of the inboard refueling floor and reactor building SCIVs.
"The spurious actuations seen on 11/1/23 are triggered at -35 inches reactor water level (RWL) for group 5 and secondary containment isolations and at -101 inches RWL for group 1 isolations. It was determined that a combination of the RWL fluctuating above and below the wide range instrument reference leg tap, the reactor vessel pressure being lowered, and reactor core isolation cooling introducing colder water conditions near the reference leg tap of the wide range instrument caused the spurious actuations. Using multiple RWL indications for each of the instances mentioned above, the actuations were confirmed to be spurious as RWL was being controlled in a band of +55 inches to +85 inches at the time of the actuations.
"This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in an invalid actuation of a partial group 1, a partial group 5, and partial secondary containment logic."
The NRC Resident has been notified.
Non-Power Reactor
Event Number: 56898
Rep Org: Texas A&M University (TAMN)
Licensee: Texas A&M University
Region: 0
City: College Station State: TX
County: Brazos
License #: R-83
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000128
NRC Notified By: Jere Jenkins
HQ OPS Officer: Natalie Starfish
Licensee: Texas A&M University
Region: 0
City: College Station State: TX
County: Brazos
License #: R-83
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000128
NRC Notified By: Jere Jenkins
HQ OPS Officer: Natalie Starfish
Notification Date: 12/19/2023
Notification Time: 16:15 [ET]
Event Date: 12/15/2023
Event Time: 11:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/19/2023
Notification Time: 16:15 [ET]
Event Date: 12/15/2023
Event Time: 11:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/19/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
Holly Cruz (NRR)
Andrew Waugh (NRR)
Holly Cruz (NRR)
Andrew Waugh (NRR)
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS VIOLATION
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At approximately 1100 CST on December 15, 2023, the facility was discovered to be in violation of a Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) according to Technical Specification 3.3.2.2, which requires that the static pressure measurement in the confinement exhaust system measure -0.1 inches of water or less during operation. It was discovered that this plant variable was not tied to the PANALARM trip for 'Building Pressure', nor was the sensor output value available in the control room to be checked by operators. The PANALARM trip for 'Building Pressure' was set to a different variable not related to the LCO required value. This condition has existed since 2006.
"The reactor was not in operation at the time of the discovery, and the situation creating this LCO violation is being corrected prior to the next reactor startup."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
The issue was discovered by the vendor when a controller board was being replaced after damage from a power outage.
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At approximately 1100 CST on December 15, 2023, the facility was discovered to be in violation of a Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) according to Technical Specification 3.3.2.2, which requires that the static pressure measurement in the confinement exhaust system measure -0.1 inches of water or less during operation. It was discovered that this plant variable was not tied to the PANALARM trip for 'Building Pressure', nor was the sensor output value available in the control room to be checked by operators. The PANALARM trip for 'Building Pressure' was set to a different variable not related to the LCO required value. This condition has existed since 2006.
"The reactor was not in operation at the time of the discovery, and the situation creating this LCO violation is being corrected prior to the next reactor startup."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
The issue was discovered by the vendor when a controller board was being replaced after damage from a power outage.
Part 21
Event Number: 56899
Rep Org: Paragon Energy Solutions
Licensee: Paragon Energy Solutions
Region: 3
City: Fort Worth State: TX
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Richard Knott
HQ OPS Officer: Natalie Starfish
Licensee: Paragon Energy Solutions
Region: 3
City: Fort Worth State: TX
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Richard Knott
HQ OPS Officer: Natalie Starfish
Notification Date: 12/19/2023
Notification Time: 17:34 [ET]
Event Date: 12/18/2023
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/19/2023
Notification Time: 17:34 [ET]
Event Date: 12/18/2023
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/19/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - Defects And Noncompliance
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - Defects And Noncompliance
Person (Organization):
Taylor, Nick (R4DO)
Edwards, Rhex (R3DO)
Part 21/50.55 Reactors, - (EMAIL)
Taylor, Nick (R4DO)
Edwards, Rhex (R3DO)
Part 21/50.55 Reactors, - (EMAIL)
INITIAL PART 21 REPORT - DEFICIENT FUEL INJECTORS
The following is a synopsis of information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Paragon provided initial notification of a defect associated with the auxiliary feedwater pump diesel engine fuel injectors supplied to Constellation. The injectors were provided to Paragon for refurbishment. Constellation provided Paragon with root cause report # 4703982 on November 12, 2023. The associated failure analysis report documented potential defects with some fuel injectors supplied to Braidwood. These reported deficiencies allowed excessive fuel oil leakage which resulted in diesel lubricating oil system contamination above specified limits. Paragon concluded their evaluation on December 18, 2023, which determined that this condition, if left uncorrected, could contribute to a substantial safety hazard and is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21.
The extent of condition is limited to the Constellation Braidwood and Byron plants.
Paragon has entered this condition in their corrective action program. Affected injectors at Braidwood have been removed from service and returned to Paragon. Paragon is coordinating with Byron on recommended actions and will follow up with a final notification on or before 1/17/2024.
The following is a synopsis of information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Paragon provided initial notification of a defect associated with the auxiliary feedwater pump diesel engine fuel injectors supplied to Constellation. The injectors were provided to Paragon for refurbishment. Constellation provided Paragon with root cause report # 4703982 on November 12, 2023. The associated failure analysis report documented potential defects with some fuel injectors supplied to Braidwood. These reported deficiencies allowed excessive fuel oil leakage which resulted in diesel lubricating oil system contamination above specified limits. Paragon concluded their evaluation on December 18, 2023, which determined that this condition, if left uncorrected, could contribute to a substantial safety hazard and is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21.
The extent of condition is limited to the Constellation Braidwood and Byron plants.
Paragon has entered this condition in their corrective action program. Affected injectors at Braidwood have been removed from service and returned to Paragon. Paragon is coordinating with Byron on recommended actions and will follow up with a final notification on or before 1/17/2024.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 56904
Facility: Framatome ANP Richland
Region: 2 State: WA
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: Uranium Fuel Fabrication
Comments: Leu Conversion
Fabrication & Scrap Recovery
Commercial Lwr Fuel
NRC Notified By: Calvin Manning
HQ OPS Officer: Brian P. Smith
Region: 2 State: WA
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: Uranium Fuel Fabrication
Comments: Leu Conversion
Fabrication & Scrap Recovery
Commercial Lwr Fuel
NRC Notified By: Calvin Manning
HQ OPS Officer: Brian P. Smith
Notification Date: 12/20/2023
Notification Time: 16:49 [ET]
Event Date: 12/17/2023
Event Time: 09:45 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/20/2023
Notification Time: 16:49 [ET]
Event Date: 12/17/2023
Event Time: 09:45 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/20/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (c) - Offsite Notification/News Rel
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (c) - Offsite Notification/News Rel
Person (Organization):
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
CONCURRENT REPORT FOR LOW FILTER EFFICIENCY
The following information was provided by the licensee email:
"Pursuant to 10CFR70 Appendix A (c) Framatome is making this concurrent report:
"On December 17, 2023 a routine DOS [di-octyl sebacate] test of one of Framatome's final filter banks had an efficiency of 99.78% which was below the 99.95% efficiency credited by Framatome's radioactive air emissions license. In compliance with Framatome's radioactive air emissions license (RAEL-038), Framatome made the required written notification to the Washington Department of Health (WDOH).
"The loss of efficiency did not cause emissions to be above allowable limits."
The following information was provided by the licensee email:
"Pursuant to 10CFR70 Appendix A (c) Framatome is making this concurrent report:
"On December 17, 2023 a routine DOS [di-octyl sebacate] test of one of Framatome's final filter banks had an efficiency of 99.78% which was below the 99.95% efficiency credited by Framatome's radioactive air emissions license. In compliance with Framatome's radioactive air emissions license (RAEL-038), Framatome made the required written notification to the Washington Department of Health (WDOH).
"The loss of efficiency did not cause emissions to be above allowable limits."