Event Notification Report for July 11, 2023
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/10/2023 - 07/11/2023
Agreement State
Event Number: 56604
Rep Org: New Mexico Rad Control Program
Licensee: Acuren Inspection, Inc.
Region: 4
City: Carlsbad State: NM
County:
License #: IR-448
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Robert Bicknell
HQ OPS Officer: Eric Simpson
Licensee: Acuren Inspection, Inc.
Region: 4
City: Carlsbad State: NM
County:
License #: IR-448
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Robert Bicknell
HQ OPS Officer: Eric Simpson
Notification Date: 06/30/2023
Notification Time: 19:27 [ET]
Event Date: 06/30/2023
Event Time: 15:50 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 07/10/2023
Notification Time: 19:27 [ET]
Event Date: 06/30/2023
Event Time: 15:50 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 07/10/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
O'Keefe, Neil (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB, (EMAIL) (EMAIL)
Grant, Jeffery (IR)
MacDonald, Mark (ILTAB)
O'Keefe, Neil (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB, (EMAIL) (EMAIL)
Grant, Jeffery (IR)
MacDonald, Mark (ILTAB)
EN Revision Imported Date: 7/11/2023
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA
The following information was provided by the New Mexico Environment Department via phone and email:
"Acuren Inspection, Inc., New Mexico Radioactive Materials License IR-448, reported a missing source of licensed material, a lost gamma camera for industrial radiography with an unknown total quantity of radioactivity. The device was lost between the cities of Carlsbad and Jal, New Mexico on Highway 128 around mile marker 38 on June 30, 2023, at approximately 1550 MDT. Crews are actively looking for the missing device.
"The licensee is licensed for gamma cameras with sources of iridium-192 not to exceed 150 curies and selenium-75 not to exceed 100 curies.
"A request for further information from the licensee as events develop has been made."
Notified external: DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, USDA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DOE Ops Center, DHS CISA Central, and EPA EOC and via E-mail: FDA EOC, Nuclear SSA, FEMA National Watch Center, and CWMD Watch Desk.
*** UPDATE ON 7/7/2023 at 1238 EDT FROM ROBERT BICKNELL TO SAMUEL COLVARD ***
The device was recovered in Kermit, Texas on July 3, 2023, and reported to the State of New Mexico at approximately 1220 [MDT].
Notified internal: R4DO (Drake), NMSS (email), NMSS (Williams), ILTAB (email), ILTAB (MacDonald), IRMOC (Crouch), INES (Smith), CNSNS (Mexico) (email).
Notified external: DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, USDA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DOE Ops Center, DHS CISA Central, and EPA EOC and via E-mail: FDA EOC, Nuclear SSA, FEMA National Watch Center, and CWMD Watch Desk.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Category 2' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for a short time (minutes to hours). It could possibly be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of hours to days. These sources are typically used in practices such as industrial gamma radiography, high dose rate brachytherapy and medium dose rate brachytherapy. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA
The following information was provided by the New Mexico Environment Department via phone and email:
"Acuren Inspection, Inc., New Mexico Radioactive Materials License IR-448, reported a missing source of licensed material, a lost gamma camera for industrial radiography with an unknown total quantity of radioactivity. The device was lost between the cities of Carlsbad and Jal, New Mexico on Highway 128 around mile marker 38 on June 30, 2023, at approximately 1550 MDT. Crews are actively looking for the missing device.
"The licensee is licensed for gamma cameras with sources of iridium-192 not to exceed 150 curies and selenium-75 not to exceed 100 curies.
"A request for further information from the licensee as events develop has been made."
Notified external: DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, USDA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DOE Ops Center, DHS CISA Central, and EPA EOC and via E-mail: FDA EOC, Nuclear SSA, FEMA National Watch Center, and CWMD Watch Desk.
*** UPDATE ON 7/7/2023 at 1238 EDT FROM ROBERT BICKNELL TO SAMUEL COLVARD ***
The device was recovered in Kermit, Texas on July 3, 2023, and reported to the State of New Mexico at approximately 1220 [MDT].
Notified internal: R4DO (Drake), NMSS (email), NMSS (Williams), ILTAB (email), ILTAB (MacDonald), IRMOC (Crouch), INES (Smith), CNSNS (Mexico) (email).
Notified external: DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, USDA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DOE Ops Center, DHS CISA Central, and EPA EOC and via E-mail: FDA EOC, Nuclear SSA, FEMA National Watch Center, and CWMD Watch Desk.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Category 2' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for a short time (minutes to hours). It could possibly be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of hours to days. These sources are typically used in practices such as industrial gamma radiography, high dose rate brachytherapy and medium dose rate brachytherapy. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Power Reactor
Event Number: 56610
Facility: Millstone
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Jason Paris
HQ OPS Officer: Karen Cotton-Gross
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Jason Paris
HQ OPS Officer: Karen Cotton-Gross
Notification Date: 07/06/2023
Notification Time: 16:48 [ET]
Event Date: 07/06/2023
Event Time: 12:32 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/10/2023
Notification Time: 16:48 [ET]
Event Date: 07/06/2023
Event Time: 12:32 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/10/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - Unanalyzed Condition
Person (Organization):
Lilliendahl, Jon (R1DO)
Lilliendahl, Jon (R1DO)
Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EN Revision Imported Date: 7/11/2023
EN Revision Text: UNANALYZED CONDITION
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"On July 6, 2023, at 1232 EDT, while operating in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the supply check valve from the number 2 steam generator to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump was determined during troubleshooting that it is not able to perform its isolation function. This failure would have resulted in the blowdown of both steam generators during a main steam line break in the number 2 steam generator main steam line upstream of the main steam isolation valves until the operators could isolate the faulted steam generator. Previous evaluation has determined that this condition constituted an unanalyzed condition that could impact containment pressure.
"There was no radioactive release to the environment. The steam line from the steam generator to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump was isolated by use of a motor operated valve in the discharge line of the number 2 steam generator. There was no impact to Unit 3 which remains at 100 percent power.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified.
"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as a condition that resulted in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety."
EN Revision Text: UNANALYZED CONDITION
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"On July 6, 2023, at 1232 EDT, while operating in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the supply check valve from the number 2 steam generator to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump was determined during troubleshooting that it is not able to perform its isolation function. This failure would have resulted in the blowdown of both steam generators during a main steam line break in the number 2 steam generator main steam line upstream of the main steam isolation valves until the operators could isolate the faulted steam generator. Previous evaluation has determined that this condition constituted an unanalyzed condition that could impact containment pressure.
"There was no radioactive release to the environment. The steam line from the steam generator to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump was isolated by use of a motor operated valve in the discharge line of the number 2 steam generator. There was no impact to Unit 3 which remains at 100 percent power.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified.
"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as a condition that resulted in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 56612
Facility: Summer
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-AP1000,[3] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: Hank Kirkland
HQ OPS Officer: Sam Colvard
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-AP1000,[3] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: Hank Kirkland
HQ OPS Officer: Sam Colvard
Notification Date: 07/07/2023
Notification Time: 12:51 [ET]
Event Date: 05/11/2023
Event Time: 12:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/10/2023
Notification Time: 12:51 [ET]
Event Date: 05/11/2023
Event Time: 12:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/10/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - Defects And Noncompliance
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - Defects And Noncompliance
Person (Organization):
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
Part 21/50.55 Reactors, - (EMAIL)
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
Part 21/50.55 Reactors, - (EMAIL)
Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 100 | Power Operation |
EN Revision Imported Date: 7/11/2023
EN Revision Text: PART 21 - CAP SCREW IMPROPER LENGTH
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"This is a non-emergency notification required by 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i). A written notification in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii) will be provided within 30 days. Steam generator emergency feedwater header discharge isolation check valves (XVC01009A-EF, XVC01009B-EF, and XVC01009C-EF) were designed specifically for and supplied to VC Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) by Flowserve under purchase order 4500653391 to replace the previous valves in the emergency feedwater system during refueling outage 27. On May 11, 2023, after valve installation, but prior to initial service, the socket head cap screws were identified as being shorter than the required design length. Valve drawings indicate a design length of 1.25" while the socket head cap screws received were 0.875". The correct length cap screws were installed prior to initial service. VCSNS completed a substantial safety hazard evaluation and determined that the improper length of the cap screws constituted a substantial safety hazard. This deviation in cap screw length resulted in a partial engagement of the cap screw to the cylinder rod extension and could potentially affect valve operation.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
EN Revision Text: PART 21 - CAP SCREW IMPROPER LENGTH
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"This is a non-emergency notification required by 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i). A written notification in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii) will be provided within 30 days. Steam generator emergency feedwater header discharge isolation check valves (XVC01009A-EF, XVC01009B-EF, and XVC01009C-EF) were designed specifically for and supplied to VC Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) by Flowserve under purchase order 4500653391 to replace the previous valves in the emergency feedwater system during refueling outage 27. On May 11, 2023, after valve installation, but prior to initial service, the socket head cap screws were identified as being shorter than the required design length. Valve drawings indicate a design length of 1.25" while the socket head cap screws received were 0.875". The correct length cap screws were installed prior to initial service. VCSNS completed a substantial safety hazard evaluation and determined that the improper length of the cap screws constituted a substantial safety hazard. This deviation in cap screw length resulted in a partial engagement of the cap screw to the cylinder rod extension and could potentially affect valve operation.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 56614
Facility: Vogtle 3/4
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] W-AP1000,[4] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: Taylor Joseph
HQ OPS Officer: Brian Lin
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] W-AP1000,[4] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: Taylor Joseph
HQ OPS Officer: Brian Lin
Notification Date: 07/09/2023
Notification Time: 16:57 [ET]
Event Date: 07/09/2023
Event Time: 13:28 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/09/2023
Notification Time: 16:57 [ET]
Event Date: 07/09/2023
Event Time: 13:28 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/09/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical
Person (Organization):
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
3 | A/R | Y | 45 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 1328 EDT on 07/09/2023, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 45 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped during power ascension testing due to low reactor coolant flow from decaying voltage to the reactor coolant pumps. The trip was not complex, with all safety-related systems responding normally post-trip.
"Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam via steam generator power operated relief valves to the atmosphere, and startup feedwater is supplying the steam generators. Units 1, 2, and 4 are not affected.
"Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 1328 EDT on 07/09/2023, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 45 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped during power ascension testing due to low reactor coolant flow from decaying voltage to the reactor coolant pumps. The trip was not complex, with all safety-related systems responding normally post-trip.
"Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam via steam generator power operated relief valves to the atmosphere, and startup feedwater is supplying the steam generators. Units 1, 2, and 4 are not affected.
"Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Agreement State
Event Number: 56608
Rep Org: Florida Bureau of Radiation Control
Licensee: Universal Engineering Sciences, LLC
Region: 1
City: St Petersburg State: FL
County:
License #: 4696-11
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Reno J. Fabii
HQ OPS Officer: Karen Cotton
Licensee: Universal Engineering Sciences, LLC
Region: 1
City: St Petersburg State: FL
County:
License #: 4696-11
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Reno J. Fabii
HQ OPS Officer: Karen Cotton
Notification Date: 07/05/2023
Notification Time: 16:21 [ET]
Event Date: 07/05/2023
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/05/2023
Notification Time: 16:21 [ET]
Event Date: 07/05/2023
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/05/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Lilliendahl, Jon (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Lilliendahl, Jon (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT- DAMAGED TROXLER GAUGE
The following information was provided by the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control via email:
"The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) for Universal Engineering Sciences, reported that a Troxler gauge, possibly Model 3440, was improperly secured on the back of a truck, fell off, and was damaged. The gauge was in the shielded position but not in the case. The worker was able to retrieve the gauge from the road and secure it. The Troxler sources are believed to be intact. The local office RSO is in route to the location with radiation instruments and shielding (bucket of sand) to verify the sources were not breached. If the sources are found to be breached, they will be returned to Troxler for repair/disposal. No Bureau of Radiation Control assistance was requested."
Florida Incident Number: FL23-101
The following information was provided by the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control via email:
"The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) for Universal Engineering Sciences, reported that a Troxler gauge, possibly Model 3440, was improperly secured on the back of a truck, fell off, and was damaged. The gauge was in the shielded position but not in the case. The worker was able to retrieve the gauge from the road and secure it. The Troxler sources are believed to be intact. The local office RSO is in route to the location with radiation instruments and shielding (bucket of sand) to verify the sources were not breached. If the sources are found to be breached, they will be returned to Troxler for repair/disposal. No Bureau of Radiation Control assistance was requested."
Florida Incident Number: FL23-101
Power Reactor
Event Number: 56618
Facility: North Anna
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP,[3] M-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Marc Hofmann
HQ OPS Officer: Kerby Scales
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP,[3] M-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Marc Hofmann
HQ OPS Officer: Kerby Scales
Notification Date: 07/11/2023
Notification Time: 17:42 [ET]
Event Date: 07/11/2023
Event Time: 15:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/11/2023
Notification Time: 17:42 [ET]
Event Date: 07/11/2023
Event Time: 15:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/11/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - Offsite Notification
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - Offsite Notification
Person (Organization):
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 1530 [EDT] on 7/11/2023, North Anna Power Station notified the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) that a small volume of filtered/purified water potentially discharged into Lake Anna from a leak from a reverse osmosis unit. The leak did not follow the normal release path for discharge through outfall 013. No environmental impact associated with this leak was observed or would be expected because the water in question is cleaner than the lake water, and would have met all discharge requirements for outfall 013.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
"This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi)."
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 1530 [EDT] on 7/11/2023, North Anna Power Station notified the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) that a small volume of filtered/purified water potentially discharged into Lake Anna from a leak from a reverse osmosis unit. The leak did not follow the normal release path for discharge through outfall 013. No environmental impact associated with this leak was observed or would be expected because the water in question is cleaner than the lake water, and would have met all discharge requirements for outfall 013.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
"This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi)."