Event Notification Report for July 03, 2023

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SOURCE RECOVERY MALFUNCTION

The following is a summary of the information provided by the Washington State Office of Radiation Protection via email:

On 6/22/23 at 1419 PDT, the licensee identified that a 56.4 Ci Ir-192 radiography source could not be retracted into the exposure device (QSA Model 880D) due to a crank malfunction. The radiographer immediately contacted the Radiation Safety Officer who provided source recovery/retrieval actions along with crank mechanism fixes. The radiographer secured the source in the exposure device at 1422 PDT. The problem with the retrieval was identified as a loose securing nut that caused the crank to spin freely and the drive cable to come out of the crank conduit.

During the incident, the radiographer's survey meter read 20 mr/hr at the crank location. A radiographer assistant expanded the boundaries and ensured the general public was not affected. The radiographer's total direct dosimeter reading after 6 normal radiography exposures and the source recovery actions were complete was 3 mRem. The incident took place at a temporary job site in Anacortes, WA. There were no overexposures or spread of contamination.

WA Incident Number: WA-23-010

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST EXIT SIGN

The following is a synopsis of information provided by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment via email:

On 6/23/23, the licensee discovered that a tritium exit sign was lost. The exit sign was an Isolite Corporation Model 2000 containing 7.62 Ci of tritium (H-3). This is being reported under Colorado Regulations Section 4.51.1.1 (10 CFR 20.2202(a)(1)(i)).

Event Report ID No.: CO230017

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN GAUGE

The following information was provided by the Maryland Department of the Environment via telephone:

On 6/26/23 at 1116 EDT, the licensee was working at Howard University in Washington, D.C. when a Niton XLp 300 (lead base paint analyzer containing a maximum of 50 mCi of Cd-109) was stolen out of a vehicle. The Howard University and Washington, D.C. police were notified of the vehicle break in.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DEVIATION - DEGRADED FUEL PIN

The following information was provided by the Texas A&M University (TAMN) via phone and email:

"At approximately 1315 CDT on Wednesday, June 28, 2023, during routine fuel inspections required under Technical Specification (TS) 4.1.5 ['Reactor Fuel Elements'], a fuel pin (serial number 11394) did not pass the test criteria. The pin was bloated enough to not fit in the bend test rig. This meets the definition of a `Reportable Occurrence' under the definitions in TS 1.3. In accordance with the requirements of TS 6.6.2 and 6.7.2, TAMN notified the NRC Headquarters Operations Officer within one working day.

"Visual inspection of the pin did not indicate any obvious degradation that would be exceptional for a pin with sixteen years of burnup history, other than a slight bloat in the middle of the pin.

"There have been no indications of cladding failure on routine primary coolant analyses.

"As required by TS 4.1.5.2, TAMN is initiating an inspection of the entire core fuel inventory once TAMN finishes the regularly scheduled fuel inspections for the year. TAMN informed the NRC Project Manager."

FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"A non-licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION VIOLATION

The following information is a summary provided by the licensee via phone and email:

The University of New Mexico reported a violation of its non-power reactor technical specification (TS) 1.1.36(c) required alarm testing frequency. The alarm testing requirement requires that the site alarms be tested on a semi-annual basis, not to exceed 7.5 months. According to the licensee, the last successful test of the New Mexico non-power reactor alarm system occurred on October 27, 2022, which is in excess of the 7.5 month requirement. The reactor was at zero percent power when the TS violation was discovered and continues to be at zero percent power. Reactor operations are suspended until the issue is resolved.

PART 21 - EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR - INCORRECT BUS BAR INSTALLATION

The following is a summary of the information provided by Engine Systems, Inc. (ESI) via fax:

Copper bus bars are used at rectifier diode pigtail connections CR1, CR2, CR3, CR4, and CR7 to provide a common connection point for associated wiring to minimize the number of conductors on a single fastener. It is intended for the conductors to clamp directly to the bus bar, thereby maintaining a low resistance conduction path between components. ESI has determined the bus bars were installed incorrectly whereby the conductors are not clamped in direct contact, resulting in current now passing through the stainless steel fasteners. This configuration is undesired and will result in unnecessary heat generation which may lead to failure of the connection and therefore failure of the automatic voltage regulator (AVR) assembly. The AVR is relied upon to automatically regulate emergency diesel generator (EDG) terminal voltage. Failure of the AVR would impact the ability of the EDG to perform its safety-related function and therefore may impact the nuclear plant's ability to manage safety-related loads during an emergency event.

This Part 21 applies to the bus bar installation for part numbers 72-12300-100-ESI, 72-14200-100-ESI, and 72-14000-100-6020. These part numbers impact Constellation Energy - Nine Mile Point, Avaltec/CFE - Laguna Verde (Div III), and Avaltec/CFE - Laguna Verde (Div II), respectively.

Corrective Actions:
Voltage regulator installed: Bus bar installation should be corrected immediately by restacking the components to ensure direct contact with all conductors.
Voltage regulators in inventory (not installed): The bus bar installation should be corrected prior to installation. If desired, the customer may perform on site or the voltage regulator chassis may be returned to ESI for rework.