Event Notification Report for June 23, 2023

EN Revision Imported Date: 6/23/2023

EN Revision Text: LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At approximately 1500 [EDT] on 5/2/2023, it was determined that the commercial telecommunications capacity was lost to the Palisades Nuclear Plant (PNP) control room and technical support center due to an issue with the telecommunications provider. After discovery of the condition it was discovered that this loss also included the emergency notification system (ENS). Communications link via the satellite phone was tested satisfactorly. In addition, if needed, the satellite phone would be used to initiate call-out of the emergency response organization. The condition did not affect the ENS or commercial telecommunications capabilities at the offsite Emergency Operations Facility. The telecommunications provider has not provided an estimated repair time."

PNP will be notifying the NRC resident inspector.

* * * RETRACTION ON 06/22/23 AT 1358 EDT FROM J. LEWIS TO T. HERRITY * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"This notification is being made to retract event EN 56501 that was reported on May 02, 2023. Based on further investigation, the Emergency Plan and Emergency Implementing Procedures provide an acceptable alternative routine communication system, which is satellite phones, for communicating with Federal, State, and local offsite agencies, that are in addition to the primary commercial telephone system. It was determined that no actual or potential loss of offsite communications capability existed per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). This is consistent with NUREG 1022, Revision 3, Supplement 1, 'Event Report Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii),' and NEI 13-01, Revision 0, 'Reportable Action Levels for Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities.'

"The NRC Decommissioning Inspector has been notified of the retraction.

"Commercial telecommunications to the plant were restored at approximately 0600 EDT on 5/3/2023."

Notified R3DO (Orlikowski)

EN Revision Imported Date: 6/23/2023

EN Revision Text: FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"On June 2, 2023, a blind specimen provided to a laboratory did not analyze as expected. The specimen reported a false negative for amphetamines and a false positive for opiates.

"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 26.719(c)(2) and 10 CFR 26.719(c)(3).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * RETRACTION AT 0909 EDT ON JUNE 22, 2023 FROM ANDREW CORRETTE TO BRIAN P. SMITH * * *

"Follow-up investigation by an independent Health and Human Services laboratory confirmed that the blind specimen in question was analyzed correctly. The error is thought to have occurred during the preparation of the blind specimen, prior to delivery to the site.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified R1DO (Eve) and FFD Group (email)

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER

The following information was provided by the Georgia Department of Natural Resources (the State) via email:

"On June 12, 2023, [the licensee] notified the State that they had discovered a stuck shutter on one of their fixed gauges [Ohmart Corp 4/2000 containing 100 mCi of Cs-137] that morning. The [licensee] had a service vendor repairing the handle of the gauge, and when they went to shut the shutter it wouldn't shut. They attempted to lubricate the shutter to get it to move, but it still would not close. It was determined that the issue will not cause undue exposure or risk to personnel. The vendor is sourcing the parts required for repair. As soon as the part is delivered, they will return to the site and replace the mechanism. Until then, the gauge will remain on the pipe with a notice attached to it, informing personnel of the issue to not interact with the gauge."

Georgia Incident Number: 66

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DOSE MISADMINISTRATION

The following information was provided by the Washington State Office of Radiation Protection via email:

"On 6/14/2023, a dose misadministration occurred during high dose rate brachytherapy at the Sacred Heart (SH) Radiotherapy Department. The authorized user (AU) intended for 15 Gy to be delivered in three [separate] 5 Gy fractions, but it was planned and delivered in a single 15 Gy treatment. The incident was discovered around 1630 [PDT] the same day. The AU has informed the patient and the referring physician.

"The SH medical physicist noted that 13 Gy in a single fraction is an effective treatment for the patient's condition (keloids on and around both ears). The 15 Gy was delivered to the keloid surface, and skin tolerance in a single fraction is greater than 25 Gy.

"Follow up with the patient will be perform in the next few days and ongoing. No other exposure to staff is reported."

WA incident number: WA-23-009

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTERS

The following information was provided by the Texas Department of Health Services (the Agency) via email:

"On June 15, 2023, the Agency was notified by the licensee that during routine shutter checks, the shutters on two Berthold model LB7442 nuclear gauges were stuck in the open position. The gauges both contain a 20 millicurie (original activity) cesium - 137 source. Open is the normal operating position of the gauges. There is no risk of additional radiation exposure to members of the general public or radiation workers due to this failure. The investigation into this event is ongoing. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

TX incident number: I-10026

60 DAY NOTIFICATION FOR AN INVALID ACTUATION OF PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION LOGIC

The following information was provided by the licensee email:

"This telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to report an invalid actuation of Division 2 Primary Containment Isolation logic at the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) that occurred while in a refueling outage.

"At approximately 0402 Central Daylight Time (CDT) on April 28, 2023 and at approximately 1611 and 2143 CDT on May 4, 2023, momentary losses of 'Y80 Division 2 Uninterruptible 120VAC Class 1E Distribution Panel', which provides power to Division 2 Primary Containment Isolation logic, resulted in a partial Primary Containment Group 2 Isolation (gas systems), initiation of the Standby Gas Treatment system, and the shift of Control Room ventilation to the high radiation mode. The momentary losses of 'Y80' were due to an intermittent, age-related degradation issue with the 'Uninterruptible Power Supply Y81, Division 2 120VAC Class 1E Inverter', which resulted in a temporary loss of output plus a lack of static switch transfer from the inverter supply to the alternate source as designed.

"The actuations were not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, these were not intentional manual initiations, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation. Therefore, these events have been determined to be invalid actuations that were attributed to the same cause.

"All systems responded as designed to the actuation signal. Operations reset the partial Primary Containment Group 2 Isolation signal, shutdown the Standby Gas Treatment system, and restored Control Room ventilation per the procedure. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP OCCURED DURING PROTECTION SYSTEM TESTING

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 1035, on June 22, 2023, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100% power, the reactor automatically tripped due to `A' train reactor trip breaker and `B' train reactor trip bypass breaker opening during testing. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. MST-021 (Reactor Protection Logic Train `B' At Power) testing was in progress at the time of trip.

"Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves.

"Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).

"As a result of the reactor trip, emergency feedwater actuated; therefore, this event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

FUEL FACILITY - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILED TO FUNCTION

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"On the first floor of the Feed Materials Building at approximately 1530 CDT on 06/21/2023 while performing cylinder filling operations, a visual indicator of material was identified and operators initiated mitigating actions in accordance with site operating procedures. It was determined that a remotely operated valve closing mechanism at the number 4 fill spot failed to close a UF6 cylinder valve. The cylinder valve was then closed manually by operations personnel. Based on preliminary observations, the licensee does not believe that regulatory limits were exceeded."