Event Notification Report for May 02, 2023
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/01/2023 - 05/02/2023
Power Reactor
Event Number: 56497
Facility: Vogtle 3/4
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] W-AP1000,[4] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: Chad Everitt
HQ OPS Officer: Sam Colvard
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] W-AP1000,[4] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: Chad Everitt
HQ OPS Officer: Sam Colvard
Notification Date: 05/02/2023
Notification Time: 07:57 [ET]
Event Date: 05/02/2023
Event Time: 04:23 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/02/2023
Notification Time: 07:57 [ET]
Event Date: 05/02/2023
Event Time: 04:23 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/02/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical
Person (Organization):
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | M/R | Y | 14 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 0423 EDT on 05/02/2023, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 14 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to securing all main feed pumps, due to sudden high differential pressure on their suction strainers. The trip was not complex, with all safety-related systems responding normally post-trip. No equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event or adversely impacted plant response to the reactor trip.
"Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the steam dumps, and startup feedwater is supplying the steam generators. Units 1, 2, and 4 were not affected.
"Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 0423 EDT on 05/02/2023, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 14 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to securing all main feed pumps, due to sudden high differential pressure on their suction strainers. The trip was not complex, with all safety-related systems responding normally post-trip. No equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event or adversely impacted plant response to the reactor trip.
"Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the steam dumps, and startup feedwater is supplying the steam generators. Units 1, 2, and 4 were not affected.
"Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 56501
Facility: Palisades
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: Jeffrey Lewis
HQ OPS Officer: Brian P. Smith
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: Jeffrey Lewis
HQ OPS Officer: Brian P. Smith
Notification Date: 05/02/2023
Notification Time: 22:41 [ET]
Event Date: 05/02/2023
Event Time: 15:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/22/2023
Notification Time: 22:41 [ET]
Event Date: 05/02/2023
Event Time: 15:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/22/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - Loss Comm/Asmt/Response
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - Loss Comm/Asmt/Response
Person (Organization):
Peterson, Hironori (R3DO)
Peterson, Hironori (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Defueled | 0 | Defueled |
EN Revision Imported Date: 6/23/2023
EN Revision Text: LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At approximately 1500 [EDT] on 5/2/2023, it was determined that the commercial telecommunications capacity was lost to the Palisades Nuclear Plant (PNP) control room and technical support center due to an issue with the telecommunications provider. After discovery of the condition it was discovered that this loss also included the emergency notification system (ENS). Communications link via the satellite phone was tested satisfactorly. In addition, if needed, the satellite phone would be used to initiate call-out of the emergency response organization. The condition did not affect the ENS or commercial telecommunications capabilities at the offsite Emergency Operations Facility. The telecommunications provider has not provided an estimated repair time."
PNP will be notifying the NRC resident inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 06/22/23 AT 1358 EDT FROM J. LEWIS TO T. HERRITY * * *
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"This notification is being made to retract event EN 56501 that was reported on May 02, 2023. Based on further investigation, the Emergency Plan and Emergency Implementing Procedures provide an acceptable alternative routine communication system, which is satellite phones, for communicating with Federal, State, and local offsite agencies, that are in addition to the primary commercial telephone system. It was determined that no actual or potential loss of offsite communications capability existed per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). This is consistent with NUREG 1022, Revision 3, Supplement 1, 'Event Report Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii),' and NEI 13-01, Revision 0, 'Reportable Action Levels for Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities.'
"The NRC Decommissioning Inspector has been notified of the retraction.
"Commercial telecommunications to the plant were restored at approximately 0600 EDT on 5/3/2023."
Notified R3DO (Orlikowski)
EN Revision Text: LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At approximately 1500 [EDT] on 5/2/2023, it was determined that the commercial telecommunications capacity was lost to the Palisades Nuclear Plant (PNP) control room and technical support center due to an issue with the telecommunications provider. After discovery of the condition it was discovered that this loss also included the emergency notification system (ENS). Communications link via the satellite phone was tested satisfactorly. In addition, if needed, the satellite phone would be used to initiate call-out of the emergency response organization. The condition did not affect the ENS or commercial telecommunications capabilities at the offsite Emergency Operations Facility. The telecommunications provider has not provided an estimated repair time."
PNP will be notifying the NRC resident inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 06/22/23 AT 1358 EDT FROM J. LEWIS TO T. HERRITY * * *
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"This notification is being made to retract event EN 56501 that was reported on May 02, 2023. Based on further investigation, the Emergency Plan and Emergency Implementing Procedures provide an acceptable alternative routine communication system, which is satellite phones, for communicating with Federal, State, and local offsite agencies, that are in addition to the primary commercial telephone system. It was determined that no actual or potential loss of offsite communications capability existed per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). This is consistent with NUREG 1022, Revision 3, Supplement 1, 'Event Report Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii),' and NEI 13-01, Revision 0, 'Reportable Action Levels for Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities.'
"The NRC Decommissioning Inspector has been notified of the retraction.
"Commercial telecommunications to the plant were restored at approximately 0600 EDT on 5/3/2023."
Notified R3DO (Orlikowski)
Agreement State
Event Number: 56498
Rep Org: Texas Dept of State Health Services
Licensee: Quantum Technical Services LLC
Region: 4
City: Houston State: TX
County:
License #: 06406
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Arthur Tucker
HQ OPS Officer: John Russell
Licensee: Quantum Technical Services LLC
Region: 4
City: Houston State: TX
County:
License #: 06406
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Arthur Tucker
HQ OPS Officer: John Russell
Notification Date: 05/02/2023
Notification Time: 17:04 [ET]
Event Date: 05/02/2023
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/02/2023
Notification Time: 17:04 [ET]
Event Date: 05/02/2023
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/02/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Gaddy, Vincent (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB, (EMAIL) (EMAIL)
CNSNS (Mexico), - (FAX)
Gaddy, Vincent (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB, (EMAIL) (EMAIL)
CNSNS (Mexico), - (FAX)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST SOURCE
The following information was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services [the Agency] via email:
"On May 2, 2023, the Agency was notified by the licensee that they were unable to locate a 200 millicurie cobalt - 60 source. The licensee stated that the company had three locations in the United States, one in California, one in Louisiana, and one in Texas. In January of 2023, the company decided to close its offices. The company transferred all its sources to the Texas location. The sources were then sent to a source disposal company in Texas. During the last transfer of sources, the cobalt source could not be found. The licensee searched for the source at the Texas facility but could not find it. The process of locating where the source might be is complicated by the fact that the licensee had laid off most of the employees. The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) was included in the layoff.
"The individual tasked by the company to dispose of the sources contacted a few of the previous employees and was told that the source was transferred to the location in Louisiana. [The Agency] asked if they had the documents for the transfer. He stated they had given all the documents to the Louisiana location. He did not have a copy of the forms.
"He said the source itself is about half the size of a magic marker. He said it is normally stored in a lead box in a sea van. He said that they would search their paperwork including the sign-out log in Louisiana to see if they can confirm the source was there.
The Agency advised the individual to go to Louisiana and search for the source in and around the storage area. He was also advised to get someone added to their license as RSO.
"Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300"
Texas Incident Number: 10014
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following information was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services [the Agency] via email:
"On May 2, 2023, the Agency was notified by the licensee that they were unable to locate a 200 millicurie cobalt - 60 source. The licensee stated that the company had three locations in the United States, one in California, one in Louisiana, and one in Texas. In January of 2023, the company decided to close its offices. The company transferred all its sources to the Texas location. The sources were then sent to a source disposal company in Texas. During the last transfer of sources, the cobalt source could not be found. The licensee searched for the source at the Texas facility but could not find it. The process of locating where the source might be is complicated by the fact that the licensee had laid off most of the employees. The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) was included in the layoff.
"The individual tasked by the company to dispose of the sources contacted a few of the previous employees and was told that the source was transferred to the location in Louisiana. [The Agency] asked if they had the documents for the transfer. He stated they had given all the documents to the Louisiana location. He did not have a copy of the forms.
"He said the source itself is about half the size of a magic marker. He said it is normally stored in a lead box in a sea van. He said that they would search their paperwork including the sign-out log in Louisiana to see if they can confirm the source was there.
The Agency advised the individual to go to Louisiana and search for the source in and around the storage area. He was also advised to get someone added to their license as RSO.
"Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300"
Texas Incident Number: 10014
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Agreement State
Event Number: 56499
Rep Org: Florida Bureau of Radiation Control
Licensee: AE Engineering
Region: 1
City: Lake Placid State: FL
County:
License #: 4478-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: John Williamson
HQ OPS Officer: Brian P. Smith
Licensee: AE Engineering
Region: 1
City: Lake Placid State: FL
County:
License #: 4478-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: John Williamson
HQ OPS Officer: Brian P. Smith
Notification Date: 05/02/2023
Notification Time: 18:09 [ET]
Event Date: 05/02/2023
Event Time: 17:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/02/2023
Notification Time: 18:09 [ET]
Event Date: 05/02/2023
Event Time: 17:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/02/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Dimitriadis, Anthony (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB, (EMAIL) (EMAIL)
Dimitriadis, Anthony (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB, (EMAIL) (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER GAUGES
The following report was received from the State of Florida Bureau of Radiation Control [BRC] via email:
"At 1720 [EDT], BRC received a call from [the licensee]. [The licensee] stated two Troxler [soil moisture density] gauges [Model Numbers 3440 and 3430; Serial Numbers 20750 and 77517; and sources 8mCi Cs-137 and 40mCi Am-241/Be] were stolen from their storage facility in Lake Placid, FL. [The] gauges were last signed in to the facility on the 28th of April and sat idle. [The] exact time of loss is not currently known, but [the licensee] went to retrieve the gauges on 5/2/23 at 1700 [EDT]. Law enforcement was notified prior to BRC's contact, however had not yet arrived on the scene at the writing of this report. [The licensee] has been provided department emails to send police reports when they are received."
Florida Incident Number: FL23-064
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following report was received from the State of Florida Bureau of Radiation Control [BRC] via email:
"At 1720 [EDT], BRC received a call from [the licensee]. [The licensee] stated two Troxler [soil moisture density] gauges [Model Numbers 3440 and 3430; Serial Numbers 20750 and 77517; and sources 8mCi Cs-137 and 40mCi Am-241/Be] were stolen from their storage facility in Lake Placid, FL. [The] gauges were last signed in to the facility on the 28th of April and sat idle. [The] exact time of loss is not currently known, but [the licensee] went to retrieve the gauges on 5/2/23 at 1700 [EDT]. Law enforcement was notified prior to BRC's contact, however had not yet arrived on the scene at the writing of this report. [The licensee] has been provided department emails to send police reports when they are received."
Florida Incident Number: FL23-064
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf