Event Notification Report for December 19, 2022

EN Revision Imported Date: 12/19/2022

EN Revision Text: PART 21 REPORT - POTENTIAL DEFECT IN QUICK DISCONNECT CONNECTOR CABLE ASSEMBLIES

The following is a synopsis of information received via facsimile:

On April 24, 2022, a potential defect was discovered in a configuration of the 1 « inch Quick Disconnect Connector (P/N: 913602-111) cable assemblies supplied to Duke [(McGuire Nuclear Station)] under procurement document 30129014. During post installation testing by Duke, it was found that one of the cable wires was shorted to ground. This damage could cause the cable assembly to not perform its intended safety function. Upon further investigation, Duke found 9 other cable assemblies to have similar damage. Duke returned the identified cable assemblies to Curtiss Wright who is investigating the issue. Although some testing and verification activities have been completed, additional testing and research is necessary and in progress. The current testing and research is projected to take 30 days and a follow-up letter with results and status will be provided by July 24, 2022.

Currently, McGuire Nuclear Station is the only affected facility.

For additional information, please contact Jim Tumlinson, Director of Operations (256-425-8037), Christopher Covan, Quality Assurance Manager (256-624-7301), or Tim Franchuk of Quality (513-201-2176).

* * * UPDATE ON 07/25/2022 AT 1417 EDT FROM CHRIS COVAN TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

The following is an update received via facsimile:

"After further research on this condition, we have determined there was a defect that was provided to this utility. The nature of the defect is a bushing supplied with these cable assemblies. This bushing was found to have burr edges near the interface of the connector. This burr, when moved up and down the wires during the installation process, has the potential to cause damage. This damage could compromise the integrating of the dielectric characteristic of the supplied connector which could lead to the component not to perform its intended safety function.

"Based on history, where we have never had an issue of this defect being detected either by Curtiss-Wright or Duke Energy, Curtiss-Wright is confident that this is a recent issue and efforts/research are being done to bound this issue to determine the extent of condition. Due to the nature of the damage, we also have a high degree of confidence that the defect would be evident and caught during the pre/post installation testing/inspection of this device which would further prevent them from being installed in the plants.

"All configuration that utilize this defective component were supplied to Duke Energy and installed in the McGuire, Oconee and Catawba operating plants. As of this time, we have identified 11 cables which have this defect and we are working closely with Duke to determine the full extent of condition. These 11 cables have been returned to Curtiss-Wright. Further evaluation will require a projected addition 30 days to continue our evaluation with the help of the utility. Another follow up letter will be issued to the NRC on August 26, 2022."

Notified R3DO (Peterson), R2DO (Miller), and Part 21 Group (by email).

* * * UPDATE ON 08/26/2022 AT 1411 EDT FROM CHRIS COVAN TO ADAM KOZIOL * * *

The following is an update received via facsimile:

"In pursuance of compliance to Federal Regulation 10CFR21, this letter is issued to provide closure for notification issued June 24, 2022 of the potential defect in a configuration of the 1 1/2 Inch Quick Disconnect Connector (P/N: 913602-111) cable assemblies supplied to Duke Energy under procurement documents 30129014, 03121479, 03114993 and 03124438 for of a total of 19 connectors at the McGuire and Catawba Nuclear Power Stations. We have a high degree of confidence that this is limited to these supply of cables.

"Of the 19 connectors, 11 have been returned to Curtiss-Wright and have been confirmed to have the suspected defect. Curtiss-Wright will be working with Duke Energy to have these connector assemblies replaced. Due to the nature of the defect and installation routines of the plant, for items installed at Duke Energy we have reasonable assurance that these connectors do not pose an immediate safety risk but could cause damaged during routine maintenance associated with the connectors and should be replace at earliest convenience.

"To prevent this from reoccurring, Curtiss-Wright will implement an inspection activity to verify the absence of burrs and/or sharp edges of all fittings that could potentially cause damage which could prevent the items from performing its intended safety function.

"For additional information, please contact Jim Tumlinson, Director of Operations (256-425-8037), Christopher Covan, Quality Assurance Manager (256-624-7301), or Tim Franchuk Director of Quality (513-201-2176)."

Notified R3DO (Pelke), R2DO (Miller), and Part 21 Group (by email).


* * * UPDATE ON12/16/22 AT 0932 EST FROM CHRIS COVAN TO THOMAS HERRITY * * *

The following is an update received via facsimile:

"In pursuance of compliance to Federal Regulation 10CFR21, this letter is issued to provide an amendment for notification issued on June 24, 2022 of the potential defect in a configuration of the 11/2 Inch Quick Disconnect Connector cable assemblies supplied to Duke Energy for a total of 460 of connectors only supplied to Oconee, McGuire and Catawba Nuclear Power Stations. This increase of scope is due to new evidence provided by Duke Energy, where this potential defect was found in other lots of material other than the ones previously bound to this condition.

"The nature of the defect is a sharp edge located inside of the supplied reducing bushing which could cause damage to the cables when being installed or removed. These cable assemblies and bushing need to be evaluated to determine if this potential defect has occurred or if there is a potential for damage to occur at the earliest convenience. To the best knowledge of the application, we believe that there is a very low risk of damage to the cable assemblies after installation but this needs to be evaluated at the plants. We have been working with Duke Energy and will continue to support them until this issue is resolved.

"To prevent this from reoccurring, Curtiss-Wright will implement inspection activities to verify the absence of burrs and/or sharp edges of all fittings that could potentially cause damage and prevent the items from performing its intended safety function.

"For additional information, please contact Jim Tumlinson, Director of Operation (256-425-8037) or Christopher Covan, Quality Assurance Manager (256-624-7301), or Tim Franchuk, Director of Quality (513-201-2176).

Notified R3DO (Ruiz), R2DO (Miller), and Part 21 Group (by email).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FAILED CABLE/DRIVE MECHANISM

The following event was received from the state of Maryland via email:

"On December 8, 2022 a UMD [University of Maryland] campus-wide power outage occurred and the panoramic irradiator source rack failed to automatically return to the fully shielded position. Operators responded and while remaining outside of the shielded vault, they manually lowered the sources to the fully shielded position. Shielding remained intact. Radiation levels in the irradiator area are at normal levels and the sources are secured in a safe and legal manner. The irradiator will not be operated until an investigation has been conducted and determined that the irradiator can be operated as normal. There was no risk for exposure to staff or members of the public. Operators are unloading the source rack and investigating to ensure that the sources will automatically return to the fully shielded position when power is lost."

60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION OF INVALID ACTUATION OF CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION VALVES

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"This 60-day telephone notification is being submitted in accordance with paragraphs 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to report an invalid Containment Ventilation Isolation (CVI) actuation at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 1.

"On November 24, 2022, at 1621 Eastern Standard Time (EST), the Train B CVI actuated due to an invalid high radiation signal from 1-RM-90-131, Containment Purge Air Exhaust Monitor. Upon investigation, the high radiation signal was caused by a failed power supply. Corrective action included replacing the power supply, 1-RM-90-131 ratemeter, and restoring the system to service.

"Prior to and following the invalid high radiation alarm, all radiation monitors except 1-RM-90-131 were stable at their normal values; therefore, the CVI was invalid. Control room operators performed appropriate checks and confirmed that all required automatic actuations occurred as designed. This event has been entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report 1819098.

"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."

ALERT - SEISMIC EVENT FELT ONSITE

The following information was provided by the licensee via fax and phone call:

"An Alert has been declared at Urenco USA. An Alert is the official designation for an emergency which is contained on the URENCO USA site. No public protective actions are recommended at this time. A seismic event was detected near the facility. A release of hazardous material has not occurred."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

On 12/16/2022 at 1645 MST, Urenco USA declared an Alert due to seismic event felt onsite. The Headquarters Operations Officer was notified of the Alert at 1916 EST (1716 MST). No radioactive release has occurred. A 5.4 magnitude earthquake occurred in western Texas with an epicenter 20 km north-northwest of Midland, Texas. Plant personnel are conducting walkdowns of the site.

The licensee notified state and local authorities.

Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, USDA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DOE Ops Center, CISA Central Watch Officer, EPA EOC, FDA EOC (email), FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), DHS NRCC (email), FEMA NRCC SASC (email), FERC (email)

* * * UPDATE ON 12/17/2022 AT 1400 MST FROM DANEIL MOLINAR TO BRIAN LIN* * *

On 12/17/2022 at 1400 MST, Urenco USA terminated the Alert due to a seismic event felt onsite. Urenco USA met conditions for event termination. No damages were found upon completion of site walkdowns. The licensee has notified state and local authorities.

Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, USDA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DOE Ops Center, CISA Central Watch Officer, EPA EOC, FDA EOC (email), FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), DHS NRCC (email), FEMA NRCC SASC (email), FERC (email), R2DO (Miller), IR (Ulses), NMSS (Helton)

MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"On December 16, 2022 at 2351 CST, with the Unit in Mode 1 at 13 percent power, a manual scram was inserted due to lowering Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) pressure, which occurred following an unexpected opening of Main Turbine Bypass Valve 1. All control rods fully inserted. Following actuation of the manual scram, RPV pressure lowered, resulting in an automatic Primary Containment lsolation (PCIS) Group 1 isolation (expected response). The main steam isolation valves and steam line drain valves all closed. The Group 1 [isolation] has been reset allowing RPV pressure control with steam line drains to the main condenser.

"All systems responded as designed. The plant is stable in Mode 3. Investigation of the bypass valve opening is ongoing.

"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS Actuation and 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) Specified System Actuation.

"There was no impact on health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - EQUIPMENT FAILURE TO HOUSE SOURCE

The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services via email:

"On December 12, 2022, the licensee reported that following a cardiac brachytherapy procedure the source train containing strontium-90 sources could not be fully retracted into the safe position. The device was placed into the emergency shielding box by a staff member. There was no exposure to the patient and there was no overexposure, based on calculations, to the individual who handled the device. The individual's ring and whole body dosimeters will be sent for processing to confirm. A manufacturer's representative responded later in the day and secured the sources into the fully shielded position and assessed the cause. He believed the hemostasis valve had been tightened a little too tight which caused a kink in the catheter that prevented the retraction.

"Device: Novoste Brachytherapy device manufactured by Best Vascular, model A-1000 series, SN: 87690

"Sources: 40 millimeter source train containing 16 Strontium-90 sealed sources with original activity of 34.88 millicuries (June 2002), source manufacturer AEA, model SICW.2, train SN: ZA-706.

"An investigation into this event is ongoing. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident No.: 9971
Texas NMED No.: TX220040

60-DAY TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of a primary containment isolation signal affecting more than one system.

"On November 11, 2022, at 2333 hours EST, Peach Bottom experienced an unplanned loss of the #343 Off-Site Startup Source. Due to the temporary loss of power during automatic bus transfers, several systems experienced Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group II and Group III (GP II/III) isolation signals. Plant Systems impacted by isolation valve closure included: Reactor Water Clean Up (RWCU), Containment Atmospheric Control (CAC), Traversing In-Core Probe (TIP) Purge, Primary Containment Floor and Equipment Drains, and the Instrument Nitrogen system. All equipment responded as designed.

"Plant conditions which initiate PCIS GP II isolation signals are Reactor Vessel Low Water Level, High Drywell Pressure, RWCU system High Flow or RWCU Non-Regenerative Heat Exchanger High Outlet Temperature. The PCIS GP III actuations are initiated by the Reactor Vessel Low Water Level, Primary Containment High Pressure, Reactor Building Ventilation High Radiation or Refuel Floor Ventilation High Radiation. At the time of the event, none of these actual plant conditions existed; therefore, the actuation of the PCIS was invalid.

"The loss of the #343 Off-Site Startup Source was caused by a failed printed circuit card in the programable logic controller (PLC) for the 3435 breaker. There is no time-based maintenance strategy for PLC replacement. The PLC circuit card was replaced, and the breaker restored to full qualification and service. Preventive maintenance strategy will be enhanced to address the identified vulnerability.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

FAILED FITNESS FOR DUTY TEST

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 0735 EST on December 19, 2022, it was determined that a non-licensed employee supervisor failed a test specified by the Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) testing program. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."