Event Notification Report for November 28, 2022
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/27/2022 - 11/28/2022
Agreement State
Event Number: 56242
Rep Org: Colorado Dept of Health
Licensee: Kleinfelder, Inc
Region: 4
City: Aurora State: CO
County:
License #: CO 958-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Meghan Cromie
HQ OPS Officer: Bill Gott
Licensee: Kleinfelder, Inc
Region: 4
City: Aurora State: CO
County:
License #: CO 958-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Meghan Cromie
HQ OPS Officer: Bill Gott
Notification Date: 11/28/2022
Notification Time: 10:35 [ET]
Event Date: 11/28/2022
Event Time: 05:30 [MST]
Last Update Date: 11/28/2022
Notification Time: 10:35 [ET]
Event Date: 11/28/2022
Event Time: 05:30 [MST]
Last Update Date: 11/28/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Vossmar, Patricia (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB, (EMAIL)
Vossmar, Patricia (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB, (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GUAGES
The following information was provided by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (the Department) via email:
"At approximately 0715 MST on November 28, 2022, the Department was contacted by the [Company Radiation Safety Officer] CRSO of Kleinfelder, Inc. (CO 958-01) to inform the Department that two Troxler 3430 (SN 35349 & SN 35335) moisture density gauges were discovered to be stolen from their temporary job site. Each gauge had sealed sources containing not more than 9 mCi of Cs-137 and 44 mCi of Am-241:Be or 66 micro curies of Cf-252. An authorized user arrived at the temporary job site around 0530 MST to pick up supplies when they noticed the door to the container express (conex) box was open. Upon further investigation, it was discovered that both gauges were missing. The site was secured by a security fence and under video surveillance, and that footage is currently under review. The thieves broke the exterior lock to the conex box door and they broke a lock to a job box in the conex box that contained both gauges in their locked transport cases. The job box was also bolted to the ground but those bolts were left intact. The CRSO estimates that the gauges were last seen/used on November 23rd or 24th, but the date of the theft is unclear at this time. Additionally, multiple other contracted companies were targeted in this theft that presumably occurred during the Thanksgiving holiday weekend."
Colorado Event Report ID No.: CO220040
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following information was provided by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (the Department) via email:
"At approximately 0715 MST on November 28, 2022, the Department was contacted by the [Company Radiation Safety Officer] CRSO of Kleinfelder, Inc. (CO 958-01) to inform the Department that two Troxler 3430 (SN 35349 & SN 35335) moisture density gauges were discovered to be stolen from their temporary job site. Each gauge had sealed sources containing not more than 9 mCi of Cs-137 and 44 mCi of Am-241:Be or 66 micro curies of Cf-252. An authorized user arrived at the temporary job site around 0530 MST to pick up supplies when they noticed the door to the container express (conex) box was open. Upon further investigation, it was discovered that both gauges were missing. The site was secured by a security fence and under video surveillance, and that footage is currently under review. The thieves broke the exterior lock to the conex box door and they broke a lock to a job box in the conex box that contained both gauges in their locked transport cases. The job box was also bolted to the ground but those bolts were left intact. The CRSO estimates that the gauges were last seen/used on November 23rd or 24th, but the date of the theft is unclear at this time. Additionally, multiple other contracted companies were targeted in this theft that presumably occurred during the Thanksgiving holiday weekend."
Colorado Event Report ID No.: CO220040
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 56241
Facility: Fermi
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Whitney Hemingway
HQ OPS Officer: Adam Koziol
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Whitney Hemingway
HQ OPS Officer: Adam Koziol
Notification Date: 11/28/2022
Notification Time: 08:38 [ET]
Event Date: 11/28/2022
Event Time: 04:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 05/04/2023
Notification Time: 08:38 [ET]
Event Date: 11/28/2022
Event Time: 04:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 05/04/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
Person (Organization):
Stoedter, Karla (R3DO)
Stoedter, Karla (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EN Revision Imported Date: 5/4/2023
EN Revision Text: HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM INOPERABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 0400 EST on November 28, 2022, during the performance of Division 2 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) cooling tower fan operability and RHR Service Water valve lineup verification, it was reported that the Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) Fan 'B' was making a loud metallic noise. The cause of the metallic noise is unknown at this time. The MDCT fans are required to support operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). The UHS is required to support operability of the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system. The EECW system cools various safety related components including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred based on inoperable cooling water to the HPCI room cooler, per LCO 3.0.6.
"Investigation into the Division 2 MDCT Fan 'B' abnormal noise is in progress.
"This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) based on an unplanned HPCI inoperability.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * RETRACTION FROM JEFF MYERS TO LLOYD DESOTELL AT 1615 EST ON 12/09/2022 * * *
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous Event Notification 56241 reported on 11/28/2022. On 11/28/22, an event notification to the NRC was made when mechanical draft cooling tower (MDCT) Fan B was declared inoperable and issued Limited Condition of Operation (LCO) 2022-0428 for Division 2 MDCT Fan B abnormal noise. The MDCT fans are required to support operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) (Technical Specification [TS] 3.7.2). The UHS is required to support operability of the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system (TS 3.7.2), which cools various safety related components, including the High-Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler (TS LCO 3.0.6).
"Subsequent inspection and evaluation determined that the brake noise is expected while fans are running at low speeds. This is supported by plant technical procedure, 24.205.10 `Div. 2 RHR Cooling Tower Fan Operability and RHRSW Valve Line-up Verification' (line item 2.2 in Precautions and Limitations) which states `Chatter from the brakes of the MDCT Fans is expected and no cause for discontinuing the test.' The equipment vendor stated that brake chatter is possible and common given that the internal components are free to move along the splined connections. Internal Operating Experience from experienced station operators and maintenance technicians confirmed that the condition is normal and expected. Both Division 2 MDCTs exhibited the same behavior at low speed and passed surveillance testing satisfactorily.
"No other concerns were noted during fan operation. Therefore, HPCI remained operable and there was no loss of safety function. The event did not involve a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"EN 56241 is retracted and no Licensee Event Report under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) is required to be submitted."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Notified R3DO (Stoedter).
EN Revision Text: HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM INOPERABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 0400 EST on November 28, 2022, during the performance of Division 2 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) cooling tower fan operability and RHR Service Water valve lineup verification, it was reported that the Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) Fan 'B' was making a loud metallic noise. The cause of the metallic noise is unknown at this time. The MDCT fans are required to support operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). The UHS is required to support operability of the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system. The EECW system cools various safety related components including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred based on inoperable cooling water to the HPCI room cooler, per LCO 3.0.6.
"Investigation into the Division 2 MDCT Fan 'B' abnormal noise is in progress.
"This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) based on an unplanned HPCI inoperability.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * RETRACTION FROM JEFF MYERS TO LLOYD DESOTELL AT 1615 EST ON 12/09/2022 * * *
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous Event Notification 56241 reported on 11/28/2022. On 11/28/22, an event notification to the NRC was made when mechanical draft cooling tower (MDCT) Fan B was declared inoperable and issued Limited Condition of Operation (LCO) 2022-0428 for Division 2 MDCT Fan B abnormal noise. The MDCT fans are required to support operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) (Technical Specification [TS] 3.7.2). The UHS is required to support operability of the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system (TS 3.7.2), which cools various safety related components, including the High-Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler (TS LCO 3.0.6).
"Subsequent inspection and evaluation determined that the brake noise is expected while fans are running at low speeds. This is supported by plant technical procedure, 24.205.10 `Div. 2 RHR Cooling Tower Fan Operability and RHRSW Valve Line-up Verification' (line item 2.2 in Precautions and Limitations) which states `Chatter from the brakes of the MDCT Fans is expected and no cause for discontinuing the test.' The equipment vendor stated that brake chatter is possible and common given that the internal components are free to move along the splined connections. Internal Operating Experience from experienced station operators and maintenance technicians confirmed that the condition is normal and expected. Both Division 2 MDCTs exhibited the same behavior at low speed and passed surveillance testing satisfactorily.
"No other concerns were noted during fan operation. Therefore, HPCI remained operable and there was no loss of safety function. The event did not involve a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"EN 56241 is retracted and no Licensee Event Report under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) is required to be submitted."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Notified R3DO (Stoedter).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 56243
Facility: Ginna
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: Jacquelyn Holshouser
HQ OPS Officer: Brian Lin
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: Jacquelyn Holshouser
HQ OPS Officer: Brian Lin
Notification Date: 11/28/2022
Notification Time: 15:34 [ET]
Event Date: 11/28/2022
Event Time: 09:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/28/2022
Notification Time: 15:34 [ET]
Event Date: 11/28/2022
Event Time: 09:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/28/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - Fitness For Duty
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - Fitness For Duty
Person (Organization):
Cahill, Christopher (R1DO)
FFD Group, (EMAIL)
Cahill, Christopher (R1DO)
FFD Group, (EMAIL)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT
A non-licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
A non-licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.