Event Notification Report for February 22, 2022

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/18/2022 - 02/22/2022

EVENT NUMBERS
55737 55738 55747 55748 55749
Agreement State
Event Number: 55737
Rep Org: PA Bureau of Radiation Protection
Licensee: Veolia ES Alaron
Region: 1
City: Wampum   State: PA
County:
License #: PA-0678
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Joshua M. Myers
HQ OPS Officer: Thomas Herrity
Notification Date: 02/11/2022
Notification Time: 14:22 [ET]
Event Date: 02/10/2022
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/11/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Bickett, Brice (R1)
McGraw, Aaron (R3)
CNSC (Canada), - (FAX)
NMSS_Events_Notification, (EMAIL)
ILTAB, (EMAIL)
Event Text
EN Revision Imported Date: 2/22/2022

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING SOURCE

The following information was received from the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, Bureau of Radiation Protection (the Department) via email:

"On February 10, 2022, the licensee informed the Department of a lost source (or sources). This is reportable per 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(i).

"The licensee performed packaging of some sealed sources and naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) under reciprocity at a client facility in Oakwood, Ohio, in October of 2021. The sources were packed in 2 drums, and shipped to the licensee's facility in Wampum, PA. The shipment was received on December 7, 2021.

"The licensee was contacted by the clients' Radiation Safety Officer last week because they were missing a source and thought perhaps that it had been erroneously packed with the sources that were shipped to the licensee's facility. The licensee had not done anything with the two drums since receiving them in December, as they batch process sealed sources every few months. The licensee inventoried the drums for the client and in doing so did not find their missing source. However, the licensee discovered that there appears to be a discrepancy in the inventory of the Strontium-90 sources within the drum.

"The packing list for the shipment identified 6 Strontium-90 sources with the following microCurie strengths: 459, 373, 432, 465, 255, and 411 with a total of 2,395 microCuries. The manifest for the shipment identified a total of 2,395 microCuries of Strontium-90. When the licensee technicians inventoried the 2 drums, they only found 5 Strontium-90 sources. The sources had been removed from their holders, which contained the source identification information. This removal was completed at the client facility. There is no way to determine which 5 Stronium-90 sources the licensee has within the drums. A licensee supervisor verified the inventory. They also cross referenced the inventory with the packing list. This double check revealed that only 5 Strontium-90 sources were present at the time of shipping. The licensee contacted the client and spoke to the technicians that packaged the materials. The client's technicians recalled that there were 6 Strontium-90 sources that were packaged.

"There was no indication that the drums had been tampered with during transit. Since there were only 5 Strontium-90 sources present when the licensee initially opened the drums, they believe that there was a miscount as the sources were packaged for shipment. The licensee was also able to verify that the 2 drums received had tamper seal placed on them at closure prior to it leaving the client facility. These seals were intact prior to the drum being opened at the licensee's facility.

"The cause of the event is believed to be human error.

"No more information is available at this time."

Pennsylvania Event Report Number: PA220006

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf


Agreement State
Event Number: 55738
Rep Org: Arkansas Department of Health
Licensee: Clearwater Paper Corporation
Region: 4
City:   State: AR
County:
License #: ARK-0530
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Christy Steward
HQ OPS Officer: Thomas Herrity
Notification Date: 02/11/2022
Notification Time: 16:17 [ET]
Event Date: 02/11/2022
Event Time: 17:38 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/11/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Kellar, Ray (R4)
NMSS_Events_Notification, (EMAIL)
Event Text
EN Revision Imported Date: 2/22/2022

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER

The following information was received from the Arkansas Department of Health, Radiation Control:

"On February 11, 2022, Clearwater Paper Corporation notified ADH Radiation Control that a gauge had a stuck shutter. During routine leak tests on February 10, 2022, the licensee noted that the shutter would not close. The gauge is identified as a Berthold Model LB 300 L source holder containing 1.54 milliCuries of Cobalt-60. The gauge remains in the normal use location with signage.

"The licensee has contacted the vendor who stated that this model is no longer available. The licensee intends to research an applicable replacement.

"In accordance with RH-1502.f.2 (10 CFR 30.50(b)(2)), the malfunctioning shutter is reportable within 24 hours. The State of Arkansas is awaiting a written report from the licensee and final disposition information for the gauge."

Arkansas Event Number: AR-2022-02


Non-Power Reactor
Event Number: 55747
Facility: North Carolina State University (NCSU)
RX Type: 1000 Kw Pulstar Pool Type
Comments:
Region: 0
City: Raleigh   State: NC
County: Wake
License #: R-120
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000297
NRC Notified By: Scott Lassell
HQ OPS Officer: Kerby Scales
Notification Date: 02/17/2022
Notification Time: 16:38 [ET]
Event Date: 02/17/2022
Event Time: 13:46 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/17/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Non-Power Reactor Event
Person (Organization):
Duane Hardesty (NRR PM)
Michael Takacs (NPR ENC)
Event Text
EN Revision Imported Date: 2/22/2022

EN Revision Text: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION VIOLATION

The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via telephone:

On February 17, 2022 at 1346 EST, while the reactor was operating at 95 percent power, the North Carolina State University test reactor was manually shutdown due to an incorrect power meter reading. The power meter was reading 20 percent power. The incorrect power meter reading violated technical specification 3.4. The facility director was notified of the event. The reactor is shutdown and secured.

The NRC Project Manager was notified.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 55748
Facility: McGuire
Region: 2     State: NC
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Tiffney Louy
HQ OPS Officer: Thomas Kendzia
Notification Date: 02/18/2022
Notification Time: 08:35 [ET]
Event Date: 02/18/2022
Event Time: 04:59 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/18/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
Person (Organization):
Miller, Mark (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 M/R Y 55 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby
Event Text
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP AND SYSTEM ACTUATION

The following information was provided by the licensee via telephone and email:

"On 2/18/2022, McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 2 experienced a turbine runback to 55 percent power. Based on concerns with unit stability, the reactor was manually tripped at 0459 [EST]. All Auxiliary Feedwater pumps started on low steam generator level as required. The reactor trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post trip. A feedwater isolation occurred as designed. Unit 1 was not affected.

"Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, actuation of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pumps along with the Feedwater Isolation, this event is being reported as a four hour,
nonemergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an 8 hour nonemergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified"

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

All control rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed via the condenser and normal feedwater. Unit 2 is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup.


Part 21
Event Number: 55749
Rep Org: Emerson Process Management
Licensee: Emerson Process Management
Region: 2
City: Louisville   State: KY
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Steven Stoops
HQ OPS Officer: Thomas Kendzia
Notification Date: 02/18/2022
Notification Time: 08:46 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2022
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/18/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - Interim Eval Of Deviation
Person (Organization):
Schroeder, Dan (R1)
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
Riemer, Kenneth (R3DO)
Azua, Ray (R4DO)
Part 21/50.55 Reactors, - (EMAIL)
Event Text
PART 21 INTERIM REPORT OF DEVIATION

The following is a summary of a report provided by Emerson Process Management:

On December 13, 2021, Framatome discovered a non-conformance with TopWorx limit switch part number C7-13521-E0 and initiated a return to TopWorx. Emerson Process Management (TopWorx) discovered that, at certain orientations, the limit switch would indicate dual continuity (both open and closed). The anomaly appears to be due to an internal component (brass washer) rotated out of position during assembly. This potentially affects 129 limits switches. TopWorx notified Framatome of the issue.

Contact Information:
Steven Stoops, Quality Manager, TopWorx
Emerson Automation Solutions, 3300 Fern Valley Road, Louisville, KY 40213
502 873 4606 Steven.Stoops@Emerson.com

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, February 22, 2022