Event Notification Report for January 07, 2022
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/06/2022 - 01/07/2022
Agreement State
Event Number: 55680
Rep Org: Texas Dept of State Health Services
Licensee: ECS Southwest LLP
Region: 4
City: Austin State: TX
County:
License #: L 05319
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Arthur Tucker
HQ OPS Officer: Karen Cotton-Gross
Licensee: ECS Southwest LLP
Region: 4
City: Austin State: TX
County:
License #: L 05319
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Arthur Tucker
HQ OPS Officer: Karen Cotton-Gross
Notification Date: 12/30/2021
Notification Time: 14:37 [ET]
Event Date: 12/29/2021
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/30/2021
Notification Time: 14:37 [ET]
Event Date: 12/29/2021
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/30/2021
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Werner, Greg (R4)
NMSS_Events_Notification, (EMAIL)
Werner, Greg (R4)
NMSS_Events_Notification, (EMAIL)
EN Revision Imported Date: 1/7/2022
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CESIUM SOURCE UNABLE TO FULLY RETRACT
The state of Texas (the Agency) reported the following via phone and email:
"On December 30, 2021, the Agency was notified by the licensee that on December 29, 2021, one of its technicians was unable to fully retract a 10 millicurie cesium-137 source to its fully shielded position. The source is installed in a Humboldt 5001EZ moisture density gauge. The technician had performed 3 samples that morning and the failure came at the end of the [fourth] exposure. The technician placed the gauge into its transport container and returned the gauge to the shop. The radiation safety officer (RSO) performed a survey of the gauge and found the highest reading 1 meter from the gauge was 0.4 millirem per hour. The RSO stated the transport index for the gauge measured that morning was 0.2. The RSO stated that the source was stuck about 2 inches outside from the fully shielded [position]. The RSO stated they used a hammer and anchor bolt and drove the source back into the shielded position. The RSO stated they noticed wet clay material oozing out of the area between the source shaft and the gauge case. The RSO believes the clay is what was preventing the source from fully retracting. The RSO stated they were taking a leak test of the cesium source. The RSO was instructed to isolate the hammer and bolt used to drive the source to the shielded position. The Agency went to the licensee's location and performed fixed and removable contamination survey on the hammer and anchor bolt used to drive the source back to the shielded position. No contamination was detected. The RSO's hands and clothing was surveyed for contamination. No contamination was detected. The RSO stated the gauge will be sent to the service company after the results of the leak test are received. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident Number: 9905
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CESIUM SOURCE UNABLE TO FULLY RETRACT
The state of Texas (the Agency) reported the following via phone and email:
"On December 30, 2021, the Agency was notified by the licensee that on December 29, 2021, one of its technicians was unable to fully retract a 10 millicurie cesium-137 source to its fully shielded position. The source is installed in a Humboldt 5001EZ moisture density gauge. The technician had performed 3 samples that morning and the failure came at the end of the [fourth] exposure. The technician placed the gauge into its transport container and returned the gauge to the shop. The radiation safety officer (RSO) performed a survey of the gauge and found the highest reading 1 meter from the gauge was 0.4 millirem per hour. The RSO stated the transport index for the gauge measured that morning was 0.2. The RSO stated that the source was stuck about 2 inches outside from the fully shielded [position]. The RSO stated they used a hammer and anchor bolt and drove the source back into the shielded position. The RSO stated they noticed wet clay material oozing out of the area between the source shaft and the gauge case. The RSO believes the clay is what was preventing the source from fully retracting. The RSO stated they were taking a leak test of the cesium source. The RSO was instructed to isolate the hammer and bolt used to drive the source to the shielded position. The Agency went to the licensee's location and performed fixed and removable contamination survey on the hammer and anchor bolt used to drive the source back to the shielded position. No contamination was detected. The RSO's hands and clothing was surveyed for contamination. No contamination was detected. The RSO stated the gauge will be sent to the service company after the results of the leak test are received. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident Number: 9905
Agreement State
Event Number: 55681
Rep Org: Nevada Radiological Health
Licensee: Universal Engineering Sciences
Region: 4
City: North Las Vegas State: NV
County:
License #: 00-11-14073-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Haley Brown
HQ OPS Officer: Karen Cotton-Gross
Licensee: Universal Engineering Sciences
Region: 4
City: North Las Vegas State: NV
County:
License #: 00-11-14073-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Haley Brown
HQ OPS Officer: Karen Cotton-Gross
Notification Date: 12/30/2021
Notification Time: 18:36 [ET]
Event Date: 12/29/2021
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/30/2021
Notification Time: 18:36 [ET]
Event Date: 12/29/2021
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/30/2021
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Werner, Greg (R4)
NMSS_Events_Notification, (EMAIL)
Werner, Greg (R4)
NMSS_Events_Notification, (EMAIL)
EN Revision Imported Date: 1/7/2022
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST AND RECOVERED GAUGE
The state of Nevada reported the following via email:
"On 12/29/21 an Authorized User failed to secure a portable nuclear gauge in its type A shipping container and transported the nuclear device from one work site to another. The unsecured gauge fell off the back of the truck's tailgate and was missing from approximately [1545 PST] until it was located at a nearby gas station at [1625 PST]. It had been placed next to an air pump refill station and left there by an unknown person. The Authorized User recovered the gauge and returned it to the licensee's use location.
"The RSO performed leak test sampling on 12/29/21 at [1900 PST] and the tests were sent to lnstroTek 's California testing facility for analysis on 12/30/21 at [0930 PST]. The gauge has been properly secured with 2 tangible barriers and isolated from use by other employees. The Radiation Control Program performed surveys and swipe testing of the damaged gauge and all results were within twice background. As soon as the licensee receives leak test results, the gauge will be prepared and shipped to the lnstroTek - California for disposal. Licensee will provide the RCP [Radiation Control Program] with additional results and information as it becomes available.
"Troxler Model 3440 S/N 23813 Americium-241/Be 40 mCi and Cesium-137 8 mCi. Last periodic leak test performed 12/14/21 - Passed"
Nevada Item Number: NV210022
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST AND RECOVERED GAUGE
The state of Nevada reported the following via email:
"On 12/29/21 an Authorized User failed to secure a portable nuclear gauge in its type A shipping container and transported the nuclear device from one work site to another. The unsecured gauge fell off the back of the truck's tailgate and was missing from approximately [1545 PST] until it was located at a nearby gas station at [1625 PST]. It had been placed next to an air pump refill station and left there by an unknown person. The Authorized User recovered the gauge and returned it to the licensee's use location.
"The RSO performed leak test sampling on 12/29/21 at [1900 PST] and the tests were sent to lnstroTek 's California testing facility for analysis on 12/30/21 at [0930 PST]. The gauge has been properly secured with 2 tangible barriers and isolated from use by other employees. The Radiation Control Program performed surveys and swipe testing of the damaged gauge and all results were within twice background. As soon as the licensee receives leak test results, the gauge will be prepared and shipped to the lnstroTek - California for disposal. Licensee will provide the RCP [Radiation Control Program] with additional results and information as it becomes available.
"Troxler Model 3440 S/N 23813 Americium-241/Be 40 mCi and Cesium-137 8 mCi. Last periodic leak test performed 12/14/21 - Passed"
Nevada Item Number: NV210022
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Power Reactor
Event Number: 55682
Facility: Columbia Generating Station
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: Dan Sharpe
HQ OPS Officer: Karen Cotton-Gross
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: Dan Sharpe
HQ OPS Officer: Karen Cotton-Gross
Notification Date: 01/01/2022
Notification Time: 17:35 [ET]
Event Date: 01/01/2022
Event Time: 09:10 [PST]
Last Update Date: 01/06/2022
Notification Time: 17:35 [ET]
Event Date: 01/01/2022
Event Time: 09:10 [PST]
Last Update Date: 01/06/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
Person (Organization):
Werner, Greg (R4)
Werner, Greg (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EN Revision Imported Date: 1/7/2022
EN Revision Text: HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE
The Licensee provided the following information via fax:
"During performance of a surveillance of the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) service water system on January 1, 2022, the HPCS system was declared inoperable for performance of the surveillance. During the surveillance, pump discharge pressure and flow were above the action range curve specified in the surveillance. For the given flow rate, pump discharge pressure was too high. This condition prevents declaring the HPCS service water system and HPCS system operable. The HPCS service water and HPCS systems remain inoperable.
"The station entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.2.A and TS 3.5.1.B at 0910 [PST] on January 1, 2022. In accordance with TS 3.5.1.B, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was verified to be operable. TS 3.5.1 Action B provides a 14-day completion time to restore HPCS to an operable status.
"All other Emergency Core Cooling systems (ECCS) are operable. This event is being reported as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function credited for mitigating the consequences of an accident per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The HPCS system is a single train system at Columbia.
"The NRC resident has been notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
The licensee is investigating the cause of the high pump discharge pressure and verifying instrumentation accuracy.
* * * RETRACTION ON 1/6/22 AT 1715 EST FROM CHASE WILLIAMS TO TOM KENDZIA * * *
"This Notification is to retract EN 55682, Unplanned High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) Inoperability. On 1/1/2022 at [1735 EST], Columbia Generating Station notified the NRC under 10 CPR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) of the inoperability of a single train of safety system (HPCS) for performance of the surveillance. During the surveillance pump discharge pressure and flow were above the action range curve specified in the surveillance.
"Engineering performed an analysis of this event and concluded the HPCS was operable during the event and would have performed its required safety function.
"The results of initial IST testing of HPCS-P-2 via OSP-SW/IST-Q703 on 01/01/22 resulted in measured parameters falling outside of the acceptable range specified for this pump. Systematic error was suspected as the cause of the failure and the test was reperformed following taking actions to eliminate the suspected systematic errors. The second performance of the test on 01/01/22 resulted in acceptable pump performance. Evidence exists that the initial performance of the test failed due to imprecise averaging techniques due to difficulties in averaging continuously changing values on the test instrument. The second performance of OSP-SW/IST-Q703 should be considered a successful test and the test of record as the systematic error was eliminated and measured parameters are considered valid.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The HOO notified R4DO (Rolando-Otero).
EN Revision Text: HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE
The Licensee provided the following information via fax:
"During performance of a surveillance of the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) service water system on January 1, 2022, the HPCS system was declared inoperable for performance of the surveillance. During the surveillance, pump discharge pressure and flow were above the action range curve specified in the surveillance. For the given flow rate, pump discharge pressure was too high. This condition prevents declaring the HPCS service water system and HPCS system operable. The HPCS service water and HPCS systems remain inoperable.
"The station entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.2.A and TS 3.5.1.B at 0910 [PST] on January 1, 2022. In accordance with TS 3.5.1.B, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was verified to be operable. TS 3.5.1 Action B provides a 14-day completion time to restore HPCS to an operable status.
"All other Emergency Core Cooling systems (ECCS) are operable. This event is being reported as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function credited for mitigating the consequences of an accident per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The HPCS system is a single train system at Columbia.
"The NRC resident has been notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
The licensee is investigating the cause of the high pump discharge pressure and verifying instrumentation accuracy.
* * * RETRACTION ON 1/6/22 AT 1715 EST FROM CHASE WILLIAMS TO TOM KENDZIA * * *
"This Notification is to retract EN 55682, Unplanned High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) Inoperability. On 1/1/2022 at [1735 EST], Columbia Generating Station notified the NRC under 10 CPR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) of the inoperability of a single train of safety system (HPCS) for performance of the surveillance. During the surveillance pump discharge pressure and flow were above the action range curve specified in the surveillance.
"Engineering performed an analysis of this event and concluded the HPCS was operable during the event and would have performed its required safety function.
"The results of initial IST testing of HPCS-P-2 via OSP-SW/IST-Q703 on 01/01/22 resulted in measured parameters falling outside of the acceptable range specified for this pump. Systematic error was suspected as the cause of the failure and the test was reperformed following taking actions to eliminate the suspected systematic errors. The second performance of the test on 01/01/22 resulted in acceptable pump performance. Evidence exists that the initial performance of the test failed due to imprecise averaging techniques due to difficulties in averaging continuously changing values on the test instrument. The second performance of OSP-SW/IST-Q703 should be considered a successful test and the test of record as the systematic error was eliminated and measured parameters are considered valid.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The HOO notified R4DO (Rolando-Otero).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 55690
Facility: Ft Calhoun
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: Kelly Daughenbaugh
HQ OPS Officer: Jeffrey Whited
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: Kelly Daughenbaugh
HQ OPS Officer: Jeffrey Whited
Notification Date: 01/05/2022
Notification Time: 13:36 [ET]
Event Date: 01/05/2022
Event Time: 09:09 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/05/2022
Notification Time: 13:36 [ET]
Event Date: 01/05/2022
Event Time: 09:09 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/05/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - Offsite Notification
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - Offsite Notification
Person (Organization):
Roldan-Otero, Lizette (R4DO) (R4DO)
Roldan-Otero, Lizette (R4DO) (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Defueled | 0 | Defueled |
EN Revision Imported Date: 1/7/2022
EN Revision Text: OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO ONSITE FIRE
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 0907 CST, a small fire was reported in the Intake Structure at Fort Calhoun Station. Offsite fire departments were notified at 0909 CST and responded at 0922 CST. Fire was confirmed extinguished at 0949 CST. Fire was extinguished using offsite resources per the Station Fire Plan. There were no injuries reported. The fire occurred in the Non-Radiological area of the plant and there was no release of radioactivity or hazardous materials."
EN Revision Text: OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO ONSITE FIRE
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 0907 CST, a small fire was reported in the Intake Structure at Fort Calhoun Station. Offsite fire departments were notified at 0909 CST and responded at 0922 CST. Fire was confirmed extinguished at 0949 CST. Fire was extinguished using offsite resources per the Station Fire Plan. There were no injuries reported. The fire occurred in the Non-Radiological area of the plant and there was no release of radioactivity or hazardous materials."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 55691
Facility: Cook
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Brent Snyder
HQ OPS Officer: Karen Cotton-Gross
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Brent Snyder
HQ OPS Officer: Karen Cotton-Gross
Notification Date: 01/06/2022
Notification Time: 11:06 [ET]
Event Date: 01/06/2022
Event Time: 10:44 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/06/2022
Notification Time: 11:06 [ET]
Event Date: 01/06/2022
Event Time: 10:44 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/06/2022
Emergency Class: Unusual Event
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - Emergency Declared
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - Emergency Declared
Person (Organization):
Skokowski, Richard (R3)
Veil, Andrea (NRR)
Shuaibi, Mohammed (R3 DRA)
Kennedy, Silas (IR)
Felts, Russell (EO)
Skokowski, Richard (R3)
Veil, Andrea (NRR)
Shuaibi, Mohammed (R3 DRA)
Kennedy, Silas (IR)
Felts, Russell (EO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EN Revision Imported Date: 1/10/2022
EN Revision Text: UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO A FIRE IN THE AUX CABLE VAULT
The following information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
On 01/06/22 at 1044 (EST), an Unusual Event was declared due to a Fire Detection Actuation in the Unit 1, auxiliary cable vault (EAL H.U 4.1). No fire was detected. Unit 1 and Unit 2 remain at 100 percent power.
The Llcensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the state, and local authorities.
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).
* * * UPDATE FROM DAN WALTER TO TOM KENDZIA AT 1452 (EST) ON 01/06/2022 * * *
At 1441 (EST), DC Cook Unit 1 terminated their notification of unusual event. The basis for termination was that the inspection identified no damage to cables or cable trays. The fire protection system is out of service for the auxiliary cable vault with compensatory measures in effect.
The licensee has notified the state and local authorities and will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Skokowski), IRD MOC (Grant), NRR EO (Felts), IR (Kennedy)(email), NRR (Veil)(email), R3 DRA (Shuaibi)(email), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).
EN Revision Text: UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO A FIRE IN THE AUX CABLE VAULT
The following information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
On 01/06/22 at 1044 (EST), an Unusual Event was declared due to a Fire Detection Actuation in the Unit 1, auxiliary cable vault (EAL H.U 4.1). No fire was detected. Unit 1 and Unit 2 remain at 100 percent power.
The Llcensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the state, and local authorities.
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).
* * * UPDATE FROM DAN WALTER TO TOM KENDZIA AT 1452 (EST) ON 01/06/2022 * * *
At 1441 (EST), DC Cook Unit 1 terminated their notification of unusual event. The basis for termination was that the inspection identified no damage to cables or cable trays. The fire protection system is out of service for the auxiliary cable vault with compensatory measures in effect.
The licensee has notified the state and local authorities and will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Skokowski), IRD MOC (Grant), NRR EO (Felts), IR (Kennedy)(email), NRR (Veil)(email), R3 DRA (Shuaibi)(email), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 55692
Facility: South Texas
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Long Han
HQ OPS Officer: Kerby Scales
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Long Han
HQ OPS Officer: Kerby Scales
Notification Date: 01/06/2022
Notification Time: 12:29 [ET]
Event Date: 01/06/2022
Event Time: 06:03 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/06/2022
Notification Time: 12:29 [ET]
Event Date: 01/06/2022
Event Time: 06:03 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/06/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
Person (Organization):
Roldan-Otero, Lizette (R4)
Roldan-Otero, Lizette (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EN Revision Imported Date: 1/10/2022
EN Revision Text: SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION - AUTO START EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR
"At 0603 CST on 1/6/2022, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the South Texas Project (STP) south switchyard electrical bus was de-energized momentarily and re-energized approximately 40 seconds later. Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) 22 automatically started in response to loss of offsite power on Train B Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Bus.
"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in the valid actuation of an emergency AC electrical power system (50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(8)).
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
Unit 2 is in a 72 hour LCO per TS 3.8.1.1.A for the loss of one offsite power supply. The plant is in a normal electrical lineup. There was no impact on Unit 1.
EN Revision Text: SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION - AUTO START EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR
"At 0603 CST on 1/6/2022, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the South Texas Project (STP) south switchyard electrical bus was de-energized momentarily and re-energized approximately 40 seconds later. Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) 22 automatically started in response to loss of offsite power on Train B Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Bus.
"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in the valid actuation of an emergency AC electrical power system (50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(8)).
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
Unit 2 is in a 72 hour LCO per TS 3.8.1.1.A for the loss of one offsite power supply. The plant is in a normal electrical lineup. There was no impact on Unit 1.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 55693
Facility: Saint Lucie
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: Stacey Dyer
HQ OPS Officer: Thomas Kendzia
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: Stacey Dyer
HQ OPS Officer: Thomas Kendzia
Notification Date: 01/06/2022
Notification Time: 20:51 [ET]
Event Date: 01/06/2022
Event Time: 19:37 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/06/2022
Notification Time: 20:51 [ET]
Event Date: 01/06/2022
Event Time: 19:37 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/06/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - Plant S/D Reqd By Ts
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - Plant S/D Reqd By Ts
Person (Organization):
Miller, Mark (R2)
Miller, Mark (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 68 | Power Operation | 35 | Power Operation |
EN Revision Imported Date: 1/10/2022
EN Revision Text: SHUTDOWN INITIATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
"On January 6, 2022 at 1937 [EST], St Lucie Unit 2 commenced a reactor shutdown as required by Technical Specification 3.1.3.1 Action 'e', due to Control Element Assembly number 27 slipping from 133 inches to 120 inches withdrawn and unable to be recovered within the prescribed time limits."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
Unit 2 entered 6 hour LCO to shutdown to mode 3 at 1539 EST as required by Technical Specification 3.1.3.1 Action 'e'. There was no impact on Unit 1.
EN Revision Text: SHUTDOWN INITIATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
"On January 6, 2022 at 1937 [EST], St Lucie Unit 2 commenced a reactor shutdown as required by Technical Specification 3.1.3.1 Action 'e', due to Control Element Assembly number 27 slipping from 133 inches to 120 inches withdrawn and unable to be recovered within the prescribed time limits."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
Unit 2 entered 6 hour LCO to shutdown to mode 3 at 1539 EST as required by Technical Specification 3.1.3.1 Action 'e'. There was no impact on Unit 1.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 55564
Facility: Louisiana Energy Services
Region: 2 State: NM
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type:
NRC Notified By: Blake Bixenman
HQ OPS Officer: Michael Bloodgood
Region: 2 State: NM
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type:
NRC Notified By: Blake Bixenman
HQ OPS Officer: Michael Bloodgood
Notification Date: 11/05/2021
Notification Time: 18:06 [ET]
Event Date: 11/05/2021
Event Time: 12:07 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 01/07/2022
Notification Time: 18:06 [ET]
Event Date: 11/05/2021
Event Time: 12:07 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 01/07/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
70.50(b)(2) - Safety Equipment Failure
10 CFR Section:
70.50(b)(2) - Safety Equipment Failure
Person (Organization):
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
EN Revision Imported Date: 1/10/2022
EN Revision Text: LOSS OF HIGH RADIATION AUDIBLE ALARM
"On November 5th, 2021, [1207 MDT] it was identified that a portable Area Radiation Monitor (ARM), which was performing the 10 CFR 70.24 safety function of the Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) to energize clearly audible alarm signals if accidental criticality occurs, had been removed from the area in error.
"On July 20th, 2021, during routine CAAS maintenance, UUSA [Urenco USA] staff identified an area in which a CAAS alarm was not clearly audible. UUSA arranged the ARM as a compensatory measure which achieves an equivalent 10 CFR 70.24 safety function in the affected area. UUSA reported this event to the NRC under Event Notification 55480 in accordance with 10 CFR 70.50(b)(2) in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when required by regulation.
"Removal of this ARM resulted in an inability for radiation detectors to energize clearly audible alarm signals if accidental criticality occurs in the affected area. UUSA hereby reports this event in accordance with 10 CFR 70.50(b)(2), in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when required by regulation (10 CFR 70.24)."
The licensee will notify the NRC Region 2 office.
* * * RETRACTION ON 1/7/22 AT 1552 EST FROM BLAKE BIXENMAN TO THOMAS KENDZIA * * *
"On November 5th, 2021, Louisiana Energy Services, LLC, dba Urenco USA, submitted Event Notification (EN) 55564 to the NRC Emergency Operations Center. This event notified the NRC of a 24 hour reportable event where a portable Area Radiation Monitor (ARM) performing a 10 CFR 70.24 safety function of the Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) was removed from service. UUSA reported this event in accordance with 10 CFR 70.50(b)(2), in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when required by regulation (10 CFR 70.24).
"Following this event, UUSA staff revised the calculations defining the Immediate Evacuation Zone (IEZ). The location of the ARM was near the edge of the IEZ boundary and the original calculation was completed prior to construction of the facility. The calculation was reviewed to ensure the boundary was still adequate. UUSA determined the boundary remains adequate with the area in question no longer inside the IEZ. The affected location is now outside of the IEZ. The IEZ is an area where personnel could be subject to an excessive radiation dose in the event of a criticality, required by 10 CFR 70.24(b)(1). Therefore, CAAS equipment subject to the event described in EN 55564 was not required to prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding regulatory limits, or to mitigate the consequences of an accident and does not meet the criteria for a reportable event UUSA herby retracts EN 55564.
"Details related to the revised IEZ boundary determination can be found in UUSA document CALC-S-00150, Rev 1, Immediate Evacuation Zone Calculations at UUSA. "
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
The licensee will notify the NRC Region 2 office.
Notified the R2DO (Miller) and NMSS Events Notification (email)
EN Revision Text: LOSS OF HIGH RADIATION AUDIBLE ALARM
"On November 5th, 2021, [1207 MDT] it was identified that a portable Area Radiation Monitor (ARM), which was performing the 10 CFR 70.24 safety function of the Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) to energize clearly audible alarm signals if accidental criticality occurs, had been removed from the area in error.
"On July 20th, 2021, during routine CAAS maintenance, UUSA [Urenco USA] staff identified an area in which a CAAS alarm was not clearly audible. UUSA arranged the ARM as a compensatory measure which achieves an equivalent 10 CFR 70.24 safety function in the affected area. UUSA reported this event to the NRC under Event Notification 55480 in accordance with 10 CFR 70.50(b)(2) in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when required by regulation.
"Removal of this ARM resulted in an inability for radiation detectors to energize clearly audible alarm signals if accidental criticality occurs in the affected area. UUSA hereby reports this event in accordance with 10 CFR 70.50(b)(2), in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when required by regulation (10 CFR 70.24)."
The licensee will notify the NRC Region 2 office.
* * * RETRACTION ON 1/7/22 AT 1552 EST FROM BLAKE BIXENMAN TO THOMAS KENDZIA * * *
"On November 5th, 2021, Louisiana Energy Services, LLC, dba Urenco USA, submitted Event Notification (EN) 55564 to the NRC Emergency Operations Center. This event notified the NRC of a 24 hour reportable event where a portable Area Radiation Monitor (ARM) performing a 10 CFR 70.24 safety function of the Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) was removed from service. UUSA reported this event in accordance with 10 CFR 70.50(b)(2), in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when required by regulation (10 CFR 70.24).
"Following this event, UUSA staff revised the calculations defining the Immediate Evacuation Zone (IEZ). The location of the ARM was near the edge of the IEZ boundary and the original calculation was completed prior to construction of the facility. The calculation was reviewed to ensure the boundary was still adequate. UUSA determined the boundary remains adequate with the area in question no longer inside the IEZ. The affected location is now outside of the IEZ. The IEZ is an area where personnel could be subject to an excessive radiation dose in the event of a criticality, required by 10 CFR 70.24(b)(1). Therefore, CAAS equipment subject to the event described in EN 55564 was not required to prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding regulatory limits, or to mitigate the consequences of an accident and does not meet the criteria for a reportable event UUSA herby retracts EN 55564.
"Details related to the revised IEZ boundary determination can be found in UUSA document CALC-S-00150, Rev 1, Immediate Evacuation Zone Calculations at UUSA. "
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
The licensee will notify the NRC Region 2 office.
Notified the R2DO (Miller) and NMSS Events Notification (email)
Agreement State
Event Number: 55683
Rep Org: Colorado Dept of Health
Licensee: Element Hotel
Region: 4
City: Superior State: CO
County:
License #: GL002594
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Phillip Peterson
HQ OPS Officer: Lloyd Desotell
Licensee: Element Hotel
Region: 4
City: Superior State: CO
County:
License #: GL002594
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Phillip Peterson
HQ OPS Officer: Lloyd Desotell
Notification Date: 01/03/2022
Notification Time: 12:46 [ET]
Event Date: 12/30/2021
Event Time: 00:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 01/03/2022
Notification Time: 12:46 [ET]
Event Date: 12/30/2021
Event Time: 00:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 01/03/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Werner, Greg (R4)
NMSS_Events_Notification, (EMAIL)
ILTAB, (EMAIL)
Roldan-Otero, Lizette (R4)
Werner, Greg (R4)
NMSS_Events_Notification, (EMAIL)
ILTAB, (EMAIL)
Roldan-Otero, Lizette (R4)
EN Revision Imported Date: 1/10/2022
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DESTROYED TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS
The following was sent by the state of Colorado by email:
"On 12/30/2021 - 12/31/2021, the Marshall wildfire damaged or destroyed nearly 1000 buildings in the towns of Superior and Louisville, Colorado. On 01/01/2022, Boulder County released a preliminary address list of affected properties. The Element Hotel is listed on the property list as destroyed. The Element Hotel has registered with Colorado 33 tritium exit signs. Based on photos of the Element Hotel, it is assumed that all 33 tritium exit signs were consumed and destroyed in the fire.
"Isotope: Hydrogen-3
"Manufacturer: Isolite Corporation
"Model: 2000
"Serial numbers: H118210, H118212 - H118241, H118243 - H118244
"Activity: 7.62 Ci per sign (251.46 Ci total)"
Event Report ID No.: CO220001
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DESTROYED TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS
The following was sent by the state of Colorado by email:
"On 12/30/2021 - 12/31/2021, the Marshall wildfire damaged or destroyed nearly 1000 buildings in the towns of Superior and Louisville, Colorado. On 01/01/2022, Boulder County released a preliminary address list of affected properties. The Element Hotel is listed on the property list as destroyed. The Element Hotel has registered with Colorado 33 tritium exit signs. Based on photos of the Element Hotel, it is assumed that all 33 tritium exit signs were consumed and destroyed in the fire.
"Isotope: Hydrogen-3
"Manufacturer: Isolite Corporation
"Model: 2000
"Serial numbers: H118210, H118212 - H118241, H118243 - H118244
"Activity: 7.62 Ci per sign (251.46 Ci total)"
Event Report ID No.: CO220001
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Power Reactor
Event Number: 55694
Facility: Comanche Peak
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Sean Woods
HQ OPS Officer: Brian P. Smith
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Sean Woods
HQ OPS Officer: Brian P. Smith
Notification Date: 01/07/2022
Notification Time: 09:32 [ET]
Event Date: 01/07/2022
Event Time: 01:20 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/07/2022
Notification Time: 09:32 [ET]
Event Date: 01/07/2022
Event Time: 01:20 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/07/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - Loss Comm/Asmt/Response
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - Loss Comm/Asmt/Response
Person (Organization):
Lizette Roldan-Otero (R4DO)
Lizette Roldan-Otero (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF METEOROLOGICAL EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY
The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email:
"At 0120 [CST] on 01/07/2022, a partial loss of the 25KV Power Distribution System caused a loss of both the Primary and Backup Meteorological Towers at the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant. This resulted in a loss of emergency assessment capability with regard to meteorological conditions.
"A backup diesel generator for the primary Meteorological Tower did not start due to a dead battery. After the battery issue was resolved, the diesel generator started but it subsequently tripped due to a loose fuse.
"The 25 KV Plant Support Power Loop feeds certain non-safety-related equipment and does not affect plant operation. Power was restored to both Meteorological Towers at 0305 [CST] on 01/07/2022 and proper operation was verified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email:
"At 0120 [CST] on 01/07/2022, a partial loss of the 25KV Power Distribution System caused a loss of both the Primary and Backup Meteorological Towers at the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant. This resulted in a loss of emergency assessment capability with regard to meteorological conditions.
"A backup diesel generator for the primary Meteorological Tower did not start due to a dead battery. After the battery issue was resolved, the diesel generator started but it subsequently tripped due to a loose fuse.
"The 25 KV Plant Support Power Loop feeds certain non-safety-related equipment and does not affect plant operation. Power was restored to both Meteorological Towers at 0305 [CST] on 01/07/2022 and proper operation was verified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 55698
Facility: Callaway
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Robert Shadbolt
HQ OPS Officer: Thomas Kendzia
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Robert Shadbolt
HQ OPS Officer: Thomas Kendzia
Notification Date: 01/07/2022
Notification Time: 16:29 [ET]
Event Date: 01/07/2022
Event Time: 12:23 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/07/2022
Notification Time: 16:29 [ET]
Event Date: 01/07/2022
Event Time: 12:23 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/07/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
Person (Organization):
Roldan-Otero, Lizette (R4)
Roldan-Otero, Lizette (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC TURBINE TRIP / REACTOR TRIP
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 1223 CST on January 7, 2022, Callaway Plant was in Mode 1 at approximately 100 percent power when a turbine trip / reactor trip occurred. All safety systems responded as expected with the exception of an indication issue with the 'B' Feedwater Isolation Valve, which was confirmed closed. A valid Feedwater Isolation Signal and Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal were also received as a result of the reactor trip. The plant is being maintained stable in Mode 3.
"All control rods fully inserted from the reactor trip signal, and decay heat is being removed via the Auxiliary Feedwater and Steam Dump Systems.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
The plant is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup.
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 1223 CST on January 7, 2022, Callaway Plant was in Mode 1 at approximately 100 percent power when a turbine trip / reactor trip occurred. All safety systems responded as expected with the exception of an indication issue with the 'B' Feedwater Isolation Valve, which was confirmed closed. A valid Feedwater Isolation Signal and Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal were also received as a result of the reactor trip. The plant is being maintained stable in Mode 3.
"All control rods fully inserted from the reactor trip signal, and decay heat is being removed via the Auxiliary Feedwater and Steam Dump Systems.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
The plant is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup.