Event Notification Report for October 13, 2021

EN Revision Imported Date: 10/13/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING SHIPMENT

The following information was received via email:

"The licensee contracted a common carrier to transport a Sr-82/Rb-82 generator to their RWM [radioactive waste management] site in Utah from the Warner Robins Facility (temporary job site). The package was picked up from the licensee's office on August 23, 2021 to be delivered in Utah on August 24, 2021. The package never arrived. The licensee contacted the common carrier, but was told they had to file a claim online. The package has not been found. The package was 84.63 mCi (3.13 GBq) with a Transport Index of 0.4. Results of a surface wipe test done before shipping were 203 dpm and surface reading was 6 mr/hr. "

GA Incident No.: 48

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

EN Revision Imported Date: 10/13/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN GAUGE

The following information was received via email:

"The morning of Wednesday, October 6, 2021, the Authorized User (AU) discovered that an InstroTek, Inc. model 3500, S/N 3360 (10 mCi Cs-137 and 40 mCi Am-241/Be) portable gauge had been stolen from the back of his work vehicle at his residence. The night before, the AU had secured the gauge with 2 chains and 2 locks to the bed of the truck and the box and trigger were locked as well. The chains had been cut according to the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO). Upon questioning, the RSO assured that gauge storage at personal residences overnight is not an acceptable practice and that the AU has current Department of Transportation training, which has not been verified by Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment. The incident was reported with the Denver Police Department. "

Colorado incident no.: CO210032

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

EN Revision Imported Date: 10/13/2021

EN Revision Text: AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM AFTER MAIN TURBINE TRIP

"At 1321 EDT on October 11, 2021, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 2 reactor automatically scrammed due to a trip of the Main Turbine.

"Unit 2 reactor was being operated at approximately 95 percent RTP [rated thermal power] with no evolutions in progress. The Control Room received indication of a Main Turbine trip with both divisions of RPS [Reactor Protection System] actuated and all control rods inserted. Turbine bypass valves opened automatically to control reactor pressure and subsequently failed open causing the reactor to depressurize. When reactor pressure reached approximately 560 psig, the operations crew manually closed the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MISVs) to stop the depressurization. Reactor water level lowered to -31 inches causing Level 3 (+13 inches) isolations. No [automatic] ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System] actuations occurred. HPCI [High Pressure Coolant Injection] and RCIC [Reactor Core Isolation Cooling] were manually initiated to control reactor water level. The Operations crew subsequently maintained reactor water level at the normal operating band using RCIC and reactor pressure was controlled with HPCI in pressure control mode and main steam line drains. The Reactor Recirculation Pumps tripped as designed on EOC-RPT [end of cycle recirculation pump trip].

"The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. An investigation into the cause of the turbine trip is underway.

"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. A voluntary notification to PEMA will be made.

"This event requires a 4 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an 8 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."

ONE PRIMARY COOLANT LOW PRESSURE INSTRUMENT CHANNEL SCRAM SETPOINT FOUND BELOW TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED MINIMUM

"[This notification is required] per University Of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) Technical Specification (TS) 6.6.c(1) to report to the NRC Operations Center that an Abnormal Occurrence, as defined by MURR TS 1.1, had occurred. MURR was not in compliance with one (1) Limiting Conditions of Operations (LCO). TS 3.2.g. which states, 'The reactor safety system and the number (N) of associated instrument channels necessary to provide the following scrams shall be operable whenever the reactor is in operation..' TS 3.2.g.6 requires four (4) Primary Coolant Low Pressure reactor safety system instrument channels provide a reactor scram when the primary coolant pressure corresponding to the pressurizer during normal flow drops below 75 psia. Surveillance testing on 10/11/2021 revealed that one (1) of the four (4) channels was not operable.

"On 10/11/21 while the reactor was shutdown for maintenance and conducting surveillance testing on the reactor core outlet pressure channels, the surveillance testing revealed that the reactor core outlet pressure channel associated with pressure transmitter 944B did not provide a reactor scram at an appropriate TS low pressure setpoint. On 10/11/21, the Primary Coolant Low Pressure reactor safety instrument channel 944B scram setpoint was calculated to be 74.43 psia which is slightly below the required 75 psia minimum. Previously on 4/12/2021, the Primary Coolant Low Pressure reactor safety instrument channel 944B scram setpoint was calculated to be 76.94 psia which is within the TS-required setpoint range. So, sometime between 4/12/2021 and 10/11/2021, the reactor possibly operated while one (1) of the four (4) instrument channels deviated from TS 3.2.g.6.

"Troubleshooting revealed the component in instrument channel 944B that caused the setpoint deviation. That component was replaced with an exact spare, and the instrument channel was retested and documented to be back in compliance with TS 3.2.g.6. In accordance with TS 6.6.c(4), permission from the Reactor Facility Director was obtained prior to the reactor returning to operation later on 10/11/21. Currently, MURR is operating at 10 MW. A detailed event report will follow within 14 days as required by MURR TS 6.6.c(3)."

UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION EVENT

"At about 0630 PDT while a process operator was attempting to move a pallet of four plastic 55-gallon drums containing uranium nitrate (UN) solution off of a containment pallet, two drums fell off of the pallet and into the sea-land container where they were stored. One of the drums split and leaked UN solution into the sea-land container contaminating the area within the sea-land container, the forklift, and the asphalt under and adjacent to it. This drum contained approximately [DELETED] of uranium. The uranium concentration in the UN solution was about [DELETED] and approximately half of the drum volume spilled.

"The operator was surveyed and was found not to have been contaminated nor to have received an acute dose from the spill.

"The spill is contained to a controlled area and no dose to a member of the public is possible. The area was restricted for decontamination and will remain restricted for over 24 hours."

The licensee notified the R2 Fuel Facility Project Inspector.