Event Notification Report for June 30, 2021

EN Revision Imported Date: 6/30/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE UNABLE TO RETRACT

The following was received via e-mail from the Rhode Island Dept. of Health, Radiation Control Agency:

"A licensee, Electric Boat Corporation, reported the inability to retract a 1.62 TBq (43.8 Ci) Co-60 source (QSA Global, Inc. Model A424-14, S/N 81346G) into the radiography exposure device (QSA Global, Inc. Model Sentry 330, S/N P30106) on March 7, 2021, at Electric Boat's Quonset Point Facility. At approximately 0120 [EDT], the [source] was [extended] without any issue.

"At the completion of the exposure, the radiographer attempted to retract the source into the exposure device, and attempted to re-expose the source to verify that the auto-locking mechanism on the Sentry 330 exposure device had engaged. At this time, the radiographer noted that the auto-lock did not engage and that dose rates indicated by his ND-2000A survey instrument at the reel (remote control) remained at approximately 10 mrem/hr. The radiographer then attempted to expose and retract the source to engage the locking mechanism 2 additional times without success.

"At approximately 0156 [EDT], the RSO [(Radiation Safety Officer)] was notified of the inability to retract a Cobalt-60 source into its exposure device. The RSO was able to observe the set up with an inspection mirror from the opposite side of the large part being inspected and determined that the guide tube had become disconnected from the collimator, exposing 10-12 feet of drive cable on the deck, and the source pigtail had become stuck in the collimator.

"After creating and briefing retrieval and contingency plans, source retrieval evolution began at 0640 [EDT]. The RSO Delegate secured the source pigtail in the collimator with a 6 ft long remote handling tool to prevent the source from leaving the collimator prematurely while the RSO stepped out from behind the lead shield with another 6 ft long remote handling tool to move the guide tube from the deck back up to the collimator. While the RSO was straightening out the guide tube and drive cable, a radiography supervisor was slowly retracting the drive cable at the reel to remove the 10-12 ft of drive cable slack on the deck while the RSO communicated via radio. Once the drive cable slack was removed and the RSO guided the guide tube back up to the collimator and tension on the source pigtail was released, the RSO Delegate released control of the source and it was immediately retracted by the radiography supervisor into the exposure device. The source was confirmed to be secured in its device by survey, and the evolution was declared secure at 0649 [EDT].

"RI Radiation Control Agency has investigated the report by Electric Boat Corporation and has determined that this does not have generic implications for the security of sources in radiography equipment at Electric Boat Corporation. The incident is considered closed by RI Radiation Control Agency."

* * * UPDATE ON 6/29/21 AT 1617 EDT FROM ALEXANDER HAMM TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

The following update was received via email from the Rhode Island Dept. of Health, Radiation Control Agency:

"Event Causes: 1) The first 1-3 male threads were rough, which lead to the female connection binding up prematurely. 2) The collimator connection was at or above the eye level of the radiographers, and obstructed from being able to perform a visual inspection of the connection. 3) Neither radiographer re-inspected nor verified the connection in the middle of the shift.

"Corrective Actions: By the licensee: 1) 2 collimators with male threads were identified as unsat and will be repaired or dispositioned for disposal by the RSO. 2) Thread protectors were procured and installed on equipment with exposed, male-threaded connections. 3) A Job Instruction Breakdown describing the connection and verification processes was developed."

Notified R1DO (Lilliendahl) and NMSS Events Notification (by email).

EN Revision Imported Date: 6/30/2021

EN Revision Text: PART 21 - FAILURE OF SIZE 1 AND 2 FREEDOM SERIES FULL VOLTAGE REVERSING STARTERS

The following is a summary of information received from Paragon Energy Solutions:

On 3/29/2021, Dominion - North Anna Station has identified instances where size 1 and 2 starters have failed to function as expected in assemblies that were originally supplied by Nuclear Logistics LLC (NLI). The mechanical interlock exhibited binding that prevented the contactor from closing when energized. The identified failed starters are utilized in an application of operating Motor Operated Valves (MOV). This is an intermittent duty application.

The issue was identified on Eaton Starter Model AN56DN*, AN56GN*, CN55DN*, CN55GN* style starters and contactors with supplied date codes T4514 (week 45 of year 2014) and T4215 (week 42 of year 2015). Paragon is in the process of identifying the date codes to provide the specific information to the identified plants.

The following plants were supplied starters from September 2014 through October 2018: Beaver Valley, Columbia, Ergytech, Harris, Millstone, NEK KRSKO, North Anna, Prairie Island.

The component design that exhibited the failure was revised by the original equipment manufacturer (Eaton) in October 2018. There have been no reported failures of the interlock mechanism in vintages manufactured before September 2014 or after October 2018.

These recommendations are based on the specific application: The reversing starters and reversing contactors are typically wired in a configuration that will electrically lock out one of the contactors when the other one is being energized to prevent both contactors from being energized at the same time. Therefore, the mechanical interlock is not required to prevent both contactors from being closed at the same time when the electrical interlock configuration is being implemented. In this scenario, the mechanical interlocks are not required and can be removed.

The motor control centers that contain the mechanical interlock should be monitored to ensure that there is no binding during operation.

The evaluation being performed by Paragon is expected to be completed by May 29, 2021.

Tracy Bolt
Chief Nuclear Officer, CNO
817-284-0077
Paragon Energy Solutions, LLC
7410 Pebble Drive
Ft. Worth, TX 76118

* * * UPDATE ON 5/3/2021 AT 1559 FROM TRACY BOLT TO BRIAN LIN * * *
The following revision was received from Paragon Energy Solutions via email and corrects the identified date code and includes the size and serial number of the starter that failed:

The issue was identified on supplied Size 1, 73262-025-00028 (Date Code: T4515 - 45th week of 2015) and Size 2, 73262-028-00001 (Date Code: T4215 - 42nd week of 2015).

Notified R1DO (Young), R2DO (Miller), R3DO (Orlikowski), R4DO (Deese), NMSS Events Notification, and Part 21 Group via email.

* * * UPDATE ON 5/28/2021 AT 1558 FROM TRACY BOLT TO KERBY SCALES * * *
The following update (Interim Report) was received from Paragon Energy Solutions via email:

"Paragon is submitting this Interim Report since this condition is currently under evaluation but will not be completed within 60 days.

"Paragon is in communication with EATON, the OEM for the starters/contactors to determine the extent of condition. The evaluation is expected to be completed by June 30, 2021.

"It was determined that Dominion - Millstone should not be included in the list of affected plants. Millstone will be removed from the list in the final revision of P21-03302021."

Notified R1DO (Bower), R2DO (Miller), R3DO (Feliz-Adorno), R4DO (Gepford), NMSS Events Notification, and Part 21 Group via email.

* * * UPDATE ON 6/29/2021 AT 1658 EDT FROM TRACY BOLT TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

The following is a synopsis of an update (completion of the evaluation) received from Paragon Energy Solutions via email:

"Paragon has identified the date codes of the supplied starters and contactors to provide the specific information to the identified plants. This information has been provided directly to the specific plant." [Millstone was removed from the list of plants.]

"The component design that exhibited the failure was revised by the original equipment manufacturer (EATON) in September of 2014. The failed units were from Date Codes T4215 and T4515 which are in the 42nd and 45th weeks of 2015. In September 2018 the drawing was revised again. In discussions with the OEM the revision of the drawing was due to a change in material type and was not a result of binding issues.

"This condition has not been identified on assemblies manufactured after September 2018.

"Due to the number of starters that have been installed and in service without issue, it is highly unlikely that there is a defect within all the supplied starters in the date range of September 2014 through September 2018. To date, Paragon has been unable to obtain any conclusive information from EATON regarding the potential cause of the binding issue. One of the failed starters along with samples of binding and non-binding interlocks have been provided to EATON for them to perform their own analysis on the potential causes of the binding issue.

"Until more information is gathered from the OEM (EATON) Paragon recommends the following:

"The reversing starters and reversing contactors are typically wired in a configuration that will electrically lock out one of the contactors when the other one is being energized to prevent both contactors from being energized at the same time. Therefore, the mechanical interlock is not required to prevent both contactors from being closed at the same time when the electrical interlock configuration is being implemented. In this scenario, the mechanical interlocks are not required and can be removed at the plant's discretion.

"Replacement mechanical interlocks may be ordered to replace the existing interlocks from the affected date code range if the plant application will not allow for removal.

"The motor control center cubicles or starter assemblies with date codes within the September 2014 through September 2018 range should be monitored to ensure that there is no binding during operation. It is possible that if the starter is found to bind during operation, the bound condition could be released by cycling the power to the starter. This action may release the bound condition and will allow the starter to operate."

Notified R1DO (Lilliendahl), R2DO (Miller), R3DO (Stone), R4DO (Werner), NMSS Events Notification, and Part 21 Group via email.

EN Revision Imported Date: 6/30/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOSS OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

The following report was received from the North Carolina (NC) Division of Health Service Regulation via email:

"A NC General Licensee reports the loss of 8 NRD Advanced Static Control devices. Each device contained Po-210 with an activity of 10 mCi, each. General License: TBD as at the time of this report our General License Coordinator is currently unavailable. The licensee reports that the devices may have been inadvertently disposed of and their search continues at this time. This report remains incomplete but shall be updated to complete and close the record."

Advanced Static Control Device:
Manufacturer: NRD Inc.; Model: P-2021-Z705; S/N's: A2MB768, A2MB770, A2MB771, A2MB775, A2MB777, A2MB731, A2MB736, A2MB738

Sources Information:
Po-210 Activity .01 Ci each

NC Item Number: NC210010

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf