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Event Notification Report for February 27, 2020

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
2/26/2020 - 2/27/2020

** EVENT NUMBERS **


54424 54546

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Part 21 Event Number: 54424
Rep Org: EMERSON PROCESS MANAGEMENT
Licensee: ROSEMOUNT NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTS, INC
Region: 3
City: CHANHASSEN   State: MN
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GERARD HANSON
HQ OPS Officer: OSSY FONT
Notification Date: 12/05/2019
Notification Time: 14:45 [ET]
Event Date: 11/06/2019
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/26/2020
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
Person (Organization):
ERIN CARFANG (R1DO)
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)

Event Text



EN Revision Imported Date : 2/27/2020

EN Revision Text: PART 21 REPORT - POTENTIAL DEVIATION OF PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS DUE TO TEMPERATURE RISE

The following information was received from Emerson Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc. via fax:

"Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc. (RNII) is providing an interim evaluation report on the treatment of temperature rise due to electronics self-heating in qualified life thermal aging calculations on Model 1153 and 1154 [inclusive of 1153 Series B, 1153 Series D, 1154, and 1154 Series H] pressure transmitters. The evaluation is being conducted to determine if modifications to the currently specified qualified life are warranted.

"Qualification programs for 1153 and 1154 pressure transmitters were structured to comply with the requirements of IEEE standard 323-1974 which requires aging to establish a qualified life prior to design basis event testing. Thermal aging is considered a significant aging mechanism; therefore, accelerated thermal aging was conducted on type test specimens as described in RNII qualification reports D8300040 and D8700096. These reports document the thermal aging basis for all 1153 and 1154 models identified in section 1.0. In both type test programs, temperature rise due to electronics self-heating was present during thermal aging and was consistent with expected in service normal operating conditions.

"These evaluations are expected to be complete by February 28, 2020.

"If there are any questions, or you require additional information related to this issue, please contact Nathan Schukei (952) 949-5213 or Paul Schmeling (952) 949-5359."

There are currently no known affected customers.

* * * UPDATE ON 2/26/20 AT 1454 EST FROM JEFF CHIVERS TO KERBY SCALES * * *

The following is a summary of the information provided by the vendor via fax:

"Rosemount Nuclear Instrument Inc. (RNII) analysis of both 1150 series and 3150 series included electronics thermal imaging to characterize the thermal distribution on electronic assemblies, as well as direct in situ temperature measurements of qualified life limiting components. Specifically, temperature measurements were taken on limiting components to quantify actual temperature rise for both the original qualification accelerated aging conditions as well as for normal operating conditions.

"The analysis demonstrates that temperature rise due to electronics self-heating on limiting components is application dependent. As a result, the calculated qualified life will be application dependent. In many application conditions, the originally established qualified life calculations will remain conservative with respect to the updated calculations (i.e. the updated qualified life will be longer than the originally established qualified life). In applications where the originally established qualified life calculations may not be conservative (i.e. the updated qualified life will be shorter than the originally established qualified life), RNII believes there is no impact to the safety function of either the 1150 series or 3150 series pressure transmitters due to any difference in calculated qualified life because long term aging information obtained from the limiting component supplier, supported by RNII independent internal testing, demonstrates insignificant change over time in the electrical parameters of the limiting components for the temperatures and operating conditions in question.

"To provide a more accurate model to account for electronics temperature rise in Arrhenius calculations, RNII is revising our temperature inputs into the Arrhenius accelerated aging calculation methodology for both 1150 series and 3150 series pressure transmitters. This revised methodology will be provided separately to end users.

"RNII does not believe this issue presents a risk to the safety function of the 1150 and 3150 series pressure transmitters. RNII recommends end users evaluate the significance of this notice to their specific pressure transmitter applications. If there are any questions, please contact our Technical Support Engineers at 952-949-5200 (RNll.lnfo@emerson.com) or Nathan Schukel at 952-949-5213."

Notified R1DO (Ferdas), R2DO (Davis), R3DO (Orth), R4DO (Kozal), and Part 21/50.55 Reactors, Part 21 Materials, NMSS _Events via e-mail.

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Non-Power Reactor Event Number: 54546
Facility: UNIV OF NEW MEXICO
RX Type: 0.005 KW AGN-201M #112
Comments:
Region: 0
City: ALBUQUERQUE   State: NM
County: BERNALILLO
License #: R-102
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000252
NRC Notified By: ROBERT BUSCH
HQ OPS Officer: KERBY SCALES
Notification Date: 02/26/2020
Notification Time: 18:15 [ET]
Event Date: 02/25/2020
Event Time: 13:30 [MST]
Last Update Date: 02/26/2020
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
NON-POWER REACTOR EVENT
Person (Organization):
EDWARD HELVENSTON (NRR PM)
LINH TRAN (EMAIL)
BETH REED (NRR)
GREG CASTO (EMAIL)

Event Text

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION NON-COMPLIANCE

The following is a summary received from the University of New Mexico Reactor Facility via email:

At 1330 MST, February 25, 2020, a pre-operational checkout was being performed on the reactor while it was shutdown. The pre-operational checkout includes confirming operation of the rod interlocks, scram systems, and control rods. The interlock check was performed and all requirements were fulfilled. During the manual scram test, Operators determined that only Safety Rod #2 and the Coarse Control Rod scrammed. Safety Rod #1 was still attached to the magnet and was being driven out along with the drive motor. As a result, the licensee was not in compliance with Limiting Conditions for Operations, Section 3.2a, which requires the fine control rod, coarse control rod, and the two safety rods be operable and the carriage position of the fine and coarse control rods be displayed at the console whenever any rod is above its lower limit.

Operators performed a series of tests to determine the cause of the problem. Operators determined that the rod and plate were sticking to the magnet, but could not be separated when the rod was subject to downward force. Corrective actions included cleaning the plate and magnet, and breaking any potential air seals at the plate. After a series of satisfactory tests, Safety Rod #1 was returned to operable condition and reinstalled in the reactor. The rod was tested to reassure it would scram in its original configuration. The issue with Safety Rod #1 did not affect the shutdown margin of the reactor, and at no time was the reactor operated when Safety Rod #1 was not in operable condition.

This notification is required per Technical Specification 6.9.

The licensee notified the NRR Project Manager (Helvenston).


Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, February 27, 2020
Thursday, February 27, 2020