DEVIATION OF TS 3.3.a(1) for ANTI-SIPHON DEVICE FOUND INOPERABLE
"On January 21, 2019 at approximately 1235 CST, with all four (4) shim control rods fully inserted into the reactor core during performance of a pre-startup checklist, the University of Missouri-Columbia Research Reactor (MURR) deviated from Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.a(1) due to test jumpers being installed while electrical power was available to the shim rod drive mechanism electromagnets. Prior to this event, the reactor was shut down for a regularly-scheduled maintenance period. A required notification per TS 6.6.c(1) to report to the NRC Operations Center that an Abnormal Occurrence, as defined by MURR TS 1.1, had occurred. Specifically, MURR was not in compliance with all TS Limiting Conditions for Operations, specifically TS 3.3.a(1).
"For about ten (10) seconds at approximately 1235 CST, power was available to the shim rod drive mechanism electromagnets while electrical test jumpers, which hold anti-siphon system isolation valves V543A and V543B closed, were inserted. In effect, the anti-siphon system was not operable while the reactor was technically operating for ten (10) seconds per the following definitions:
1. TS 1.23 Reactor in Operation - The reactor shall be considered in operation unless it is either shutdown or secured.
2. TS 1.27 Reactor Shutdown - The reactor is shutdown when: All four (4) of the shim blades (rods) are fully inserted and power is unavailable to the shim rod drive mechanism electromagnets.
3. TS 1.26 Reactor Secured - MURR did not meet the definition of Reactor Secured during the event.
"Though all four shim rods were fully inserted and a reactor startup had not commenced, electrical power being available to the shim rod drive mechanism electromagnets caused the reactor to technically be in Operation for a very brief period. Though this event happened at approximately 1235 CST, it was not fully identified as an abnormal occurrence per TS 1.1.b until approximately 1625 CST, after a reactor startup was performed to 10 MW operation. Once the abnormal occurrence was realized, the Reactor Facility Director was immediately notified at 1715 CST, and he gave permission to continue reactor operation. A detailed event report will follow within 14 days as required by MURR TS 6.6.c(3)." |