| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
12/20/2018 - 12/21/2018 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 53763 | Rep Org: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Licensee: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Region: 1
City: ROCKY MOUNT State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAN ROBERTS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 11/30/2018
Notification Time: 16:08 [ET]
Event Date: 11/30/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/21/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
JASON KOZAL (R4DO)
- PART 21/50.55 REACTORS (EMAIL) | Event Text PART-21 - EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR EMD FUEL AND SOAKBACK PUMPS LOOSE BOLTS
The following report was received via fax:
"ESI [Engine Systems, Inc.] was notified by a nuclear customer of two instances where a bolt was found loose or backed out of the cover of an EMD [Electro-Motive Diesel] engine driven fuel pump P/N 8410219. Following notification, ESI inspected remaining pumps in inventory and found instances where one or more of the pump cover bolts were loose or lightly torqued.
"EMD fuel pump, P/N 8410219, is commonly used on all 12, 16, and 20-cylinder EMD model 645E4 and E4B engines. The pump is either mechanically driven from the engine (via the scavenging tube oil pump) or motor driven (as in the case of a backup/redundant fuel pump). The pump transfers fuel oil from the day tank to the fuel injectors to support fuel combustion. Without the supply of fuel oil, the diesel engine is unable to produce power which adversely affects the safety-related operation of the emergency diesel generator set.
"ESI recommends inspecting the bolts of all pumps for proper bolt tightness. Use a torque wrench and ensure all bolts are tightened to 108 to 120 in-lbs (12 to 13 Nm).
"This activity should be performed at the earliest opportunity; however, it is more important for the inspection to be performed on newly installed pumps. It is expected that for pumps supplied with low bolt torque, if a problem were to develop it would be in the form of a fuel leak soon after installation. For pumps that have been successfully installed for several months or years with no detectable leakage, it is less likely that bolt(s) are loose and therefore the urgency of this inspection is reduced."
Points of Contact: (252) 977-2720
Dan Roberts, Quality Manager
John Kriesel, Engineering Manager
Affected Plants:
Region 1: Nine Mile Point, Fitzpatrick
Region 2: Brown's Ferry, Savannah River, Oconee, St Lucie, Surry Power Station, Turkey Point, Watts Bar
Region 3: La Salle, Point Beach, Dresden, Clinton
Region 4: Grand Gulf, River Bend, Energy Northwest,, Entergy Operations Inc - Arkansas, Omaha Public Power - Fort Calhoun
* * * UPDATE FROM DAN ROBERTS TO JEFFREY WHITED AT 1202 EST ON 12/21/18 * * *
The following was received via fax:
Revision 1 involves updates on page 2 of the 10 CFR Part 21 Report which include:
"In item (iv), added reference to F4B engine application.
Revised Item (vii):
"For all affected customers:
"ESI recommends inspecting the bolt tightness for all pumps. The recommended bolt torque is 108 to 120 in-lbs (12 to 13 Nm). After verifying bolt torque, a shaft freeness check is recommended. The pump shaft should be capable of being rotated by hand in either direction. Due to the small shaft size, this check is commonly performed with a small crescent wrench or with the coupling half installed on the shaft. Inability to rotate by hand indicates loss of end clearance and the pump should be returned to ESI for rework or replacement.
"Note: For installed pumps where it is not possible to check shaft freeness, ESI recommends using a reduced bolt torque of 60 to 70 in-lbs (7 to 8 Nm). This is sufficient to ensure the bolts are snug while safeguarding against loss of end clearance that would otherwise go undetected.
"This activity should be performed at the earliest opportunity; however, it is more important for the inspection to be performed on newly installed pumps. It is expected that for pumps supplied with low bolt torque, if a problem were to develop it would be in the form of a fuel leak soon after installation. For pumps that have been successfully installed for several months or years with no detectable leakage, it is less likely that bolt(s) are loose and therefore the urgency of this inspection is reduced.
"For ESI: The dedication procedures for these pumps have been revised or are being revised to add a step to verify proper bolt torque. This will be completed prior to any future shipments. In addition, ESI is in correspondence with the pump manufacturer to implement corrective actions to prevent reoccurrence."
Notified R1DO (Jackson), R2DO (Bonser), R3DO (Stone), R4DO (Alexander), and Part 21/50.55 Reactors (e-mail). |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED.THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 53784 | Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: SAM KELLER
HQ OPS Officer: THOMAS KENDZIA | Notification Date: 12/08/2018
Notification Time: 06:12 [ET]
Event Date: 12/07/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/20/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
| Person (Organization):
PATRICIA PELKE (R3DO) | | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text INOPERABLE CONTROL ROOM ENVELOPE
"Braidwood Station was performing Control Room Envelope Testing. During testing the Station identified a failed acceptance criteria. The Control Room Envelope is a single train system and could constitute a Loss of Safety Function. If a single train system is inoperable per Technical Specifications (TS), it is Reportable as a Loss of Safety Function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) regardless of the system's continued ability to meet the accident analysis requirements.
"Both Units remain Mode 1, 100% power."
The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.
The acceptance criteria that failed was to maintain the control room pressure above the miscellaneous electrical equipment room pressure.
The station has realigned ventilation to normal, and has entered TS Limited Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.10 condition B, which requires the station to restore to operable the control room envelope within 90 days or shutdown the plant.
The station has also initiated contingency actions to verify SCBA (self contained breathing apparatus) are available and control room personnel are qualified to use SCBA.
* * * RETRACTION ON 12/20/18 AT 1714 EST FROM ANTHONY SIEBERT TO JEFFREY WHITED * * *
"On Wednesday, December 19, 2018, Braidwood Station concluded that the ENS notification 53784 could be retracted. It has been determined that the issue was not with the Control Room Envelope structure. Troubleshooting identified that the Unit 1 Upper Cable Spreading Room Area Supply Flow Control (OVC035Y) damper which supplies the Train A control room ventilation equipment room with air flow was not opening enough to supply the required flow. The subject duct work is shared by both A-train and B-train, and the flow through OVC035Y is controlled by a two-position actuator. The damper is less open when A-train is in operation (actuator energized) and more open when B-train is in operation (actuator de-energized). The only adjustments performed were to the actuator energized stroke limits which only affect the A train and thus a single train failure which could affect the safety function of both trains did not exist.
"Further calculations of unfiltered air inleakage into the Control Room Envelope (CRE) under a slightly negative differential pressure condition resulted in a calculated in leakage to the CRE of less than the maximum allowable unfiltered air inleakage for a radiological event of 436 scfm. The unfiltered air inleakage into the CRE assumed in the licensing basis analyses of Design Basis Accident consequences was never exceeded. Thus, TS Surveillance Requirement 3.7.10.4 continued to be met and entry into TS 3.7.10 Condition B was not required.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified the R3DO (Stone). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 53790 | Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: VERSA INTEGRITY GROUP
Region: 1
City: SANFORD State: FL
County:
License #: 4500-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TIM DUNN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 12/13/2018
Notification Time: 15:03 [ET]
Event Date: 12/13/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/22/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RAY MCKINLEY (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL) | | This material event contains a "Category 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA LOST BY COMMERCIAL CARRIER
The following report was received from the state of Florida via e-mail:
"Received a call from Versa Integrity Group to report a missing Ir-192 radiography camera. The device was shipped from Sanford, Florida via [commercial carrier] on 11-29-18 in route to Corpus Christi, Texas, but never arrived. The last location that [the commercial carrier] can confirm the location of the package was Memphis, Tennessee. (Source information - model: A424-9, S/N: 62109G)."
The camera had a 330 GBq Ir-192 source.
The licensee contacted the commercial carrier on 12-10-18, to inquiry about the shipment and was told it was delayed. The licensee recontacted the commercial carrier on 12-13-18 and was told the package could not be located.
Florida Incident: FL18-153
* * * UPDATE FROM ART TUCKER TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1556 EST ON 12/13/18 * * *
The state of Texas also reported the same event since their licensee was the intended recipient. The Texas Department of State Health Services will be contacting the state of Florida about this event.
Texas Incident: 9645
Notified R4DO (Taylor) and NMSS Events Notification group (email).
* * * UPDATE AT 1345 EST ON 12/21/2018 FROM ART TUCKER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The following information was received via fax:
"At 12:39 PM [CST] on December 21, 2018, the licensee contacted the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] and stated they had received an email from [the commercial carrier] stating the exposure device would be delivered to the facility in Corpus Christi by 1645 [CST] hours today."
Texas Incident: I-9645
Notified the R1DO (Jackson), R4DO (Alexander) and NMSS (via e-mail).
* * * UPDATE AT 1703 EST ON 12/21/2018 FROM ART TUCKER TO TOM KENDZIA * * *
The following information was received via fax:
"The licensee contacted the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] at 1550 hours and reported they had received the exposure device. The licensee stated they would provide additional information after they completed their investigation. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident: I-9645
Notified the R1DO (Jackson), R4DO (Alexander) and NMSS (via e-mail).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for some hours. It could possibly - although it is unlikely - be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high activity sources (for example: level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and spinning pipe gauges) and well logging. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Note: This device is assigned an IAEA Category 3 value based on the actual radioactivity of the source, not on the device type. (Reference IAEA RG-G-1.9) |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 53791 | Rep Org: NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: BRAUN INTERTEC CORPORATION
Region: 4
City: BELFIELD State: ND
County:
License #: 33-48303-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVE STRADINGER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 12/13/2018
Notification Time: 16:12 [ET]
Event Date: 12/12/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/13/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL) | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY GUIDE TUBE KINKED WITH SOURCE EXPOSED
"Braun Intertec Corporation reported an event of the inability to retract a 1.44 TBq (39 Ci) Ir-192 sealed source (QSA Global, Inc. Model A424-9, SN 67476) which occurred at a temporary job site near Belfield, ND at approximately 4:02 pm CST on December 12, 2018. While performing radiography using a QSA Global, Inc. Model 880 Delta (SN D9541) exposure device on a pipe section resting on a stand, the pipe fell from the stand and kinked the guide tube. The radiography crew was unable to retract the source and immediately expanded the public dose boundary to an actual 2 mR/hr distance and maintained continuous surveillance and contacted their RSO for guidance. The RSO arrived on site the same day at approximately 8:45 pm CST and completed the source retrieval at approximately 9:45 pm CST. The sealed source was successfully retrieved into the exposure device. The maximum exposure readings from the direct reading exposure devices of the radiography crew and retrieval personnel was 3 mR. The crank assembly and guide tube were taken out of service. Visual inspection noted no defects to the pigtail assembly."
North Dakota Event: 180003 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 53796 | Facility: WATERFORD
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: TRACEY BERRY
HQ OPS Officer: BRIAN P. SMITH | Notification Date: 12/20/2018
Notification Time: 05:32 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/20/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
RYAN ALEXANDER (R4DO) | | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text CONTROL ROOM ENVELOPE INOPERABLE
"On December 19, 2018, at 2322 CST, the shift operating crew declared the control room envelope inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.6.1 due to valve HVC-102 exceeding its maximum allowed closed stroke time of 2.0 seconds during performing of surveillance procedure OP-903-119. Actual closed stroke time was 2.1 seconds. Valve HVC-102 is part of the control room envelope. TS 3.7.6.1 requires that two control room emergency air filtration trains shall be OPERABLE. Operations entered TS 3.7.6.1 action b, which requires that with one or more control room emergency air filtration trains inoperable due to inoperable control room envelope boundary in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4, then: 1. immediately initiate action to implement mitigating actions; 2. within 24 hours, verify mitigating actions ensure control room envelope occupant exposures to radiological, chemical, and smoke hazards will not exceed limits; and 3. within 90 days, restore the control room envelope boundary to OPERABLE status. Actions b.1 and b.2 were completed by placing the control room ventilation system in isolate mode at 2355. This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident,' due to the control room envelope being inoperable.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation | Event Number: 53798 | Rep Org: SAN ONOFRE
Licensee: SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY
Region: 4
City: SAN CLEMENTE State: CA
County: SAN DIEGO
License #: GL
Agreement: Y
Docket: 72-41
NRC Notified By: TIM CUSICK
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 12/20/2018
Notification Time: 13:56 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/20/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
72.75(d)(1) - SFTY EQUIP. DISABLED OR FAILS TO FUNCTION
| Person (Organization):
RYAN ALEXANDER (R4DO) | Event Text SPENT FUEL TRANSFER VEHICLE OUTSIDE SEISMIC ANALYSIS LIMITS
"As part of the reviews following the August 3rd 2018 canister downloading event (EN#53605), SCE has identified events where the HI-PORT may have been operated outside the analytical assumptions of the seismic analysis while transporting a loaded canister in the HI-TRAC. SCE has decided to conservatively report this issue.
"The HI-PORT is subject to requirements in the Certificate of Compliance that result in seismic restrictions on center of gravity and proximity to structures that could adversely affect the function of the HI-PORT along the haul route. SCE has concluded that during previous movements of loaded spent fuel canisters during 2018, the HI-PORT likely exceeded these procedural and analytical limits in some cases.
"Additional analysis is underway that may conclude that damage to the HI-PORT would not occur under these conditions. Nevertheless, this situation is being reported in accordance with 10CFR72.75(d)(1) for an important to safety component that was disabled or failed to function. There was no seismic event that resulted in damage to the HI-PORT during the fuel transfer campaign. All 29 spent fuel canisters are currently in safe storage within the ISFSI.
"NRC Region IV will be notified as SONGS does not have a NRC Resident Inspector." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 53801 | Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CHARLES BROESCHE
HQ OPS Officer: ANDREW WAUGH | Notification Date: 12/21/2018
Notification Time: 00:02 [ET]
Event Date: 12/20/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/21/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO) | | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text CONTAINMENT AIR RETURN FAN SYSTEM INOPERABLE
"At 1642 Eastern Standard Time (EST) on December 20, 2018, it was determined that both trains of Containment Air Return Fan (CARF) were simultaneously INOPERABLE from 0817 (EST) to 1129 (EST) on November 20, 2018. This condition is not bounded by existing design and licensing documents; however, it poses no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Therefore, this event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." | |