Event Notification Report for October 19, 2018
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/18/2018 - 10/19/2018
EVENT NUMBERS
53674536755367653677
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53674
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JUSTIN D. WILHELM
HQ OPS Officer: OSSY FONT
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JUSTIN D. WILHELM
HQ OPS Officer: OSSY FONT
Notification Date: 10/19/2018
Notification Time: 10:00 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2018
Notification Time: 10:00 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
LOW PRESSURE CORE INJECTION PUMPS INCAPABLE OF AUTOMATIC STARTUP
"On 10/19/2018, at approximately 0400 EDT, during an investigation into a failed surveillance test for a Loss of Offsite Power (LOP) coincident with a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), it was identified that the Engineered Safety System Bus degraded voltage relay scheme contained a time delay setting that could inhibit all Low Pressure Core Injection (LPCI) pumps from automatically starting and operating during a LOP/LOCA, thus making LPCI incapable of meeting its functional requirement of automatic startup and operation regardless of the availability of offsite power supply (UFSAR Section 6.3.1.4 and Tech. Spec. Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.17).
"The condition was identified during the first-time performance of a revised surveillance procedure for a LOP coincident with a LOCA signal. Fermi is currently in Mode 4 (Cold Shutdown) and LPCI auto start on a LOP/LOCA signal is not required. However, the initial investigation identified the condition likely existed in the past during modes of operation where LPCI auto start on LOP/LOCA was required. Investigation into the cause and corrective actions is ongoing.
"Since LPCI auto start is not required at the time of discovery (Mode 4), this event is being reported pursuant to 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(b).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"On 10/19/2018, at approximately 0400 EDT, during an investigation into a failed surveillance test for a Loss of Offsite Power (LOP) coincident with a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), it was identified that the Engineered Safety System Bus degraded voltage relay scheme contained a time delay setting that could inhibit all Low Pressure Core Injection (LPCI) pumps from automatically starting and operating during a LOP/LOCA, thus making LPCI incapable of meeting its functional requirement of automatic startup and operation regardless of the availability of offsite power supply (UFSAR Section 6.3.1.4 and Tech. Spec. Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.17).
"The condition was identified during the first-time performance of a revised surveillance procedure for a LOP coincident with a LOCA signal. Fermi is currently in Mode 4 (Cold Shutdown) and LPCI auto start on a LOP/LOCA signal is not required. However, the initial investigation identified the condition likely existed in the past during modes of operation where LPCI auto start on LOP/LOCA was required. Investigation into the cause and corrective actions is ongoing.
"Since LPCI auto start is not required at the time of discovery (Mode 4), this event is being reported pursuant to 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(b).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53675
Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: EDWARD CONDO
HQ OPS Officer: ANDREW WAUGH
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: EDWARD CONDO
HQ OPS Officer: ANDREW WAUGH
Notification Date: 10/19/2018
Notification Time: 12:04 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2018
Notification Time: 12:04 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
POSTULATED HOT-SHORT FIRE EVENT THAT COULD ADVERSELY IMPACT SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT
"During extent of condition review of a previously identified fire induced hot-short (Ref. EN#53644) an unfused circuit associated with the 0M23C0002A, Miscellaneous Switchgear Recirculation Fan was discovered. This condition is not bounded by existing design and licensing documents.
"This results in an unanalyzed condition due to the possibility for a postulated fire induced hot-short to cause a secondary fire in a different fire area, which would be outside the boundaries analyzed for safe shutdown in the Appendix R Evaluation, Safe Shutdown Capabilities Report, due to an unfused circuit.
"Without overcurrent protection for this circuit, the potential exists that an initial fire event affecting this circuit could cause a short circuit that would cause excessive current through the circuit beyond the capacity rating of the conductors. This could lead to a secondary fire in another plant area where this circuit is routed, challenging the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.
"The postulated event would affect multiple fire zones in the control complex.
"This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Interim compensatory measures (i.e., fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas of the plant.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
* * * UPDATE ON 10/19/2018 AT 1454 EDT FROM EDWARD CONDO TO ANDREW WAUGH * * *
"Further extent of condition reviews have discovered another unfused circuit. The circuitry is related to 0M24C001A, Battery Room Exhaust Fan. This condition is not bounded by existing design and licensing documents.
"This results in an unanalyzed condition due to the possibility for a postulated fire induced hot-short to cause a secondary fire in a different fire area, which would be outside the boundaries analyzed for safe shutdown in the Appendix R Evaluation, Safe Shutdown Capabilities Report, due to an unfused circuit.
"This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Interim compensatory measures (i.e., fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas of the plant.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector."
Notified R3DO (Hills).
"During extent of condition review of a previously identified fire induced hot-short (Ref. EN#53644) an unfused circuit associated with the 0M23C0002A, Miscellaneous Switchgear Recirculation Fan was discovered. This condition is not bounded by existing design and licensing documents.
"This results in an unanalyzed condition due to the possibility for a postulated fire induced hot-short to cause a secondary fire in a different fire area, which would be outside the boundaries analyzed for safe shutdown in the Appendix R Evaluation, Safe Shutdown Capabilities Report, due to an unfused circuit.
"Without overcurrent protection for this circuit, the potential exists that an initial fire event affecting this circuit could cause a short circuit that would cause excessive current through the circuit beyond the capacity rating of the conductors. This could lead to a secondary fire in another plant area where this circuit is routed, challenging the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.
"The postulated event would affect multiple fire zones in the control complex.
"This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Interim compensatory measures (i.e., fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas of the plant.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
* * * UPDATE ON 10/19/2018 AT 1454 EDT FROM EDWARD CONDO TO ANDREW WAUGH * * *
"Further extent of condition reviews have discovered another unfused circuit. The circuitry is related to 0M24C001A, Battery Room Exhaust Fan. This condition is not bounded by existing design and licensing documents.
"This results in an unanalyzed condition due to the possibility for a postulated fire induced hot-short to cause a secondary fire in a different fire area, which would be outside the boundaries analyzed for safe shutdown in the Appendix R Evaluation, Safe Shutdown Capabilities Report, due to an unfused circuit.
"This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Interim compensatory measures (i.e., fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas of the plant.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector."
Notified R3DO (Hills).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53676
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TERRY BRANDT
HQ OPS Officer: ANDREW WAUGH
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TERRY BRANDT
HQ OPS Officer: ANDREW WAUGH
Notification Date: 10/19/2018
Notification Time: 21:44 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2018
Notification Time: 21:44 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVE FAILING CLOSED
"At 1725 CDT, a Feedwater Regulating valve failed closed, resulting in a reactor level transient, which initiated a reactor trip, Primary Containment Isolation System signals to valves in Groups 2, 3, and 4 and initiation of High Pressure Coolant Injection and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling. All control rods inserted and level has been restored to normal. The cause of the feedwater valve failure is under investigation. All other systems responded as expected.
"This report is being made under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B), (b)(3)(iv)(A) and (b)(2)(iv)(A).
"The Senior Resident Inspector has been informed."
Decay heat is being removed via the main condenser and reactor vessel water level is being maintained by the condensate and feedwater systems.
"At 1725 CDT, a Feedwater Regulating valve failed closed, resulting in a reactor level transient, which initiated a reactor trip, Primary Containment Isolation System signals to valves in Groups 2, 3, and 4 and initiation of High Pressure Coolant Injection and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling. All control rods inserted and level has been restored to normal. The cause of the feedwater valve failure is under investigation. All other systems responded as expected.
"This report is being made under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B), (b)(3)(iv)(A) and (b)(2)(iv)(A).
"The Senior Resident Inspector has been informed."
Decay heat is being removed via the main condenser and reactor vessel water level is being maintained by the condensate and feedwater systems.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53677
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: DERICK DURHAM
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: DERICK DURHAM
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 10/20/2018
Notification Time: 01:13 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/20/2018
Notification Time: 01:13 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/20/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 19 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
TURBINE STEAM SEAL HEADER PRESSURE MALFUNCTION
"On 10/19/18 at 2202 EDT, at 19 [percent] Reactor power, a malfunction of [the] Turbine Steam Seal Header pressure control caused a loss of Condenser vacuum, resulting in an automatic trip of the Main Turbine and a manual reactor trip (RPS Actuation). Just prior to the reactor trip, Emergency Feedwater was manually initiated to mitigate the potential loss of Main Feedwater. Condenser vacuum was recovered after the reactor trip and Main Feedwater remained in operation. Due to the RPS actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a 4-hour non-emergency per 10CFR50.72(b)(2). Also, due to the manual initiation of Emergency Feedwater, this event is also being reported as an 8-hour non-emergency per 10CFR50.72(b)(3).
"Following the reactor trip, all systems responded as expected with no complications. Emergency feedwater was secured at 2300. Unit 1 is in Mode 3 and stable, continuing to cooldown for a refueling outage."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"On 10/19/18 at 2202 EDT, at 19 [percent] Reactor power, a malfunction of [the] Turbine Steam Seal Header pressure control caused a loss of Condenser vacuum, resulting in an automatic trip of the Main Turbine and a manual reactor trip (RPS Actuation). Just prior to the reactor trip, Emergency Feedwater was manually initiated to mitigate the potential loss of Main Feedwater. Condenser vacuum was recovered after the reactor trip and Main Feedwater remained in operation. Due to the RPS actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a 4-hour non-emergency per 10CFR50.72(b)(2). Also, due to the manual initiation of Emergency Feedwater, this event is also being reported as an 8-hour non-emergency per 10CFR50.72(b)(3).
"Following the reactor trip, all systems responded as expected with no complications. Emergency feedwater was secured at 2300. Unit 1 is in Mode 3 and stable, continuing to cooldown for a refueling outage."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.