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Event Notification Report for June 21, 2018

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
6/20/2018 - 6/21/2018

** EVENT NUMBERS **


53391 53419 53457 53462 53463 53464

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Agreement State Event Number: 53391
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: E I DU PONT DE NEMOURS & COMPANY
Region: 4
City: ORANGE   State: TX
County:
License #: L00005
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARTHUR TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: OSSY FONT
Notification Date: 05/07/2018
Notification Time: 22:11 [ET]
Event Date: 05/05/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/20/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SOURCE DISCONNECTED FROM GAUGE'S OPERATING ROD

"On May 7, 2018, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee's radiation safety officer [RSO] that on the night of May 5, 2018, they discovered the 100 milliCurie (original activity) source had disconnected from the operating rod of a Berthold model P2608.100 gauge. The RSO stated a set of tongs were used to remove the source from the vessel and place it in a lead pig designed for the source. The RSO stated the manufacturer has been contacted for assistance in repairing the gauge. The individuals who removed the source from the vessel were wearing dosimetry and the RSO stated they were sending the dosimeters in for processing. The RSO stated they had no reason to believe any individual exceeded any limit. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident # 9570

* * * UPDATE ON 6/20/2018 AT 1117 EDT FROM ART TUCKER TO DONG PARK * * *

The following was received via e-mail:

"During the licensee's investigation of this event, the radiation safety officer (RSO) found that the source on a second, almost identical, gauge had also separated from the operating rod. The second gauge, model HPS-1, contains a 500 milliCurie cobalt - 60 source. The failure does not create an exposure risk to any individual. The RSO stated they had received the results for the dosimetry sent for processing from the first reported failure and all readings were 0.0 millirem. The highest lifetime dose for any individual in the report was 105 millirem. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Notified R4DO (Hay), and NMSS Events Notification via email.

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED.THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 53419
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1     State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JIM DOUGHERTY
HQ OPS Officer: THOMAS KENDZIA
Notification Date: 05/22/2018
Notification Time: 18:38 [ET]
Event Date: 05/22/2018
Event Time: 12:56 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/21/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

GAS VOIDS DISCOVERED IN BOTH TRAINS OF LOW HEAD SAFETY INJECTION

"On 5/22/2018, while operating at approximately 100 percent power, Ultrasonic Testing of the Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit 1 Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) pump suction piping identified gas voids in excess of the acceptable limit for void volume. Both trains of LHSI were declared inoperable. Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.2 for both trains of the LHSI system was entered along with TS 3.0.3 which requires the initiation of a plant shutdown. Time of TS entry was 12:56 (EDT).

"Plant shutdown was commenced at 15:56 (EDT) in accordance with plant procedures.

"At 15:59 (EDT) Train 'A' LHSI was restored to operable status, TS 3.0.3 Action was exited and the power reduction was stopped at approximately 99 percent.

"At 17:43 (EDT) Train 'B' LHSI was restored to operable status, TS 3.5.2 Actions were exited.

"This is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii) Unanalyzed Condition, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented the Fulfillment of a Safety Function and 10 CFR 50. 72(b )(2)(i) TS Required Shutdown.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * RETRACTION ON 6/21/18 AT 1535 EDT FROM SHAWN KEENER TO RICHARD SMITH * * *

"Further engineering evaluation has determined that the gas voids that existed at the time of discovery would not have rendered the LHSI [Low Head Safety Injection] system inoperable if it were required to actuate. The engineering evaluation concluded that filling of the containment sump during a Design Basis Accident would result in a void volume reduction such that the void in the LHSI suction piping would not be large enough to significantly impact the operability of the system. Therefore, the system remained operable but degraded. No TSs [Technical Specifications] were required to be entered and no shutdown was required. As such, all three reporting criteria do not apply and are being retracted.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified R1DO (Burritt).

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Agreement State Event Number: 53457
Rep Org: OK DEQ RAD MANAGEMENT
Licensee: UNIVERSAL PRESSURE PUMPING, INC.
Region: 4
City:   State: OK
County:
License #: OK-32152-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEVIN SAMPSON
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 06/13/2018
Notification Time: 17:19 [ET]
Event Date: 06/13/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/13/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIXED NUCLEAR GAUGE SHUTTER STUCK

The following information was received via E-mail:

"We [Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality] have been informed by Universal Pressure Pumping, Inc. that one of their Berthold LB 8010 fixed gauges has experienced a failure of the shutter mechanism resulting in it being stuck in the open position. The gauge has been removed from the truck and is in storage. The licensee has contacted Berthold and is arranging for one of Berthold's technicians to come to their facility to repair the gauge."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 53462
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2     State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK MOEBES
HQ OPS Officer: RICHARD SMITH
Notification Date: 06/20/2018
Notification Time: 11:39 [ET]
Event Date: 06/20/2018
Event Time: 10:03 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/20/2018
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
BRIAN HOLIAN (NRR)
CATHY HANEY (R2RA)
JEFF GRANT (IRD)
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
3 N Y 94 Power Operation 94 Power Operation

Event Text

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO TOXIC GAS RELEASE

On June 20, 2018 at 1003 CDT, the licensee declared a Notification of Unusual Event based on Emergency Action Level (EAL) 6.5.U, toxic gas release on site.

The Notification of Unusual Event was terminated at 1025 CDT.

The toxic gas release occurred when site personnel were filling a fire suppression carbon dioxide (CO2) tank outside the diesel generator building. The relief valve in the common diesel generator room for Unit 1 and 2 diesel generators inadvertently lifted causing a toxic gas environment by releasing CO2 into the room. The licensee terminated the tank fill stopping the release of CO2, and with the door to the room being opened, the gas cleared in about 20 minutes.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email) and NuclearSSA (email).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 53463
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3     State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: ROBERT RUSH
HQ OPS Officer: RICHARD SMITH
Notification Date: 06/20/2018
Notification Time: 17:51 [ET]
Event Date: 06/20/2018
Event Time: 11:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/20/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 98 Power Operation 98 Power Operation

Event Text

HIGH-PRESSURE CORE SPRAY INOPERABLE

"On June 20, 2018, at 1145 hours (CDT), during panel walkdown, it was identified that High-Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) injection valve 1E22F004 was in the open position. Valve 1E22F004 is normally closed for containment integrity purposes. Operations personnel verified that the valve was open locally and that the plant computer indicated the valve is in the 'not closed' position. No alarms or status lamps indicated why the valve would be open and there was no valid demand signal. Reactor power, pressure, level, and feedwater parameters remain steady and unchanged, with no indication of HPCS injection having occurred or in progress.

"A low-water level signal, or a high drywell pressure signal, or manual operation initiates HPCS. When a high-water level in the reactor vessel is detected, HPCS injection is automatically stopped by a signal to close injection valve 1E22F004. With valve 1E22F004 in the open position without a demand signal, closure on a high reactor water level condition was not assured. Therefore, HPCS was declared inoperable. The following Technical Specifications were entered: 3.5.1, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) - Operating and 3.6.1.3, Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs).

"Subsequently, HPCS injection valve 1E22F004 was observed to be cycling without operator action. The valve was deactivated in the closed position to assure the containment isolation function.

"The cause of valve 1E22F004 cycling without operator action is under investigation.

"HPCS is a single train safety system that consists of a single motor-driven pump, a spray sparger in the reactor vessel, and associated piping, valves, controls and instrumentation. HPCS is part of the ECCS network, which also includes Low-Pressure Core Spray, Low-Pressure Coolant Injection, and the Automatic Depressurization system.

"This event is being reported as an 8-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as, 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; (B) Remove residual heat; (C) Control the release of radioactive material; or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.'"

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Part 21 Event Number: 53464
Rep Org: AAF FLANDERS
Licensee: AAF FLANDERS
Region: 1
City: WASHINGTON   State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SHAWN WINDLEY
HQ OPS Officer: RICHARD SMITH
Notification Date: 06/20/2018
Notification Time: 20:55 [ET]
Event Date: 05/02/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTORS ()

Event Text

PART 21 - INTERIM REPORT NOTIFICATION

The following was received via phone call and email:

This report provides notification and interim information concerning an evaluation being performed by AAF Flanders for an unapproved design change in a High Efficiency Particulate Air Filter.

"An evaluation is underway for filters that underwent a non-approved design change. AAF Flanders has determined that an evaluation cannot be completed within the 60 day period. Discovery of the potential deviation was May 2, 2018.

"The information required for the 60-Day Interim Report Notification 21.21(a)(2) was provided. We anticipate that the evaluation will be completed by Sept 15, 2018.

"AAF Flanders is evaluating a potential nonconforming condition associated with filters (model number 0-007-C-42-03-NU-11-13-GG FU5) supplied to Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) / Xcel Energy."

AAF Flanders notified Prairie Island Nuclear Plant of this potential defect.

* * * UPDATE ON 9/14/2108 AT 1129 EDT FROM SHAWN WINDLEY TO ANDREW WAUGH * * *

The following information was received via email:

"A notification was submitted to the Commission with the subject matter of, 'Unapproved Design Change in a High Efficiency Particulate Air Filter.' At this time, the evaluation is pending third party qualification testing of the product. Information obtained from the qualification will be used in the determination of a defect. AAF Flanders had anticipated this process to have been completed by Sept 15, 2018 but because it is still on-going, we request an extension until October 31, 2018 to submit a final report to the Commission.

"The subject filters (model number 0-007-C-42-03-NU-11-13-GG FU5) supplied to Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP)/ Xcel Energy had not been installed. AAF Flanders has recalled the subject filters and currently have them segregated and stored at our facility. They pose no threat public safety."

Notified R3DO (Hanna) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors Group (email).

* * * UPDATE ON 10/31/18 AT 1545 EDT FROM SHAWN WINDLEY TO HOWIE CROUCH * * *

The following information was excerpted from information received via email:

"AAF Flanders had anticipated the qualification process for said filters to have been completed by Sept 15, 2018. AAF requested a second extension by October 31, 2018 to submit a final report to the Commission, however; at this time our qualification is still pending third party approval. AAF Flanders is requesting another extension on the basis of an incomplete qualification of these filters. We anticipate qualification and a completed report on or before 12/15/2018."

Notified R3DO (Stoedter) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors Group (email).


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