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Event Notification Report for April 2, 2018

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
03/30/2018 - 04/02/2018

** EVENT NUMBERS **


53215 53278 53279 53280 53281 53282 53283 53284 53302 53303 53304 53305

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Power Reactor Event Number: 53215
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: JORGE LESTER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 02/16/2018
Notification Time: 02:50 [ET]
Event Date: 02/15/2018
Event Time: 21:53 [MST]
Last Update Date: 03/30/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOW DEPARTURE FROM NUCLEATE BOILING SIGNAL

"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.

"On February 15, 2018, at approximately 2153 Mountain Standard Time (MST), the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 1 Control Room received Reactor Protection System alarms for Low Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio and an automatic reactor trip occurred. Prior to the reactor trip, Unit 1 was operating normally at 100 percent power. Plant operators entered the emergency operations procedures and diagnosed an uncomplicated reactor trip but noted that Reactor Coolant Pumps 1B and 2B were not running due to a loss of power. All CEAs [Control Element Assemblies] fully inserted into the core. Following the reactor trip, all nuclear instruments responded normally. No emergency classification was required per the PVGS Emergency Plan.

"The PVGS Unit 1 safety related electrical busses remained energized from normal offsite power during the event. The Unit 1 'B' Diesel Generator is currently removed from service for maintenance. Due to ongoing planned maintenance on NAN-X02, Startup Transformer 2, fast bus transfer for NAN-S02 (from NAN-S04) was blocked. This resulted in a loss of offsite power to NAN-S02 and NBN-S02. The offsite power grid is stable. Unit 1 is currently stable in Mode 3 with the reactor coolant system at normal operating temperature and pressure.

"The event did not result in any challenges to fission product barriers and there were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event. The event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of the Unit 1 reactor trip."

* * * UPDATE ON 2/16/18 AT 1640 EST FROM DAVID HECKMAN TO DONG PARK * * *

"Unit 1 is stable in Mode 3 following an uncomplicated trip. Offsite power has been restored to non-safety related electrical busses. Troubleshooting continues to determine the cause of the event.

"During performance of the alarm response procedure, it was identified that the seismic monitoring (SM) system had been in alarm since the reactor trip and was incapable of performing its emergency plan function. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), this condition constitutes a major loss of emergency assessment capability. Compensatory measures have been implemented in accordance with PVNGS procedures to provide alternative methods for HU2.1 event classification with the SM system out of service. Maintenance is currently in progress to restore SM system functionality."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Werner).

* * * UPDATE AT 1537 EDT ON 03/30/18 FROM LORRAINE WEAVER TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

"Station staff completed an evaluation of event EN #53215 reported on February 15, 2018, and determined that the seismic monitoring system remained capable of assessing a seismic event following the reactor trip. Therefore, a major loss of emergency assessment capability pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) did not occur as reported in the update on February 16, 2018.

"The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified."

Notified the R4DO (Gaddy).

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Agreement State Event Number: 53278
Rep Org: OK DEQ RAD MANAGEMENT
Licensee: WESTERN FARMERS ELECTRIC COOP.
Region: 4
City: HUGO State: OK
County:
License #: OK-19428-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JENNIFER MCALLISTER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 03/22/2018
Notification Time: 10:48 [ET]
Event Date: 03/22/2018
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/22/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JEREMY GROOM (R4DO)
NMSS EVENTS NOTIFICA (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIXED NUCLEAR GAUGE SHUTTER FAILED CLOSED

The following information was received via E-mail:

The licensee reported on 3/22/2018 that the spring for the shutter cable on a Texas Nuclear Corporation (now TN Technologies) Model 5197 fixed nuclear gauge broke. The shutter is closed and surveys have been taken showing no leakage. The licensee has contacted the manufacturer who will dispatch technicians to repair the device.

Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality will update this report when more information is known.


* * * UPDATE FROM JENNIFER MCALLISTER TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1536 EDT ON 3/22/2018 * * *

The following information was received via E-mail:

The event occurred on 3/15/2018. The source is a TN Tech. Model 57157C, 100 mCi, Cs-137 source. The Serial Number of the gauge is B919.

Notified R4DO (Groom) and NMSS Event Notifications.

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 53279
Facility: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
                   LEU FABRICATION
                   LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
Region: 2
City: WILMINGTON State: NC
County: NEW HANOVER
License #: SNM-1097
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001113
NRC Notified By: PHILLIP OTIS
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 03/22/2018
Notification Time: 16:58 [ET]
Event Date: 03/22/2018
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/22/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (c) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION/NEWS REL
Person (Organization):
SHANE SANDAL (R2DO)
NMSS EVENT NOTIFICAT (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

CONCURRENT REPORT DUE TO LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGN TUBE

"At approximately 1645 EDT on 3/22/2018, a report was made to the State of North Carolina Department of Radiation Protection. The report is below:

"At approximately 1600 EDT on 3/22/2018 it was determined that a tube from an Everglo Tritium Exit sign was missing. The other three tubes were in the sign. The discovery was made as the sign was being prepared for shipment to disposal. This report is being made in accordance with 10A NCAC 15.1645(a). There is no suspected excessive exposure to employees or members of the public.

"This report to NRC is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 70 Appendix A(c) - Concurrent Reports, '... notification to other government agencies has been or will be made, shall be reported to the NRC Operations Center concurrent to the news release or other notification.'"

See EN 53282 for corresponding report from the State of North Carolina.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Agreement State Event Number: 53280
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: CAN USA INC.
Region: 4
City: HARVEY State: LA
County:
License #: LA-10258-L01,
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH NOBLE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 03/22/2018
Notification Time: 15:12 [ET]
Event Date: 03/22/2018
Event Time: 06:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/29/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JEREMY GROOM (R4DO)
NMSS EVENT NOTIFICAT (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DISCONNECTED RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE

The following is a synopsis of information received via E-mail:

On March 22, 2018, LA-DEQ (Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality) received an on-line notification that CAN USA Inc. had an incident where a radiography source was irretrievable during operations at a temporary jobsite at the Phillips 66-Alliance Refinery in Belle Chase, LA.

The crew stated they had made an exposure and were performing their post-job survey when the survey meter indicated the source was not in the shielded position. The radiography crew realized the source could not be retracted back into the shielded position and called the assistant RSO (Radiation Safety Officer) for radiation safety assistance.

The assistant RSO arrived at the jobsite at 0615 CDT. The assistant RSO covered the source in the guide tube with lead shot bags to reduce the exposure during the retrieval operation. It was determined that the guide tube had disconnected from the exposure device. The guide tube was reconnected, the source was returned to the shielded position, and an investigation into this incident begun. The assistant RSO completed the retrieval work at approximately 0645 CDT. The assistant RSO's direct read pocket dosimeter had an exposure of approximately 60 mR.

The exposure device and associated equipment (crankout control and source guide tube) were taken to the CAN USA facility for further evaluation. The equipment is a QSA Global Model 880 Delta exposure device, S/N D9222, utilizing a 70.7 Ci Ir-192 source, S/N 63452-G. An internal investigation continues into this irretrievable source incident.

Louisiana Event Report ID No.: LA-180005

* * * UPDATE AT 1730 EDT ON 3/29/18 FROM JOE NOBLE TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

The following update was submitted by the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality via email:

"Updated information:

"A source retrieval has developed into a situation involving, licensed activities, equipment QC/QA practices and personnel qualifications.

"QSA Global Delta 880, S/N D9222; source [approximately] 70 Ci of Ir-192 s/n 63452-G
Associated Equipment: 3rd party, drive cable and source guide tube. (not Amersham/QSA Global manufactured equipment)
The connector did not appear to be compatible with the exposure device source assembly in the Delta 880 device. (excessive use)
A misconnect/disconnect test was not performed on the source assembly and 3rd party associated equipment (drive cable and guide tube).
Assessment and Evaluation: the exposure device and associated equipment were transferred to QSA Global, Baton Rouge, LA then to QSA Global Burlington, MA.

"CAN USA Inc. was not licensed to perform source retrievals nor did they contact a 'qualified licensed radiation service' company to perform the source retrieval. The Corporate RSO, [deleted] was available by telephone. There was no site/assistant RSO trained or qualified to perform the source retrieval.

"Disconnect happened on a 15 foot elevated catwalk [at] an Aromatics Extractor unit # 1797. The facility, Phillips 66-Alliance, [deleted]. Phillips 66-Alliance Contact: [deleted], EHS Officer

"Personnel:
CAN USA:
Two Radiography Instructors were directly involved in the source retrieval.
Two Carded Radiographers were working with the equipment when it disconnected on the first exposure.
Provided Pocket Dosimeter readings 'provided' were 8 mR, 30 mR, 40 mR and 70 mR.
Landaure whole body badges immediately processes for three individuals, with the Maximum exposure 290 mrem. The acting site RSO, [deleted] whole body badge is 'lost' in the system.
The individuals involved in the source retrieval are having cytogenetic/chromosomal blood sample analysis by REACTS Medical Dosimetry Dept./ORISE.ORAU; results pending.

"Analytical Stress Employees.
Three non-radiation workers were evacuated from the vicinity of the disconnected source and evaluated by blood sample analysis.

"SWAT Specialty Welding and Turnaround:
One non-radiation worker was evacuated from the vicinity of the disconnected source and evaluated by blood sample analysis.

"The Departmental [Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality] investigation is still incomplete depending on assessment, evaluation and analysis results."

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Agreement State Event Number: 53281
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: NBC UNIVERSAL
Region: 4
City: UNIVERSAL CITY State: CA
County:
License #: GL
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: THOMAS GEZA MIKO
HQ OPS Officer: ANDREW WAUGH
Notification Date: 03/22/2018
Notification Time: 21:47 [ET]
Event Date: 03/22/2018
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 03/22/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JEREMY GROOM (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENT_NOTIFICAT (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - BROKEN TRITIUM EXIT SIGN

The following is a synopsis of information received via E-mail from the State of California:

On March 22, 2018 the Director of Environmental Affairs at NBC Universal (i.e. Universal Studios) in Universal City, California called Los Angeles County Radiation Management to report the discovery of a broken Tritium exit sign. The Tritium sign was subsequently isolated for secure and safe keeping. A Los Angeles County Radiation Management employee will visit Universal Studios on March 23, 2018 to check for Tritium leakage or contamination.

The broken sign is a Forever Lite Inc. Tritium sign, S/N 286342, with an expiration date of March 2027, containing 11.21 Curies.

California 5010 Number: 032218

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Agreement State Event Number: 53282
Rep Org: NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: GE HITACHI
Region: 1
City: WILMINGTON State: NC
County:
License #: 0317-3
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRAVIS CARTOSKI
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 03/23/2018
Notification Time: 12:42 [ET]
Event Date: 03/22/2018
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/23/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RAY MCKINLEY (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING TUBE FROM TRITIUM EXIT SIGN

The following information was received via E-mail:

"Licensee reports that on 3/22/2018 it was determined that a tube from an Everglo Tritium Exit sign was missing. The other three tubes were in the sign. The discovery was made as the sign was being prepared for shipment to disposal. At this time, there is no suspected excessive exposure to employees or members of the public.

"Licensee will follow up with additional information [as required] per 10 CFR 20.2201(b). When this report is received by the NC Radioactive Materials Branch, this event will be updated to complete the record."

NC Event Tracking Number: 180013

See EN 53279 for corresponding report from licensee.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Agreement State Event Number: 53283
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: QUASLPEC, LLC (currently merged with TEAM)
Region: 4
City: BENICIA State: CA
County:
License #: 5299-07
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARUNIKA HEWADIKARAM
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 03/23/2018
Notification Time: 16:49 [ET]
Event Date: 03/22/2018
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 03/23/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JEREMY GROOM (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY PERSONNEL OVEREXPOSURE

The following information was received via E-mail:

"On 03/23/18, the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) (appointed RSO since the merge with TEAM) contacted RHB (California Department of Public Health, Radiologic Health Branch) to report an occupational overexposure to one of their radiographer trainers. On 03/22/18, the licensee was made aware of an overexposure to a trainer when the trainer's instadose dosimeter was processed. The badge reading indicated a whole body exposure of 5769 mR (licensee processes instadose dosimetry every two weeks for all the users). Further investigation revealed that the radiographer assistant that worked with this trainer also received a whole body exposure of 4583 mR. Preliminary investigation indicates the individuals may have received the recorded exposure during radiographic operations conducted at Chevron Refinery, Richmond, CA, where the source apparently may not have been fully retracted into the shielded position following an exposure. It is believed that a confirmatory survey was not performed following the exposure.

"The exposure device involved is an INC-IR100 camera, device S/N 6756, with an activity of 88.9 Ci of Ir-192.

"Both individuals have been removed from any radiographic operations. The exposure device was inspected and did not show any signs of defects or damages. The licensee's investigation is ongoing and RHB will be following up on this incident.

"Note: RHB is in the process of merging the two licenses, Qualspec, LLC and Team Industrial Services RML # 6720."

California 5010 Number: 032318

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Agreement State Event Number: 53284
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: RADIOLOGY SUPPORT DEVICES, INC. aka RSD
Region: 4
City: LONG BEACH State: CA
County:
License #: 5311-19
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: THOMAS MIKO
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 03/23/2018
Notification Time: 18:36 [ET]
Event Date: 09/01/2017
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 03/23/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JEREMY GROOM (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST AM-241 SOURCE

The following information was received via E-mail:

"In a letter dated December 20, 2017, the President of Radiology Support Devices (RSD)/Alderson Phantoms reported to the Sacramento office of California Department of Health Services, Radiological Health Branch that 9 (nine) sealed sources were missing. The source activities varied from very low microCi quantities to less than picoCi quantities. It was not recognized that one source met the criteria for immediate reporting until a routine, scheduled inspection by Los Angeles County Radiation Management was performed of RSD.

"It was discovered on March 22, 2018 that eight of the nine sealed sources were below the 10 CFR 20 Table C reporting requirements, but one sealed source, 2.89 microCi of Am-241 (North American Scientific; calibration date January 1995, no serial number available) met the NRC 24 hour reportability threshold of 1.0 microCi.

"The licensee suspects the sources may have been taken by a previous employee. However, the previous employee has denied taking the sources."

California 5010 Number: 032218

Notified Mexican Government Representatives via E-mail.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Part 21 Event Number: 53302
Rep Org: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Licensee: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Region: 1
City: ROCKY MOUNT State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAN ROBERTS
HQ OPS Officer: THOMAS KENDZIA
Notification Date: 03/30/2018
Notification Time: 15:50 [ET]
Event Date: 02/01/2018
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/30/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
STEVE ROSE (R2DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTO (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 - REFURBISHED PRESSURE REGULATOR MAY RESULT IN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR FAILURE TO START

The following report is an excerpt from a fax from Engine Systems, Inc.:

"ESI [Engine Systems, Inc.] supplied a refurbished pressure regulator assembly, P/N 1776 506, S/N 20776487, to Brunswick Nuclear Plant in August 2017. ESI later determined that two components of the assembly, an upper and lower diaphragm plate, were omitted during reassembly of the refurbished regulator. Reference item 8 on Figure 1 for location of the diaphragm plates within the pilot valve portion of the regulator
assembly. These metal diaphragm plates distribute load and retain the associated rubber diaphragm. Omission of the metal plate may not initially affect operation of the pilot valve and therefore may not be detected during functional testing; however over repeated cycles there is a strong possibility that
the rubber diaphragm would tear or rupture without the benefit of load distribution and support
provided by the metal diaphragm plate.

"The regulator assembly is used in the safety-related air start system of the emergency diesel generators (EDGs) at Brunswick Nuclear Plant. Failure of the regulator to function properly due to the omission of a component within the pilot valve portion of the assembly could adversely affect the starting capability of the EDG. Since the EDG is a safety system used to ensure the safe shutdown of the nuclear reactor, this issue is considered to be a reportable defect as defined by 10CFR21."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 53303
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: LEROY CLINGER
HQ OPS Officer: THOMAS KENDZIA
Notification Date: 03/30/2018
Notification Time: 20:47 [ET]
Event Date: 03/30/2018
Event Time: 13:05 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/30/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
PATRICIA PELKE (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 98 Power Operation 98 Power Operation

Event Text

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO BOTH AIRLOCK DOORS OPEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

"On March 30, 2018 at 1305 CDT, with the reactor at 98 percent core thermal power and steady state conditions, plant personnel identified that both doors of the containment personnel airlock were open simultaneously due to failure of the interlock. Personnel were at both the outside and inside doors. Immediate action was taken to close the inner containment personnel airlock door and it was verified closed. Both doors of the containment personnel airlock were open for less than one minute. There was no radioactive release as a result of the event. The cause of the interlock failure is under investigation.

"This condition requires an 8-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers (primary containment), being seriously degraded. This condition is also reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material."

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 53304
Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: WESLEY MARSHALL
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 03/31/2018
Notification Time: 10:00 [ET]
Event Date: 03/31/2018
Event Time: 02:06 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/31/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INOPERABLE DUE TO FAILED SURVEILLANCE TEST

"At 0206 [CDT] on March 31, 2018, with the plant in Mode 1 at 100% rated core thermal power, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station experienced a loss of Secondary Containment. During the performance of a Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) drawn down test with Auxiliary Building train bay door (1A319A) as the secondary containment boundary, Grand Gulf was unable to maintain secondary containment pressure, as required by SR [surveillance requirement] 3.6.4.1.4, greater than or equal to 0.266 inches of water vacuum for 1 hour. Following initial vacuum draw down, secondary containment pressure degraded to 0.225 inches of water vacuum with operators in the field reporting air leakage from door 1A319A. The test was secured and Secondary Containment was declared inoperable and Technical Specification 3.6.1.4 A.1 was entered. Following completion of the failed surveillance test, Secondary Containment was returned to an operable status at 0315 hours on March 31, 2018, by returning the system to a previously known operable configuration by closing doors 1A310, 1A312 and 1A319. This is being report under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 53305
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ADAM HUKILL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 03/31/2018
Notification Time: 19:33 [ET]
Event Date: 03/31/2018
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/31/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Defueled 0 Defueled

Event Text

ONE HEAD PENETRATION NOT ACCEPTABLE DURING PENETRATION EXAMINATIONS

"On March 31, 2018, during the Indian Point Unit 2 refueling outage, with the reactor defueled and the head removed and located on the head stand, and all fuel from the reactor vessel removed and located in the spent fuel pool, while performing planned examinations on the 97 reactor vessel head penetrations, it was determined that one penetration could not be dispositioned as acceptable per the requirements of 10CFR50.55a for the reactor coolant system pressure boundary. The examinations are being performed to the meet the requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D), and ASME Code Case N-729-4, to find potential flaws/indications well before they increase to a degree that could potentially challenge the reactor vessel head pressure boundary. All other reactor vessel head penetrations have had a bare metal visual inspection completed with no other indications identified. The station is currently performing the remaining non-destructive examinations required by Code Case N-729-4.

"Repairs are currently being planned, and will be completed prior to entering Mode 5 from the current refueling outage.

"This is reportable, pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) since the as found indications did not meet the applicable acceptance criteria referenced in ASME Code Case N-729-4 to remain in-service without repair.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. "

The licensee has also notified the NY Public Service Commission.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Monday, April 02, 2018
Monday, April 02, 2018