| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
11/24/2017 - 11/27/2017 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 53075 | Rep Org: NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: DESERT NDT, LLC dba SHAWCOR
Region: 4
City: ABILENE State: TX
County:
License #: 33-51220-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID STRADINGER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 11/16/2017
Notification Time: 15:43 [ET]
Event Date: 11/15/2017
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/16/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JASON KOZAL (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE FAILED TO RETRACT
The following information was received via E-mail:
"Desert NDT, LLC dba Shawcor (Shawcor) reported that a 3.15 TBq (85 Ci) Ir-192 sealed source (SPEC model G-60, serial #YJ2608) had disconnected from a drive cable connected to a SPEC model SPEC-150 radiography exposure device (serial #786) at a temporary job site in Watford City, ND on 11/15/2017.
"Upon completion of an exposure, the radiography crew performed a radiation survey while approaching the exposure device. At approximately 35 feet from the device, they noticed an elevated reading of approximately 20 mR/hr. At this point, the crew determined the source had not retracted into the safe, shielded position. The crew moved away from the device, secured the area, maintained a 2 mR/hr barrier and contacted the Branch Manager. The Branch Manager, who is trained in source retrieval, responded to the site. He successfully recovered the source following Shawcor established procedures. The Branch Manager inspected the exposure device and associated equipment. He determined no damage had occurred to the exposure device, guide tube, and/or crank assembly, rather the drive cable was not properly connected to the source pigtail.
"At no time during the event did the radiography crew member's pocket dosimeters go off-scale. In response to the initial notification, the North Dakota Department of Health requested the licensee send the exposure device and associated equipment involved in the event to the manufacturer for further evaluation."
North Dakota Item Number: ND170001 |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 53076 | Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: LTI SMART GLASS
Region: 1
City: PITTSFIELD State: MA
County:
License #: G0350
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ZARA REJAEE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 11/16/2017
Notification Time: 15:42 [ET]
Event Date: 05/01/2017
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/16/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
DAN SCHROEDER (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING POLONIUM-210 SEALED SOURCE
The following information was received via E-mail:
"On November 16, 2017, the Massachusetts Radiation Control Program determined that one NRD, LLC, Model P-2021-8201, S/N A2KQ898, static control device, containing a 10 milliCurie, polonium-210 sealed source, could not be located by the licensee (Current decayed activity is approximately 600 microCurie with an original assay date of 5/5/2016).
"When questioned by the Program, the licensee stated that it noticed that the device has been missing since sometime in May of 2017. The licensee believes that they transferred the device from their Lenox, MA facility to their Pittsfield, MA facility and it is somewhere within their Pittsfield facility. However, the licensee stated that it's very unlikely they will find the device due to the facility size and complexity.
"The Program notified the licensee of its responsibility for providing a written report within 30 days of their telephone report in accordance with the requirements of 105 CMR 120.281(B).
"Root cause and corrective action are not known at this time and the Program intends to perform a special inspection.
"This event remains open."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 53090 | Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DAVID BURRUS
HQ OPS Officer: DAN LIVERMORE | Notification Date: 11/25/2017
Notification Time: 06:02 [ET]
Event Date: 11/25/2017
Event Time: 02:38 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/26/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | M/R | Y | 0 | Startup | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DURING STARTUP
"At 0238 [CST] a manual reactor scram was inserted by placing the Reactor Mode Switch in Shutdown. At 0149 [CST], with reactor power just above the point of adding heat, IRM [Intermediate Range Monitor] channels A, C, and D received a spurious upscale trip signal which immediately cleared. Upon investigation, operability of RPS [Reactor Protection System] scram function for Intermediate Range Detectors was placed in question. This event is being reported under 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), as any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS), when the reactor is critical."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON NOVEMBER 26, 2017, AT 1850 FROM GRAND GULF TO MICHAEL BLOODGOOD * * *
"At 0238 [CST] a manual reactor scram was inserted by placing the Reactor Mode Switch in Shutdown. At 0149 [CST], with reactor power just above the point of adding heat, Intermediate Range Monitor neutron flux detector (IRM) channels A, C, and D received a spurious Upscale Trip signal which immediately cleared. Upon investigation, IRM channels A, C, and D were declared Inoperable. IRM G was already Inoperable for another reason. RPS scram function from IRM channels B, E, F, and H was always Operable and available. That event is being reported under 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), as any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS), when the reactor is critical.
"This Revised Statement to Event Notification # 53090 is being made to make it clear that only four IRM channels (A, C, D, G) were Inoperable and that the IRM RPS SCRAM function was still available from the four remaining Operable IRM channels (B, E, F, and H)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (O'Keefe) |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 53091 | Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN ALEXANDER
HQ OPS Officer: ANDREW WAUGH | Notification Date: 11/26/2017
Notification Time: 00:36 [ET]
Event Date: 11/25/2017
Event Time: 20:25 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/26/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF MAIN FEED WATER
"At time 2025 [CST] on 11/25/17, Unit 2 reactor was manually tripped due to a loss of all Main Feedwater. Operators observed both Main Feed Pumps tripped and SG [Steam Generator] levels decreasing, resulting in the direction for a manual reactor trip. The reactor trip actuated a turbine trip, both Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps started on the loss of both Main Feed Pumps, and Steam Generator Lo Lo levels started the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump. All systems responded as expected. There was no work in progress at the time of the incident.
"Currently Unit 2 is being maintained in Hot Standby (Mode 3) in accordance with Integrated Plant Operating Procedure IP0-0078 and the Emergency Response Guideline Procedure Network has been exited. Decay Heat is being rejected to the Main Condenser via Steam Dump Valves."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 53092 | Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN MCILNAY
HQ OPS Officer: MICHAEL BLOODGOOD | Notification Date: 11/26/2017
Notification Time: 16:16 [ET]
Event Date: 11/26/2017
Event Time: 12:25 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/26/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION
| Person (Organization):
LADONNA SUGGS (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text UNPLANNED EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (ECCS) INJECTION DURING A PLANNED SAFETY INJECTION TEST
"On November 26, 2017, at 1225 Eastern Standard Time (EST), the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 experienced an unplanned ECCS discharge to the Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) while de-pressurized, in Mode 5, with the Pressurizer vented to the Pressurizer Relief Tank. ECCS injection via the Boron Injection flow path occurred during planned Safety Injection system Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) testing. The Boron Injection flow path should have been isolated and should not have resulted in any injection flow to the Unit 2 RCS. Since the injection was not a part of the pre-planned test this is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv), System Actuation.
"All other systems responded as expected in accordance with the ESFAS testing procedure. The unintended ECCS injection flow was isolated and flow through the Boron Injection path was verified to be stopped at 1232 EST. The Unit 2 Pressurizer level and pressure remained below any limits and no safety limits were challenged.
"NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." | |