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Event Notification Report for October 31, 2017

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
10/30/2017 - 10/31/2017

** EVENT NUMBERS **


51097 53027 53028 53029 53032 53033 53041 53042 53043 53044

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Part 21 Event Number: 51097
Rep Org: C&D TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
Licensee: C&D TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
Region: 1
City: BLUE BELL State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BOB MALLEY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 05/29/2015
Notification Time: 10:21 [ET]
Event Date: 03/04/2015
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
Person (Organization):
FRED BOWER (R1DO)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)

Event Text

INTERIM PART 21 REPORT - INABILITY TO COMPLETE EVALUATION REGARDING CRACKING IN KCR-13 STANDBY BATTERY JARS

The following was received via email:

"The purpose of this letter is to provide the NRC a report in general conformity to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21.21(a)(2). On March 4, 2015, C&D Technologies, Inc. (C&D) was informed by Entergy Nuclear Northeast that a KCR-13 battery installed at the Indian Point Nuclear Energy Center had developed a crack in the polycarbonate jar material. This is the second KCR-13 at this site that has experienced a crack in the jar material [see EN 49667]. The jar is a safety related component with the primary function of containing electrolyte. The battery has not been returned to C&D for analysis, and analysis of the previous issue was inconclusive.

"C&D is submitting this interim report to the NRC and notifying C&D's customers that use C&D KCR-13 batteries, of this Interim report, and is initiating an action plan to evaluate the reported potential defect and determine whether it could pose a substantial safety hazard for any US licensee using such batteries.

"KCR-13 Batteries manufactured in 2005, battery manufacturing date is on the label. Note: C&D has not completed its evaluation of the reported potential defect and whether it could pose a substantial safety hazard at any US licensee using such batteries.

"The cracked jar has not been fully evaluated and may or may not indicate a potential defect which could create a substantial safety hazard.

"KCR -13 batteries used at Nuclear Plants in 1E applications made in 2005:

"Utility/Plant Name/Battery Model/Quantity of Batteries

"Entergy/Indian Point /KCR-13 NUC/72

"Xcel Energy/Monticello/KCR-13 NUC/62

"Concurrent Actions underway to complete the evaluation:

"a) On receipt of the battery from Indian Point, C&D will perform a failure analysis with the intent of determining the root cause of the cracking issue. Maximum time 30 days from receipt of the battery.

"b) In conjunction with the licensees identified in Section VI, C&D will recommend maintenance assessment of all KCR-13 batteries at these locations to determine their status and specifically, the presence of any evidence of potential defects via visual examination. For any cells exhibiting the presence of potential defect, C&D shall further recommend that they be returned for analysis. Estimated completion date of analysis is thirty (30) days from the receipt of the returned batteries.

"U.S. Licensees using batteries possibility containing the alleged defect have been notified of the filing of this interim report with recommendations that they examine their batteries for any signs of problems. NOTE: A similar notification and advice was provided in December 2013 with the previous battery. C&D did not receive any reports of similar problems from other product users.

"If you have any questions or wish to discuss this matter or this report, please contact:"

Robert Malley
VP Operational Excellence
bmalley@cdtechno.com
(215) 619-7830

The similar notification and advice provided in December 2013 is EN 49667.

* * * RETRACTION AT 1409 EDT ON 10/30/17 FROM ROBERT MALLEY TO S. SANDIN VIA EMAIL * * *

The following information was received from C&D Technologies via email:

"Subject: Retraction of Interim Report - Inability to Complete 10CFR Part 21 Evaluation Regarding Cracking in KCR-13 Standby Battery Jars

"On May 29, 2015 C&D Technologies submitted an interim Part 21 report (ML15155A575, Part 21 log 2015-34-00) regarding jar cracks discovered in a KCR-13 battery at Indian Point Nuclear Energy Center. This report was issued as the analysis of this battery jar had not yet been completed. The analysis was subsequently completed, and it was determined that the jar cracking was not related to the design or production of this battery, and thus is not a defect reportable under Part 21. Indian Point Nuclear Energy Center was notified of the findings of the report; however, no final Part 21 report was issued by C&D to the NRC, leaving the interim Part 21 report open.

"Based on the results of the analysis the Interim Report (NRC Log No. 2015-34-06) dated May 29, 2015 is retracted."

Notified R1DO (McKinley), R3DO (Stone) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors via email.

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Agreement State Event Number: 53027
Rep Org: SC DIV OF HEALTH & ENV CONTROL
Licensee: GEO METRICS
Region: 1
City: CONWAY State: SC
County:
License #: 553
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ANDREW ROXBURGH
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 10/20/2017
Notification Time: 14:42 [ET]
Event Date: 10/20/2017
Event Time: 13:37 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN GAUGE

The licensee notified the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control that an Instrotek Model 3500 moisture density gauge serial number 3055 was stolen from the licensee's truck during a lunch break. The gauge contained 11 mCi of Cs-137 and 44 mCi of Am-241:Be. LLEA was notified of the incident.

* * * UPDATE AT 0948 EDT ON 10/23/2017 FROM ANDREW M. ROXBURGH TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

The following update was received from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control via email:

"The licensee notified the Department [South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control] at approximately 1330 [EDT] on October 20, 2017 that one of its gauges had been stolen from the back of one of its trucks while on a lunch in Myrtle Beach, SC. The gauge is an Instrotek Model 3500 moisture density gauge serial number 3055. The gauge contained 11 mCi of Cs-137 and 44 Ci of Am-241:Be. The licensee is in the process of getting a copy of the police report to submit to the Department."

Notified the R1DO (Bickett), ILTAB and NMSS_Events (via email).

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Agreement State Event Number: 53028
Rep Org: NJ RAD PROT AND REL PREVENTION PGM
Licensee: LEW CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: MINE HILL State: NJ
County:
License #: NJ PI ID # 44
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CATHY BIEL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 10/20/2017
Notification Time: 15:59 [ET]
Event Date: 10/20/2017
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/20/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING XRF DEVICE RETURNED TO MANUFACTURER FOR REPAIRS

The following information was received from the State of New Jersey via email:

"The licensee [Lew Corporation] called [the NJ Department of Environmental Protection's Bureau of Environmental Radiation] to report that one of their XRF devices is apparently lost. The device is a Protec LPA-1, serial number 2106, containing a Co-57 source with an activity of 7.2 mCi as of January 2017. The unit was shipped to the manufacturer, Protec, back in July for repairs. The licensee has proof from the delivery service that the device was signed for at Protec's office in Massachusetts back in July. Protec has now informed the licensee that they don't know the location of the device and are considering it lost. A written report from the licensee will be supplied within 30 days. The Massachusetts radiation control office has been informed."

The LPA-1 is a handheld Lead Paint Analyzer using X-Ray Florescence (XRF) and K-Shell technologies to non-destructively detect the presence of lead on a painted surface.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Agreement State Event Number: 53029
Rep Org: NEW YORK STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH
Licensee: ALLIANCE HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC.
Region: 1
City: BRONX State: NY
County:
License #: 3263
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DANIEL SAMSON
HQ OPS Officer: ANDREW WAUGH
Notification Date: 10/20/2017
Notification Time: 16:52 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2017
Event Time: 22:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/20/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)
CNSC (CANADA) (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST Cs-137 VIAL STANDARD

The following information was received from the state of New York via fax:

"On 10/5/17 the Department [New York State Department of Health] was notified of a lost Cs-137 vial standard (Solid Sealed Source, Eckert and Ziegler, S/N: 1258-41-15, Activity 194.4 microCi on 12/01/2007) from the hot lab of a mobile PET imaging service provider coach.

"A report from the licensee [Alliance HealthCare Services, Inc.] gave the following timeline. On 9/21/17 the driver of the mobile imaging coach slammed on the brakes going over the GW [George Washington] bridge to avoid an accident on the way to Bronx-Lebanon Hospital. Upon arrival, the driver went to assess damage in the hot lab and notified an Alliance manager of the incident. The cabinet that held up the L block had fallen away from the wall and broke a portable sink. Some other items had been dislodged. He and another driver put the cabinet back into place and put items back in their respective places. They discarded pieces of the broken sink in a trash can on the side of the parking lot of the client facility. The next morning an Alliance Tech did a visual inventory and confirmed that all sources were present.

"On 10/3/17 another Alliance Tech went into the hot lab on the coach and discovered that the lead pig for the Cs-137 vial standard was empty. The Alliance staff searched for the vial but could not locate it on the coach. It was reported to the RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] on 10/5/17.

"On 10/06/17 a physicist did a survey to determine whether the vial was on the coach and had rolled under a piece of equipment. They determined that the vial was not on the coach and did not find any contamination.

"Alliance believes that the source was thrown out in the general waste stream outside Bronx-Lebanon Hospital, along with pieces of the broken sink from the hot lab. The NYSDOH notified both the NYS Dept. of Environmental Conservation and the New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection of possible waste alarm trips.

"Event Report ID No. NYDOH-17-09"

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Agreement State Event Number: 53032
Rep Org: OR DEPT OF HEALTH RAD PROTECTION
Licensee: PROVIDENCE HEALTH SERVICES OREGON
Region: 4
City: PORTLAND State: OR
County:
License #: ORE-90946
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DARLY LEON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Notification Date: 10/23/2017
Notification Time: 12:34 [ET]
Event Date: 10/20/2017
Event Time: 10:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - GAMMA KNIFE MALFUNCTION

On 10/20/17, at 1000 PDT, a Gamma knife treatment was in process when the machine malfunctioned and recorded an error. The backup battery on the UPS (Uninterruptible Power Source) was low and resulted in the machine pausing and returning the source to the shielded position. The patient received approximately one third of the prescribed dose. The service provider was contacted and is scheduled to report to the hospital today (10/23/2017) to replace the backup battery.

Elekta Leksell Gamma Knife Model Perfexion
Serial number NM-001-NM201

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

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Agreement State Event Number: 53033
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: MISTRAS GROUP, INC.
Region: 4
City: GEISMAR State: LA
County:
License #: LA-10986-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH NOBLE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Notification Date: 10/23/2017
Notification Time: 17:30 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/2017
Event Time: 11:05 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - WHOLE BODY MONITOR EXCEEDED THE ANNUAL OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE LIMIT

The following was received via email from the State Of Louisiana:

"The RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] was notified by Landauer that an individual's August 1-31, 2017, personal whole body monitor exceeded the annual occupational exposure limit. MG [Mistras Group, Inc.] contacted the Radiography Instructor (RI) and conducted an internal investigation with the radiation safety personnel and the RI that concluded September 20, 2017. It concluded with the exposures were incremental over the annual monitoring period and there was no evidence the whole-body badge had received the exposures and the RI had not received the exposures to his monitor. At this time MG is not pursuing this issue further to reduce the exposure to the whole-body monitor. The RI was issued safety equipment that was not under the RI's constant control or observation at all times.

"The RI notified the Department, LDEQ [Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality], on October, 19, 2017, [at approximately] 1105 [CDT]. LDEQ was notified due to the fact the RI was not employable to perform radiography work in his field due to the radiation exposure levels.

"This was a complaint from a Radiography Instructor (RI) whose personal whole-body badge exposure reading levels exceeded the 5,000 mRem/5 Rem occupational annual limit. The RI called in a complaint because he was no-longer employed by MG and with the excessive exposure he was not employable to work in a radiation restricted area.

"A LDEQ investigator took the call from the RI. The excessive exposure reported by Landauer to MG for the August 2017 monitoring period was 5,440 mRem Dose Equivalent. MG reported the excessive exposure during a phone call during the LDEQ preliminary investigation. The MG went on to explain that the RI was still in possession of his September 2017 personal whole body monitor."

Event Report ID: LA-170016

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Power Reactor Event Number: 53041
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: PAUL GALLANT
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 10/30/2017
Notification Time: 10:38 [ET]
Event Date: 10/30/2017
Event Time: 02:47 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
RAY MCKINLEY (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

SEVERE WEATHER CAUSES LOSS OF POWER TO SUPPORT BUILDINGS

There was a loss of power from the local grid which did not affect the power block. The support buildings lost power and a UPS failed which affects computers, switching, and telephones. This includes a loss of the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). The Joint Information Center and Emergency Operations Facility were not affected. Though this is a major loss of communications ability, alternate communications methods are available.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 53042
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: ALEX RIVAS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 10/30/2017
Notification Time: 12:48 [ET]
Event Date: 10/30/2017
Event Time: 04:04 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Hot Standby 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

DEFECTIVE WELD IDENTIFIED ON REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEAL UPPER ROOT

"During a scheduled refueling outage, an inspection of components inside containment revealed a suspected weld defect on 1CV-309B, 1P-1B RCP Labyrinth Seal 1PT-124 Upper Root.

"10 CFR 50.2 (2)(i) defines the reactor coolant pressure boundary as being connected to the reactor coolant system, up to and including the outermost containment isolation valve in system piping which penetrates primary reactor containment. The weld defect is located on the transmitter side of 1CV-309B. This can be isolated from the RCS by shutting 1CV-309B and 1CV-308B, 1P-1B RCP Labyrinth Seal 1PT-124 Lower Root.

"Based on the definition provided in 10 CFR 50.2, the condition is considered reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(ii).

"Unit 1 is currently in mode 3. Repairs for the condition are being determined.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

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Part 21 Event Number: 53043
Rep Org: AMETEK SOLID STATE CONTROLS
Licensee: AMETEK SOLID STATE CONTROLS
Region: 3
City: COLUMBUS State: OH
County:
License #: N/A
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ETHAN SALSBURY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 10/30/2017
Notification Time: 12:36 [ET]
Event Date: 10/30/2017
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
RAY MCKINLEY (R1DO)
SHAKUR WALKER (R2DO)
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTO (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 - EATON AUXILIARY SWITCH INSTALLED EG FRAME MOLDED CASE CIRCUIT BREAKER POTENTIALLY DEFECTIVE

The following is excerpted from an email received from Ametek:

"COMPONENT DESCRIPTION:
"Eaton auxiliary switches, catalog number AUX2A2BPK installed in EG Frame Molded Case Circuit Breakers (30A - 125A).

"PROBLEM YOU COULD SEE:
"Eaton auxiliary switches manufactured after May 2015 and installed in EG Frame Breakers (30A - 125A) could experience intermittent operation of the auxiliary switch due to a design defect of the auxiliary switch. The design defect of the auxiliary switch can result in the auxiliary switch to fail to change state during breaker operation.

"CAUSE:
"Ametek Solidstate Controls identified intermittent auxiliary switch operation during testing. Eaton confirmed a problem with the auxiliary switches used in EG Frame Breakers manufactured since May of 2015. The auxiliary switch in the EG frame breakers may not operate reliably, resulting in the auxiliary switch returning to, or staying in, its shelf state. The auxiliary switch is being redesigned to improve the mechanical interface reliability between the breaker mechanism and the auxiliary switch.

"EFFECT ON SYSTEM PERFORMANCE:
"The breaker overcurrent protection and shunt trip function are not affected by this defect. If the auxiliary switch defect occurs in the DC Input breaker (B1) while the system is operating, the static switch will transfer the load to Bypass (alternate Source) and the Inverter will shut down. If the defect occurs during startup, the Inverter will not start. If the auxiliary switch defect is present in any other breaker, it will result in a failure to annunciate a breaker closed indicator. A list of affected equipment with the breaker locations is provided below.

"ACTION REQUIRED:
"Replacement auxiliary switches from Eaton are expected to be available sometime in the second quarter of 2018. An immediate solution is not available. For circuit breakers in the B1 position, Ametek Solidstate Controls recommends replacing the auxiliary switch as soon as a redesigned auxiliary switch is available.

"For all other breakers, the state of the breaker should be verified prior to performing any maintenance until the auxiliary switch can be replaced. In this situation, the auxiliary switch should be replaced at the earliest convenience.

"AMETEK SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS CORRECTIVE ACTION:
"If you wish to replace the auxiliary switches, Ametek Solidstate Controls will work with you to arrange replacements. Please contact Mr. Mark Shreve of our Client Services group at 1-800- 222-9079 or 1-614-846-7500 ext. 6332. mark.shreve@ametek.com

"A copy [including Eaton EG Frame Part Number, Ametek Part Number, Serial Number, Equipment Part No., Customer, Breaker Location and Total] will also be provided to the affected licensees - Ameren, TVA, Southern Nuclear, Duke, and Krsko."

Curtiss Wright also received eight (8) of the suspect breakers.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 53044
Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN McILNAY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 10/30/2017
Notification Time: 15:50 [ET]
Event Date: 10/30/2017
Event Time: 09:42 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
SHAKUR WALKER (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

TEMPORARY LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM ENVELOPE BOUNDARY

"At 0942 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on October 30, 2017, a Main Control Room (MCR) alarm was received for low control room positive pressure.

"At 0943 EDT, a Control Room Envelope (CRE) door was found ajar and immediately closed. Technical Specification 3.7.10 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) was declared not met for both trains and Condition B entered.

"At 0945 EDT the alarm cleared, CREVS was declared operable and LCO 3.7.10, Condition B was exited.

"The safety function of the CRE boundary is to ensure the in-leakage of unfiltered air into the CRE will not exceed the in-leakage assumed in the licensing basis analysis of Design Basis Accident (DBA) consequences to CRE occupants. From 0942 EDT to 0943 EDT WBN [Watts Bar Nuclear] was unable to validate that CREVS could fulfill its required Safety Function.

"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

"NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, October 31, 2017
Tuesday, October 31, 2017