| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
07/19/2017 - 07/20/2017 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 52846 | Rep Org: NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: ECS CAROLINAS, LLP
Region: 1
City: CHAPEL HILL State: NC
County:
License #: 092-0253-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRAVIS CARTOSKI
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 07/11/2017
Notification Time: 12:08 [ET]
Event Date: 07/10/2017
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/11/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TROXLER GAUGE DAMAGED AT CONSTRUCTION SITE
The following report was received from the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services via email:
"North Carolina Licensee ECS Carolinas, LLP, License Number 092-0253-1 reported that a Troxler Model 3440, S/N 24665 Moisture Density Gauge had been damaged on July 10, 2017 at a construction site in Chapel Hill, NC. The gauge contained 8 mCi of Cesium-137 and 40 mCi of Americium-241. An approved technician backed up a company vehicle over the gauge. North Carolina Radiation Protection immediately dispatched an inspector on site to perform a reactive inspection same day. Event Date and Notification Date: July 10, 2017. Licensee had cordoned off a 15+ foot barrier around the vehicle and the gauge. Surveys taken at various distances from the gauge and on contact confirmed that the sources were intact and shielded in the gauge. The gauge sustained minimal damage to the guide rod and the source rod was not extended at the time of the incident. No other local or federal authorities were contacted for this event. The gauge was returned to the manufacturer for repair or disposal. A 30-Day Report is pending from the licensee and follow-up information will be provided. NC Event Report Tracking Number: 170026. Event reportable due to: 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2)(ii)." |
| Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 52847 | Rep Org: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Licensee: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Region: 1
City: WASHINGTON State: DC
County:
License #: 45-23645-01NA
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CAPTAIN JERRY SANDERS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 07/11/2017
Notification Time: 12:53 [ET]
Event Date: 07/05/2017
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/11/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
| Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text LOST CHEMICAL AGENT DETECTOR
The following report was received via email:
"During routine maintenance and inventory of the equipment one of the devices could not be accounted for during the evolution. An extensive internal investigation was conducted by the local command and thorough search for the missing device was conducted and ultimately concluded the device was not located and determined lost. The device was declared lost 5 July 2017.
"Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane reported the lost chemical agent detector containing a 10 millicurie Nickel-63 (Ni-63) source. As the quantity exceeds 10 times the quantity listed in 10 CFR 20 Appendix C, a telephone notification is required to the NRC within 30 days per 10CFR20.2201. A follow up written report will be submitted within 30 days after this initial notification.
"The device, Serial Number 09-4326, contains one foil-sealed source of Ni-63 and does not to exceed 10 milliCuries. The source is Eckert and Ziegler Isotope Products Laboratories Model NER-004. The Ni-63 source is encapsulated in a 304 steel cup with 1 millimeter wall thickness. The source cup is fitted into a ceramic enclosure of 10 millimeter wall thickness. The Ni-63 source is sealed in a detection chamber located inside the housing of the detector. The device has two radioactive material labels to warn personnel of the radioactive source inside the device. One label is on the outside of the device and the other is on the detector housing on the inside of the instrument.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 52849 | Rep Org: ACUREN INSPECTION
Licensee: ACUREN INSPECTION
Region: 1
City: MORGANTOWN State: WV
County:
License #: 22-27593-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHRIS DIXON
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 07/12/2017
Notification Time: 12:08 [ET]
Event Date: 06/28/2017
Event Time: 17:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/12/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
| Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
| Event Text STUCK RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE
"On June 28, 2017, at approximately 1725 EDT, a RT [Radiographic Testing] crew was performing radiography in Morgantown, WV. After completing a weld, they proceeded to move the exposure device to the next location. Due to the terrain and trench conditions, the crew was utilizing a 7 foot guide tube with a 7 foot extension tube with the exposure device on the top side of the trench.
"While exposing the source, the trench below the exposure device shifted causing the exposure device to barrel roll into the trench. The radiographer attempted to retract the source, but was unsuccessful. He then adjusted his boundaries and notified the RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] and Operations Manager [OM] of the situation.
"The RSO proceeded to the Akron, OH lab to gather the retrieval equipment while the OM discussed the situation with the technician over the phone. Multiple photos of the scene were sent to the OM, at which time, it was determined that the guide tube had most likely been damaged during the fall. Within 15 minutes of the initial notification, both the RSO and OM were on their way.
"Once in route to the job site, the OM notified the Assistant Director of Radiation Safety of the situation. He then contacted another RSO to assist in the retrieval.
"At approximately 2130 EDT, the retrieval team arrived on site and continued to assess the situation. The exposure device was at the bottom of a trench, on its side. The source was in an unshielded position. The team believed that the source was just outside of the exposure device due to readings that were taken with the Teletector.
"With multiple attempts of pulling the cranks, the team was eventually able to position the source into the 4 HVL [Half-Value Layer] collimator that was still strapped to the pipe. At this point, the team was able to get a better view of the front of the camera and confirmed that the extension tube had been crimped right at the connection to the bayonet. The exposure device was then pulled backwards by the cranks in an attempt to straighten the tubes. When challenging the cranks, the team confirmed that the source would not be able to be retracted by normal means.
"The team then planned to move the exposure device back to an area of the trench that gave them better access to the damaged tube. They noted that the bungie cord holding the collimator to the pipe was behind the set screw that holds it to the guide tube stop. Knowing that they did not want to lose the 4 HVL of shielding provided by the collimator, they decided that the bungie would need to be removed first.
"With the use of remote tongs and an extendable hook, the collimator was freed from the bungie. At this time, the team proceeded to pull the exposure device back approximately 10 feet to an area with adequate lighting and room to continue with the retrieval process. As the device was being pulled backwards, the guide tube remained over the pipe. The extendable hook was then used to move the remainder of the guide tube and collimator to the camera side of the pipe with the collimator pointing down into the ground.
"With the dose rates at ALARA, the team proceeded with lead shot bags. At first, the bags were walked by rope with one person on either side of the trench. Once the dose rates were lowered even further, the team applied several more until the dose rate at the front of the exposure device was less than 5 mR/hr. The team then approached the exposure device with tools in hand. The tube was unable to be uncrimped completely with the protective coating on the tube. The damaged area was then stripped and uncrimped to the best of the team's ability. Once complete, the area was cleared and the source was retracted back into its shielded position inside of the exposure device. Once the confirmatory surveys were made, [Assistant Director of Radiation Safety] was notified of the successful retrieval."
The three individuals involved in the source retrieval received 13, 5 and 4 mRem. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52863 | Facility: WATERFORD
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: MICKEY FOLSE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 07/17/2017
Notification Time: 17:37 [ET]
Event Date: 07/17/2017
Event Time: 16:17 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/19/2017 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
| Person (Organization):
THOMAS HIPSCHMAN (R4DO)
MICHAEL F. KING (NRR)
BRIAN HOLIAN (NRR)
KRISS KENNEDY (R4RA)
JEFF GRANT (IRD)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER
During a rain and lightning storm, plant operators observed arcing from the main transformer bus duct and notified the control room. The decision was made to trip the main generator which resulted in an automatic reactor trip. The plant entered EAL SU.1 as a result of the loss of offsite power for greater than fifteen minutes. Plant safety busses are being supplied by both emergency diesel generators while the licensee inspects the electrical system to determine any damage prior to bringing offsite power back into the facility. Offsite power is available to the facility. No offsite assistance was requested by the licensee.
During the trip, all rods inserted into the core. Decay heat is being removed via the atmospheric dump valves with emergency feedwater supplying the steam generators. The main steam isolation valves were manually closed to protect the main condenser. There were no safeties or relief valves that actuated during the plant transient. There is no known primary-to-secondary leakage. Reactor cooling is via natural circulation. All safety equipment is available for the safe shutdown of the plant.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality and the local Parish emergency management agencies.
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, FEMA National Watch Center (email) and Nuclear SSA (email).
* * * UPDATE ON 7/17/17 AT 2007 EDT FROM MARIA ZAMBER TO DONG PARK * * *
This notification is also made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3.
"On July 17, 2017 at 1606 CDT, the reactor automatically tripped due to a loss of Forced Circulation, which was the result of Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) to the electrical (safety and non-safety) buses. Both 'A' and 'B' trains of Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) started as designed to reenergize the 'A' and 'B' safety buses. The LOOP caused a loss of feedwater pumps, resulting in an automatic actuation of the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) system.
"Prior to the reactor trip, at 1600 CDT, personnel noticed the isophase bus duct to main transformer 'B' glowing orange due to an unknown reason. Due to this, the main turbine was manually tripped at 1606 CDT. Following the turbine trip, the electrical (safety and non-safety) buses did not transfer to the startup transformers as expected due to an unknown reason.
"The plant entered the Emergency Operating Procedure for LOOP/Loss of Forced Circulation Recovery.
"At 1617 CDT, an Unusual Event was declared due to Initiating Condition (IC) SU1 - Loss of all offsite AC power to safety buses [greater than] 15 minutes.
"All safety systems responded as expected.
"The plant is currently in mode 3 and stable with the EDGs supplying both safety buses and with EFW feeding and maintaining both steam generators. Offsite power is in the process of being restored."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality and the local Parish emergency management agencies.
* * * UPDATE FROM ADAM TAMPLAIN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2203 EDT ON 7/17/17 * * *
The licensee terminated the Notification of Unusual Event at 2056 CDT. The basis for terminating was that offsite power was restored to the safety busses.
The licensee has notified Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, St. John and St. Charles Parishes, Louisiana Homeland Security Emergency Preparedness, and will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified IRD (Stapleton), NRR (King), R4DO (Hipschman), DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, FEMA National Watch Center (email) and Nuclear SSA (email).
* * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT MEIKLEJOHN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1724 EDT ON 7/19/17 * * *
This update is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B).
"During the event discussed in EN# 52863, at 1642 CDT [on July 17, 2017], Condensate Storage Pool (CSP) level lowered to less than 92% resulting in entry to Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.1.3. Level in the CSP was lowered due to feeding from both Steam Generators with EFW. Normal makeup to the CSP was temporarily unavailable due to the LOOP. Filling the CSP commenced at 1815 CDT [on July 17, 2017], and TS 3.7.1.3 was exited on July 18, 2017 at 0039 CDT."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Hipschman). | |