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Event Notification Report for July 18, 2017

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
07/17/2017 - 07/18/2017

** EVENT NUMBERS **


52840 52862 52863

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 52840
Facility: BWX TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU FABRICATION & SCRAP
Region: 2
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County: CAMPBELL
License #: SNM-42
Agreement: N
Docket: 070-27
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN SUBOSITS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 07/04/2017
Notification Time: 16:30 [ET]
Event Date: 07/04/2017
Event Time: 15:33 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/05/2017
Emergency Class: ALERT
10 CFR Section:
70.32(i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
PART 70 APP A (a)(4) - ALL SAFETY ITEMS UNAVAILABLE
Person (Organization):
LAURA DUDES (R2RA)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
JAMIE HEISSERER (R2DO)
BERNARD STAPLETON (IRD)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
FUELS GROUP (EMAI)

Event Text

NO ITEMS RELIED ON FOR SAFETY AVAILABLE / ALERT DECLARED DUE TO LOSS OF PARAMETER CONTROL TO PREVENT CRITICALITY IN THE RESEARCH TEST REACTOR AREA

"On July 4, 2017 at 1533 [EDT] it was identified that two desiccant filters serving a dry train ventilation system on a uranium processing glovebox line contained a uranium compound. The two containers were located within close proximity to one another, but were separated during maintenance activities associated with the equipment prior to knowledge of the uranium mass presence. This was assumed to be a non-uranium-bearing system and there were no documented controls in the Integrated Safety Analysis to prevent accumulations. The system was not included in typical duct surveys to identify such accumulations. Uranium processing operations were shut down and the plant is in the summer shutdown outage. There was no immediate risk of criticality or threat to the safety of workers or the public as a result of this event. Security is controlling access to the area and the area will remain shutdown."

The initial 10 CFR 70 Appendix A(a)(4) 1 hour report notification was made at 1630 EDT. While making that telephone notification, at approximately 1646 EDT, the licensee communicator notified the Headquarters Operations Officer that the licensee had declared an Alert at 1556 EDT. The Alert declaration was based on a loss of control of all parameters preventing criticality for which control cannot be immediately re-established per the site's Emergency Plan. There is no release and a release is not projected. The licensee's Emergency Operations Center has been activated.

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee notified the Commonwealth of VA and local agencies.

Notified DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DHS NICC, USDA Ops Center, EPA EOC via conference call.
Notified FDA EOC, FEMA NWC, Nuclear SSA and FEMA NRCC SASC via email.

* * * UPDATE AT 0231 EDT ON 07/05/17 FROM CHRIS TERRY TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee has completed preliminary NCS [Nuclear Criticality Safety] calculations based on conservative theoretical analysis and concluded that vessel no. 1, which has the higher loading of material, could achieve a k-effective >1 if conditions were changed, Vessel no. 2 would remain sub-critical under all conditions. The licensee will reconvene their technical staff in the morning to determine what controls could be applied to the higher loaded vessel to evaluate two possible options; the first option is to characterize the material in the sub-critical vessel no. 2 for a better informed NCS analysis of the higher loaded vessel no.1 and the second option is to poison the higher loaded vessel no. 1.

The situation remains stable and the licensee continues to restrict access to the RTR Processing Area.

Notified R2DO (Heisserer), NMSS (Moore), IRD (Stapleton) and NMSS Events Notification and Fuels Group via email.

* * * UPDATE AT 0938 EDT ON 07/05/17 FROM ROBERT JOHNSON TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is still reviewing the NCS calculations to identify the appropriate course of action and will reconvene the technical staff at 1300 EDT. Following this meeting, additional surveys of the area will be performed.

Notified R2DO (Heisserer), NMSS (Moore), IRD (Stapleton) and NMSS Events Notification and Fuels Group via email.

* * * UPDATE AT 1437 EDT ON 7/5/17 FROM ROBERT JOHNSON TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

The Licensee is reporting no change in status they are still in an Alert condition. The licensee reported that the density of the desiccant is being re-evaluated. It is expected that actual density is less than initial assumed density which is favorable. The net effect should be to reduce the estimated grams inside the unit. Reduced estimated grams will improve the safety margin and assist the recovery process. Additional calculations and modeling is being conducted and more information is expected at a licensee discussion meeting at 1600 EDT.

The Emergency Operations Center remains staffed at this time.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

Notified R2DO (Heisserer), NMSS (Moore), IRD (Grant) and NMSS Events Notification and Fuels Group via email.

* * * UPDATE AT 1954 EDT ON 7/5/2017 FROM ROBERT JOHNSON TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

"On July 5, 2017 at 1857 (EDT) BWXT LOG-Lynchburg downgraded form an Alert status. Based on a conservative estimate of U-235 mass and an accurate characterization of the desiccant material involved, Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) has determined that a criticality is highly unlikely. Updated evaluations based on as-found conditions and technical information provided by the system manufacturer demonstrated the maximum amount of U-235 in system #1 and system #2. Current NCS controlled parameters in place are mass, moderation, spacing, and container geometry. NCS has determined that the worst case K-adjusted is below the normal license limit. Based on this information, there was no immediate risk of criticality or threat to the safety of workers or the public as a result of the event. Access to the area remains restricted under the control of Security and the Emergency Operations Center."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO (Heisserer), NMSS (Moore), IRD (Grant) and NMSS Events Notification, Fuels Group (via email).
Notified DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DHS NICC, USDA Ops Center, EPA EOC via conference call.
Notified FDA EOC, FEMA NWC, Nuclear SSA and FEMA NRCC SASC via email.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 52862
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: RICHARD KISS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Notification Date: 07/17/2017
Notification Time: 10:55 [ET]
Event Date: 05/18/2017
Event Time: 11:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/17/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
LAURA KOZAK (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

INVALID ACTUATION OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR

"The following information is provided as a 60-day telephone notification to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of the Division 3 emergency diesel generator (DG). The event occurred on May 18, 2017, at 1115 CDT. As allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), the notification is being made via telephone.

"(a) The specific train(s) and system(s) that actuated were:
During troubleshooting of blown fuses for the Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (RAT) main feed metering and relaying circuit, the Division 3 DG automatically started as a result of a loss of power signal, the RAT feed breaker for the offsite power source opened after a 15 second time delay as a result of a degraded voltage signal, and the DG output breaker subsequently closed. The loss of voltage and degraded voltage signals were generated when maintenance technicians opened the wrong test switch in the Division 3 4160-Volt Switchgear 1E22S004.

"(b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial:
Upon receiving the simulated loss of voltage and degraded voltage signals, the Division 3 DG started and the DG breaker closed as expected. No additional actuations occurred.

"(c) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully:
Upon receiving the simulated loss of voltage and degraded voltage signals, the Division 3 DG and the DG breaker were verified to have properly functioned in response to the invalid signals.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 52863
Facility: WATERFORD
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: MICKEY FOLSE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 07/17/2017
Notification Time: 17:37 [ET]
Event Date: 07/17/2017
Event Time: 16:17 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/17/2017
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
Person (Organization):
THOMAS HIPSCHMAN (R4DO)
MICHAEL F. KING (NRR)
BRIAN HOLIAN (NRR)
KRISS KENNEDY (R4RA)
JEFF GRANT (IRD)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER

During a rain and lightning storm, plant operators observed arcing from the main transformer bus duct and notified the control room. The decision was made to trip the main generator which resulted in an automatic reactor trip. The plant entered EAL SU.1 as a result of the loss of offsite power for greater than fifteen minutes. Plant safety busses are being supplied by both emergency diesel generators while the licensee inspects the electrical system to determine any damage prior to bringing offsite power back into the facility. Offsite power is available to the facility. No offsite assistance was requested by the licensee.

During the trip, all rods inserted into the core. Decay heat is being removed via the atmospheric dump valves with emergency feedwater supplying the steam generators. The main steam isolation valves were manually closed to protect the main condenser. There were no safeties or relief valves that actuated during the plant transient. There is no known primary-to-secondary leakage. Reactor cooling is via natural circulation. All safety equipment is available for the safe shutdown of the plant.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality and the local Parish emergency management agencies.

Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, FEMA National Watch Center (email) and Nuclear SSA (email).

* * * UPDATE ON 7/17/17 AT 2007 EDT FROM MARIA ZAMBER TO DONG PARK * * *

This notification is also made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

"This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3.

"On July 17, 2017 at 1606 CDT, the reactor automatically tripped due to a loss of Forced Circulation, which was the result of Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) to the electrical (safety and non-safety) buses. Both 'A' and 'B' trains of Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) started as designed to reenergize the 'A' and 'B' safety buses. The LOOP caused a loss of feedwater pumps, resulting in an automatic actuation of the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) system.

"Prior to the reactor trip, at 1600 CDT, personnel noticed the isophase bus duct to main transformer 'B' glowing orange due to an unknown reason. Due to this, the main turbine was manually tripped at 1606 CDT. Following the turbine trip, the electrical (safety and non-safety) buses did not transfer to the startup transformers as expected due to an unknown reason.

"The plant entered the Emergency Operating Procedure for LOOP/Loss of Forced Circulation Recovery.

"At 1617 CDT, an Unusual Event was declared due to Initiating Condition (IC) SU1 - Loss of all offsite AC power to safety buses [greater than] 15 minutes.

"All safety systems responded as expected.

"The plant is currently in mode 3 and stable with the EDGs supplying both safety buses and with EFW feeding and maintaining both steam generators. Offsite power is in the process of being restored."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality and the local Parish emergency management agencies.

* * * UPDATE FROM ADAM TAMPLAIN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2203 EDT ON 7/17/17 * * *

The licensee terminated the Notification of Unusual Event at 2056 CDT. The basis for terminating was that offsite power was restored to the safety busses.

The licensee has notified Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, St. John and St. Charles Parishes, Louisiana Homeland Security Emergency Preparedness, and will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified IRD (Stapleton), NRR (King), R4DO (Hipschman), DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, FEMA National Watch Center (email) and Nuclear SSA (email).

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, July 18, 2017
Tuesday, July 18, 2017