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Event Notification Report for July 17, 2017

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
07/14/2017 - 07/17/2017

** EVENT NUMBERS **


52840 52842 52859 52861

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 52840
Facility: BWX TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU FABRICATION & SCRAP
Region: 2
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County: CAMPBELL
License #: SNM-42
Agreement: N
Docket: 070-27
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN SUBOSITS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 07/04/2017
Notification Time: 16:30 [ET]
Event Date: 07/04/2017
Event Time: 15:33 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/05/2017
Emergency Class: ALERT
10 CFR Section:
70.32(i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
PART 70 APP A (a)(4) - ALL SAFETY ITEMS UNAVAILABLE
Person (Organization):
LAURA DUDES (R2RA)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
JAMIE HEISSERER (R2DO)
BERNARD STAPLETON (IRD)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
FUELS GROUP (EMAI)

Event Text

NO ITEMS RELIED ON FOR SAFETY AVAILABLE / ALERT DECLARED DUE TO LOSS OF PARAMETER CONTROL TO PREVENT CRITICALITY IN THE RESEARCH TEST REACTOR AREA

"On July 4, 2017 at 1533 [EDT] it was identified that two desiccant filters serving a dry train ventilation system on a uranium processing glovebox line contained a uranium compound. The two containers were located within close proximity to one another, but were separated during maintenance activities associated with the equipment prior to knowledge of the uranium mass presence. This was assumed to be a non-uranium-bearing system and there were no documented controls in the Integrated Safety Analysis to prevent accumulations. The system was not included in typical duct surveys to identify such accumulations. Uranium processing operations were shut down and the plant is in the summer shutdown outage. There was no immediate risk of criticality or threat to the safety of workers or the public as a result of this event. Security is controlling access to the area and the area will remain shutdown."

The initial 10 CFR 70 Appendix A(a)(4) 1 hour report notification was made at 1630 EDT. While making that telephone notification, at approximately 1646 EDT, the licensee communicator notified the Headquarters Operations Officer that the licensee had declared an Alert at 1556 EDT. The Alert declaration was based on a loss of control of all parameters preventing criticality for which control cannot be immediately re-established per the site's Emergency Plan. There is no release and a release is not projected. The licensee's Emergency Operations Center has been activated.

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee notified the Commonwealth of VA and local agencies.

Notified DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DHS NICC, USDA Ops Center, EPA EOC via conference call.
Notified FDA EOC, FEMA NWC, Nuclear SSA and FEMA NRCC SASC via email.

* * * UPDATE AT 0231 EDT ON 07/05/17 FROM CHRIS TERRY TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee has completed preliminary NCS [Nuclear Criticality Safety] calculations based on conservative theoretical analysis and concluded that vessel no. 1, which has the higher loading of material, could achieve a k-effective >1 if conditions were changed, Vessel no. 2 would remain sub-critical under all conditions. The licensee will reconvene their technical staff in the morning to determine what controls could be applied to the higher loaded vessel to evaluate two possible options; the first option is to characterize the material in the sub-critical vessel no. 2 for a better informed NCS analysis of the higher loaded vessel no.1 and the second option is to poison the higher loaded vessel no. 1.

The situation remains stable and the licensee continues to restrict access to the RTR Processing Area.

Notified R2DO (Heisserer), NMSS (Moore), IRD (Stapleton) and NMSS Events Notification and Fuels Group via email.

* * * UPDATE AT 0938 EDT ON 07/05/17 FROM ROBERT JOHNSON TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is still reviewing the NCS calculations to identify the appropriate course of action and will reconvene the technical staff at 1300 EDT. Following this meeting, additional surveys of the area will be performed.

Notified R2DO (Heisserer), NMSS (Moore), IRD (Stapleton) and NMSS Events Notification and Fuels Group via email.

* * * UPDATE AT 1437 EDT ON 7/5/17 FROM ROBERT JOHNSON TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

The Licensee is reporting no change in status they are still in an Alert condition. The licensee reported that the density of the desiccant is being re-evaluated. It is expected that actual density is less than initial assumed density which is favorable. The net effect should be to reduce the estimated grams inside the unit. Reduced estimated grams will improve the safety margin and assist the recovery process. Additional calculations and modeling is being conducted and more information is expected at a licensee discussion meeting at 1600 EDT.

The Emergency Operations Center remains staffed at this time.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

Notified R2DO (Heisserer), NMSS (Moore), IRD (Grant) and NMSS Events Notification and Fuels Group via email.

* * * UPDATE AT 1954 EDT ON 7/5/2017 FROM ROBERT JOHNSON TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

"On July 5, 2017 at 1857 (EDT) BWXT LOG-Lynchburg downgraded form an Alert status. Based on a conservative estimate of U-235 mass and an accurate characterization of the desiccant material involved, Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) has determined that a criticality is highly unlikely. Updated evaluations based on as-found conditions and technical information provided by the system manufacturer demonstrated the maximum amount of U-235 in system #1 and system #2. Current NCS controlled parameters in place are mass, moderation, spacing, and container geometry. NCS has determined that the worst case K-adjusted is below the normal license limit. Based on this information, there was no immediate risk of criticality or threat to the safety of workers or the public as a result of the event. Access to the area remains restricted under the control of Security and the Emergency Operations Center."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO (Heisserer), NMSS (Moore), IRD (Grant) and NMSS Events Notification, Fuels Group (via email).
Notified DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DHS NICC, USDA Ops Center, EPA EOC via conference call.
Notified FDA EOC, FEMA NWC, Nuclear SSA and FEMA NRCC SASC via email.

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Agreement State Event Number: 52842
Rep Org: KENTUCKY DEPT OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: MURRAY STATE UNIVERSITY
Region: 1
City: HOPKINSVILLE State: KY
County:
License #: GL
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARISSA VEGA VELEZ
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 07/06/2017
Notification Time: 10:32 [ET]
Event Date: 06/19/2017
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/06/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOSS OF Ni-63 GAS CHROMATOGRAPH SOURCE

The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Kentucky via email:

"On July 5, 2017, Murray State University [General License 401-111-20] reported the loss of an electron capture detector (ECD) contained in a Hewlett-Packard gas chromatograph model 6890. The ECD contained 15 mCi of Ni-63, S/N US00000603. The licensee stated they shipped the ECD on 1/14/16 by [common carrier] to Agilent Technologies, Inc. On 6/19/17 Agilent Technology verified with the licensee they had not received the device. The licensee believes the package containing the ECD was picked up with other items shipped that day by mistake."

Kentucky Event Report ID No.: KY170006

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Power Reactor Event Number: 52859
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JEFF YEAGER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 07/14/2017
Notification Time: 15:45 [ET]
Event Date: 03/24/2017
Event Time: 15:48 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/14/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION DURING TESTING

"This telephone notification, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an unplanned, invalid actuation of containment isolation valves in more than one system which occurred during the most recent refueling outage at Fermi 2. On 3/24/2017, at approximately 1548 EDT, when synchronizing an emergency diesel generator (EDG) to the grid during testing, an electrical perturbation occurred. Further investigation found that the EDG was slightly out of phase when it was attempted to be synchronized to the grid. The electrical perturbation resulted in an unexpected half-scram of Reactor Protection System (RPS) A and actuation (closure) of some containment isolation valves. The actuations were invalid as they were not initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation. Fermi 2 was shut down for a refueling outage at the time, and therefore, the half-scram of RPS A occurred after the safety function had already been completed. Containment isolation valves actuated (closed) in Division 1 of the Torus Water Management, Drywell Pneumatics, and Drywell Floor and Equipment Drain Sumps systems. All valves operated as expected. Since containment isolation valves in more than one system were actuated by this perturbation, this event constitutes an event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of the system listed in paragraph 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(B)(2) and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 52861
Facility: OYSTER CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: JIM RITCHIE
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 07/14/2017
Notification Time: 21:44 [ET]
Event Date: 07/14/2017
Event Time: 17:24 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/15/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION SYSTEM

"Oyster Creek Generating Station has experienced a loss of the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system due to an electrical perturbation.

"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during the time TSC ventilation is non-functional, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures.

"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to a loss of the TSC. An update will be provided once the TSC ventilation has been restored to normal operation.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * UPDATE AT 0537 EDT ON 07/15/17 FROM JIM RITCHIE TO S. SANDIN * * *

TSC ventilation was restored at 0128 EDT on 07/15/17. The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis).

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Monday, July 17, 2017
Monday, July 17, 2017