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Event Notification Report for June 1, 2017

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
05/31/2017 - 06/01/2017

** EVENT NUMBERS **


52756 52770 52778

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Part 21 Event Number: 52756
Rep Org: CURTISS WRIGHT FLOW CONTROL CO.
Licensee: CURTISS-WRIGHT
Region: 1
City: HUNTSVILLE State: AL
County:
License #: N/A
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TONY GILL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 05/15/2017
Notification Time: 18:55 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2017
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/31/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTO (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 - POTENTIAL DEFECT IN GRAYBOOT SOCKET CONTACTS

The following information was received via email:

"This letter is issued to provide an interim notification of a potential defect in certain lots of Grayboot socket contacts supplied with EQ qualified Grayboot Connector Kits. On March 16, 2017, Curtiss-Wright, Nuclear Division, Huntsville Operations was contacted by Georgia Power Vogtle Nuclear Power Plant concerning a potential defect where the socket contact tines were in a relaxed state.

"Although we have completed some testing and verification activities, additional testing is in progress now and will provide necessary information to complete our evaluation. Current testing will be completed and final conclusions made by May 31, 2017.

"At this time, based on test results, evaluations and operating experience, Curtiss Wright is confident that any potentially affected Grayboot Assemblies will continue to perform their intended safety functions. As such, if the final recommendation is to replace the potentially defective socket contact, this can be accomplished during subsequent routine maintenance activities.

"This notification is being made to comply with 60 day interim reporting requirements as defined in 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2).

"For additional information, please contact Samuel Bledsoe, EGS Products Engineering Manager (1-256-690-7852) or Tony Gill, EGS and Trentec Quality Assurance Manager (1-256-426-4558)."

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY TONY GILL TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1813 EDT ON 05/31/2017 * * *

The following information was provided via email:

"This letter is issued to provide final findings associated with a potential defect concerning GRAYBOOT socket contacts. This issue was initially identified in an interim report dated May 15, 2017. As documented previously, Curtiss-Wright, Nuclear Division, Huntsville Operations was contacted by Georgia Power Vogtle Nuclear Power Plant on March 16, 2017 concerning a potential defect wherein GRAYBOOT socket contact tines were in a relaxed state. This notification of a potential defect concerns model GB-1 GRAYBOOT kits supplied with two-tined, silver-plated, 12-14 AWG socket contacts.

"Based upon this scope, potentially affected kits/parts are: 1. GB-1(12-14) GRAYBOOT kits, 2. GB-1 (12-14/ 16-18) GRAYBOOT kits, and 3. GB-1-6 GRAYBOOT 12-14 AWG socket contacts.

"This issue does not affect the following: 1. Any GRAYBOOT 'A' kits/parts, 2. Any model GB-2 or GB-3 GRAYBOOT kits/parts, or 3. Any model GB-1 GRAYBOOT kits/parts with 16-18 AWG socket contacts.

"Our evaluation is documented in Report No. EGS-TR-880708-15 and is available for review at our facility in Huntsville, AL. The results identify the most likely root cause is improper heat treating of the socket contacts during manufacturing. Additional testing and analysis was performed to confirm that any affected GRAYBOOT assemblies can still preform their safety-related function and do not present a substantial safety hazard .

"The findings outlined in Report No. EGS-TR-880708-15 provide a high level of confidence that affected GRAYBOOT assemblies do not present a substantial safety hazard. This position is further validated by the lack of negative operating experience over the last 20 plus years from properly installed GRAYBOOT assemblies. However, this condition causes the contact to be more susceptible to damage from handling during connection and disconnection, and therefore the following actions are recommended:

"1. Any affected sockets in inventory should be replaced. Affected sockets in service should be replaced during routine maintenance activities.

OR

"2. In lieu of replacement, it is acceptable to perform the following [steps 1-3] to confirm a separation force greater than 0.19 lbs. This is consistent with existing Curtiss-Wright dedication acceptance criteria. It is recommended that any contacts not meeting this criteria be replaced. 1. Crimp a spare pin contact to an appropriate piece of wire. 2. Connect a force gage or 0.19 lbs. of static weight to the opposite end of the wire. 3. Insert the pin into the socket and confirm that the pin does not separate from the socket under a minimum load of 0.19 lbs.

"To confirm this deviation is not present in existing inventory or in future purchased lots, the following corrective actions have been or will be implemented by Curtiss-Wright: 1. Micro hardness testing was performed on all socket contact lots in inventory to verify their acceptability. Results confirmed that all lots were acceptable. 2. Acceptance criteria for dedication of socket contacts will be revised to include verification of acceptable contact hardness. This corrective action will be completed by June 9, 2017. No dedication of socket contacts will be performed until this corrective action is complete.

"A list of affected utilities and associated purchase orders is being developed and will be complete and submitted by June 9, 2017.

"For additional information, please contact Samuel Bledsoe, EGS Products Engineering Manager (1-256-690-7852) or Tony Gill, EGS and Trentec Quality Assurance Manager (1-256-426-4558)."

Notified R1DO (Bower), R2DO (Shaeffer), R3DO (Daley), R4DO (O'Keefe) and Part 21 Operating Reactors Group via email.

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Agreement State Event Number: 52770
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: HUMBOLDT SCIENTIFIC
Region: 1
City: RALEIGH State: NC
County:
License #: UNKNOWN
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARTHUR TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 05/24/2017
Notification Time: 12:20 [ET]
Event Date: 05/24/2017
Event Time: 10:52 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/24/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)
JEREMY GROOM (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FOUND MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was received from the State of Texas by email:

"On October 16, 1998, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified that a Humboldt model 5001 moisture/density gauge containing a 10 millicurie cesium - 137 and a 40 millicurie americium - 241 source was lost during transport from San Antonio to Laredo, Texas. The gauge was to be delivered to the Texas Department of Transportation (TXDOT). A search of the transportation companies warehouses and delivery locations along the transportation route did not find the gauge. The investigation was placed in "Inactive" status. On May 17, 2017, the Agency received an email string showing that a moisture/density gauge was for sale on the internet site 'eBay'. A search of the eBay site found that the gauge serial number matched the serial number of the gauge reported missing in 1998. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was contacted and a request was made for assistance in gathering information on the seller. Using the information gathered by the Agency and the FBI, the Agency was able to contact the seller. The seller removed the posting off of eBay immediately. The seller stated they purchase materials from companies who are going out of business and resell them. The seller stated they did not remember when or where the gauge was purchased. The seller stated they had just moved all the materials they store in a large warehouse into two smaller warehouses and that is when they discovered the gauge. They did some research on the use for the gauge online and decided to sell it. The seller turned the gauge over to TXDOT on May 24, 2017. Dose rates taken on the gauge by TXDOT were normal. The gauge will be leak tested and returned to the manufacturer. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Event #35040 initially reported the event on 11/16/1998 as a lost source while in transit.

Texas Incident: I-7394

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Power Reactor Event Number: 52778
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK TURKAL
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 05/31/2017
Notification Time: 07:50 [ET]
Event Date: 04/06/2017
Event Time: 12:12 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/31/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

INVALID ACTUATION OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS

"This 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER submittal, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).

"On April 6, 2017, at 1212 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), an invalid actuation of emergency diesel generators (EDGs) 1, 2. 3. and 4 occurred. In support of maintenance associated with the onsite electrical distribution system, activities were in progress to power the 2C balance-of-plant (BOP) bus from the startup auxiliary transformer (SAT) followed by de-energization of the 2D BOP bus. However, flexible links between the SAT and the 2D BOP bus had not been installed. As a result, under voltage sensing relay (27SX) was not energized and an invalid SAT secondary side under voltage EDG auto start signal was generated. There was no actual under voltage on the SAT, no loss of power, and all emergency buses continued to be powered by the unit auxiliary transformer (UAT).

"The EDGs responded properly to the auto-start signal. The actuation was complete, in that the EDGs successfully started and ran unloaded. The EDGs were returned to standby status by 1415 EDT. Since no actual under voltage condition existed which required the EDGs to start, and the start was not in response to actual plant conditions satisfying the requirements for initiation, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation.

"This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, June 01, 2017
Thursday, June 01, 2017