| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
05/15/2017 - 05/16/2017 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 52366 | Rep Org: NJ RAD PROT AND REL PREVENTION PGM
Licensee: CARDELLA WASTE SERVICES
Region: 1
City: NORTH BERGEN State: NJ
County:
License #: UNLICENSED FA
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES MCCULLOUGH
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 11/15/2016
Notification Time: 16:14 [ET]
Event Date: 11/15/2016
Event Time: 14:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
BRICE BICKETT (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MULTIPLE RADIUM PAINTED DIALS FOUND IN MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE
The following information was reported by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection via email:
"On November 15, 2016 a specifically licensed waste broker company reported the discovery of multiple (estimated 85) radium-painted dials within two loads of municipal solid waste. The items appear to be dials from U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard deck clocks. A few items appeared within clock housings, while most were loose. The waste broker indicated the items were all found contained within garbage bags and no further contamination was identified outside the bags. The items were placed inside two 5-gallon pails and will be secured on-site pending proper disposal. The estimated total activity was reported as 240 microCuries. This is a reportable incident under N.J.A.C. 7:28-6.1 (10 CFR 20.2201(a)(i)). NJDEP [New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection] is tracking this incident internally as incident ID# C621791 and C622346 (one for each waste load)."
* * * UPDATE FROM JAMES MCCULLOUGH TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1550 EST ON 11/18/2016 * * *
"One truck which had been screened by the waste broker consultant was again rejected at a PA [Pennsylvania] landfill and returned to the facility. The consultant returned to the facility on 11/17/2016 and 11/18/2016 to more thoroughly scan the contents of both truck loads. NJDEP was present on 11/17/2016 to observe. Additional radium dials, movements and associated waste contents were isolated in three 30-gallon waste drums. The three drums and two pails will be secured at the waste facility in a sea van container with lock. An estimated total activity has not yet been provided by the consultant.
"Paperwork, dated in 1980s and mixed into the load, identified a possible responsible party in New York, which appears may no longer be in business. New York State Department of Health Bureau of Environmental Radiation Protection was informed of this by telephone on 11/18/2016.
"NJDEP has received responses from U.S. military contacts who are looking into the possibility of assisting with disposal of the materials."
Notified R1DO (Bickett) and via E-mail NMSS Events Notification group.
* * * UPDATE AT 1222 EST ON 5/15/17 FROM JAMES MCCULLOUGH TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
The following update was received from the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection via email:
"On May 12, 2017 the US Army Joint Munitions Command, Safety/Risk Assessment Directorate - Risk Assessment Division reported that their contractor had picked up the waste shipment on May 11th. The shipment was received by a waste broker in Pennsylvania; the final waste disposal site was identified as US Ecology in Grand View, Idaho."
Notified the R1DO (Burritt), ILTAB (email), NMSS Events group (via email).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 52651 | Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JEFF YEAGER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 03/30/2017
Notification Time: 20:05 [ET]
Event Date: 03/30/2017
Event Time: 17:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text SECONDARY CONTAINMENT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION NOT MET
"On March 30, 2017 at 1710 EDT, with Reactor Building HVAC in service maintaining normal building pressure, Reactor Building pressure began to rise for an unknown reason. The Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary was not met for approximately 50 seconds. Division 1 Standby Gas Treatment System was started and returned Secondary Containment pressure to the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1). The highest pressure observed on the Main Control Room indications was 0.105 inches of vacuum water gauge. During the event, Operations with the Potential to Drain the Reactor Vessel (OPDRV) were in progress. Actions to immediately suspend OPDRVs were taken.
"Investigation of the cause of the event is in progress. There were no radiological releases associated with this event.
"Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
* * * RETRACTION AT 1652 EST ON 5/15/17 FROM JEFF YEAGER TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on March 30, 2017 (EN 52651). The notification to the NRC involved an event where secondary containment momentarily exceeded the Technical Specification (TS) requirements during refueling activities which had been designated as operations with the potential to drain the reactor vessel (OPDRVs). The notification was made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an 'event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to ... control the release of radioactive material.' Subsequent to the initial notification, the event and the NRC guidance in NUREG-1022 pertaining to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) were reviewed further. At the time of the event, Fermi 2 was shutdown (Mode 5. Refueling). In Mode 5, the pressures and temperatures that could cause a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) are not present. No movement of fuel was in progress such that the fuel handling accident (FHA) was also not applicable. Thus secondary containment was only required per TS 3.6.4.1 due to the ongoing OPDRVs. The Fermi 2 UFSAR does not describe OPDRVs as an accident that secondary containment is required to mitigate. Based on this information, secondary containment was not required to mitigate the consequences of an accident as described in the UFSAR during the event on March 30, 2017. Under these circumstances, the momentary exceedance of TS requirements for secondary containment is not considered a loss of safety function under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) per the guidance in NUREG-1022. Therefore, EN 52651 is retracted and no Licensee Event Report (LER) under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v) is required to be submitted."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Notified the R3DO (Cameron). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 52735 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: S-2 ENGINEERING, INC.
Region: 4
City: RANCHO CUCAMONGA State: CA
County:
License #: 7192-36
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONALD OESTERLE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 05/05/2017
Notification Time: 16:02 [ET]
Event Date: 05/01/2017
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/05/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
GREGORY AHERN (ILTA)
CNSNS (MEXICO) (FAX)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - THEFT OF TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following information was provided by the State of California:
"S-2 Engineering reported the loss of a Troxler 3411-B # [S/N] 12398 moisture density gauge that had been in storage at a job site in Barstow, CA. This device contains 0.296 GBq (8 mCi) of Cs-137 and 1.48 GBq (40 mCi) of Am-241.
"The licensee was conducting a physical inventory of their devices containing radioactive material and found this one to be missing from the locked storage box.
"The licensee checked with all of their authorized gauge users to determine if the device was in use but not checked out properly before reporting it as lost. The last documented use of the density gauge was Sept. 22, 2016.
"This investigation is ongoing."
The licensee notified their Local Law Enforcement Agency (LLEA) of the theft.
CA 5010 Number: 050417
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 52737 | Rep Org: NE DIV OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Licensee: BECTON DICKINSON AND COMPANY
Region: 4
City: COLUMBUS State: NE
County:
License #: 10-08-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRYAN MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 05/08/2017
Notification Time: 10:48 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2017
Event Time: 06:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/08/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JOHN KRAMER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CO-60 IRRADIATOR SOURCE DOWN SWITCH FAILURE
"According to 180 NAC 3-026.02 (NRC 10 CFR 30.50) this is the twenty four hour report to the HOO [NRC Headquarters Operations Officer] due to an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed and is required to regulation or license condition and no redundant equipment was available and operable to perform the required safety function.
"The RSO [Radiation Safety Officer], called to report that on May 6th, [2017] at approximately 0645 [CDT] in the morning, Becton Dickinson had a source rack time-out alarm. The Source Rack down switched failed to indicate the rack reached the down position. Upon initial investigations they determined the source was in the down and shielded position. With the help of their service company, Nordion, they bypassed the door interlock and with survey instruments, they ensured the sources were down in the shielded position. No exposure to personnel occurred. Upon initial visual inspection, it appears there may have been a broken [electrical] cable that caused the alarm. Nordion is expected to be on-site today, Monday, May 8, to fix the problem. Will update when we receive the written report." |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 52756 | Rep Org: CURTISS WRIGHT FLOW CONTROL CO.
Licensee: CURTISS-WRIGHT
Region: 1
City: HUNTSVILLE State: AL
County:
License #: N/A
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TONY GILL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 05/15/2017
Notification Time: 18:55 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2017
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
| Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTO (EMAI)
| Event Text PART 21 - POTENTIAL DEFECT IN GRAYBOOT SOCKET CONTACTS
The following information was received via email:
"This letter is issued to provide an interim notification of a potential defect in certain lots of Grayboot socket contacts supplied with EQ qualified Grayboot Connector Kits. On March 16, 2017, Curtiss-Wright, Nuclear Division, Huntsville Operations was contacted by Georgia Power Vogtle Nuclear Power Plant concerning a potential defect where the socket contact tines were in a relaxed state.
"Although we have completed some testing and verification activities, additional testing is in progress now and will provide necessary information to complete our evaluation. Current testing will be completed and final conclusions made by May 31, 2017.
"At this time, based on test results, evaluations and operating experience, Curtiss Wright is confident that any potentially affected Grayboot Assemblies will continue to perform their intended safety functions. As such, if the final recommendation is to replace the potentially defective socket contact, this can be accomplished during subsequent routine maintenance activities.
"This notification is being made to comply with 60 day interim reporting requirements as defined in 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2).
"For additional information, please contact Samuel Bledsoe, EGS Products Engineering Manager (l-256-690-7852) or Tony Gill, EGS and Trentec Quality Assurance Manager (1-256-426-4558)." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52757 | Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: TOM PLOWER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 05/16/2017
Notification Time: 00:17 [ET]
Event Date: 05/15/2017
Event Time: 18:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/16/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text VALID EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR SIGNAL GENERATED UPON LOSS OF 4160V POWER
"On May 15, 2017 at 1800 hours EDT, the '2A3' 4.16 KV safety related bus unexpectedly de-energized. The '2A' emergency diesel generator (EDG) system received a valid start signal from the undervoltage condition on the '2A3' bus but did not start as the EDG had been removed from service for maintenance. Loss of the '2A3' 4.16 KV bus resulted in a valid actuation of the undervoltage protection relays. The direct cause of the de-energization was determined to be failed secondary side potential transformer fuses. The 'B' train safety related electrical busses were unaffected by the event.
"The '2A3' 4.16 KV bus was reenergized at 2340.
"This event was determined to be reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."
During the electrical transient, the licensee briefly entered Technical Specification 3.0.3 but plant conditions were restored, all required LCOs were satisfied, and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited before the plant was required to downpower.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52758 | Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DOUG ASHTON
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 05/16/2017
Notification Time: 00:27 [ET]
Event Date: 05/15/2017
Event Time: 19:18 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/16/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE
"On May 15, 2017 at 1918 hours [CDT], Unit Two High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Minimum Flow Valve MO 2-2301-14 failed to open as required by procedure and HPCI was declared inoperable. When the HPCI Turbine was tripped, the Minimum Flow Valve did not open when system flow reduced to the low flow setpoint. This event is being reported as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The HPCI system is a single train system and the loss of HPCI could impact the plant's ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident. In accordance with Technical Specification 3.5.1 Condition G, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was confirmed operable."
This places the plant in a 14-day LCO action statement.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |