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Event Notification Report for March 20, 2017

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
03/16/2017 - 03/20/2017

** EVENT NUMBERS **


52076 52084 52205 52320 52380 52398 52432 52434 52437 52603 52604 52618
52619 52621 52623 52624

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 52076
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DEREK ETUE
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 07/08/2016
Notification Time: 23:14 [ET]
Event Date: 07/08/2016
Event Time: 20:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/17/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION NOT MET

"On July 8 2016, at 19:09 [EDT] a severe thunderstorm warning was issued for Monroe County. This severe thunderstorm warning included the Fermi 2 site. Due to the high winds encountered during the thunderstorm, the Technical Specification (TS) for the secondary containment pressure boundary was not met two times during the storm for a duration time of 2 seconds total (one second for each event).

"At 20:05:21 Secondary Containment pressure went positive (0.22 inches of water gauge) and at 20:05:22 returned back below plant TS limits (-0.35 inches of water gauge).

"At 20:06:33 Secondary Containment pressure went greater than TS limits (-0.10 inches of water gauge) and at 20:06:34 returned below TS limits (-0.28 inches of water gauge).

"All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned the secondary containment pressure below the TS limits. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. The severe thunderstorm warning for the area was cancelled at 20:30.

"The TS requirement is to maintain secondary containment greater than or equal to 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) for secondary containment operability. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION AT 1922 EDT ON 3/17/2017 FROM DEREK ETUE TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

"In this event notification, DTE Electric Company (DTE) reported conditions whereby the Fermi 2 secondary containment was believed to have exceeded Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements due to high winds. DTE hereby retracts this event notification as the Fermi 2 secondary containment has been determined to have been operable during this event as described below.

"The Fermi 2 secondary containment pressure is maintained at a pressure less than the external pressure to contain, dilute, hold up, and reduce the activity level of fission products prior to release to the environment, and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during a Design Basis Accident or certain operations. Secondary containment pressure is monitored by a number of differential pressure (dP) sensors. High wind gusts have resulted in momentary negative pressure on the leeward side of the building, causing a more positive pressure indication from one or more dP sensors. The secondary containment building pressure remains relatively constant during these 'wind events.'

"In December 2016, DTE implemented a software design change to display a 120-second rolling average for secondary containment dP indication. A 120-second rolling average recorded every second provides the operator a more accurate report of actual secondary containment conditions, while mitigating the signal noise and wind gust effects. The conditions associated with the subject event notification were re-reviewed in light of the improved secondary containment dP indication and it was determined that the Fermi 2 secondary containment was operable during this event. Specifically, the secondary containment pressure did not exceed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements during this event.

"In summary, the above event notification is retracted because the Fermi 2 secondary containment was determined to have been fully operable during the conditions identified in the subject report."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R3DO (Stoedter).

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 52084
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JEFF YEAGER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 07/13/2016
Notification Time: 22:43 [ET]
Event Date: 07/13/2016
Event Time: 19:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/17/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION NOT MET

"On July 13, 2016, at 19:50 EDT a severe thunderstorm warning was issued for Monroe County. This severe thunderstorm warning included the Fermi 2 site.

"Due to high winds encountered during the thunderstorm, the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary was not met numerous times. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately 1 second for each event.

"All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. At 20:40 EDT secondary containment vacuum was greater than the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) and steady, and the LCO was exited. There were no radiological releases associated with this event.

"Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

* * * RETRACTION AT 1922 EDT ON 3/17/2017 FROM DEREK ETUE TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

"In this event notification, DTE Electric Company (DTE) reported conditions whereby the Fermi 2 secondary containment was believed to have exceeded Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements due to high winds. DTE hereby retracts this event notification as the Fermi 2 secondary containment has been determined to have been operable during this event as described below.

"The Fermi 2 secondary containment pressure is maintained at a pressure less than the external pressure to contain, dilute, hold up, and reduce the activity level of fission products prior to release to the environment, and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during a Design Basis Accident or certain operations. Secondary containment pressure is monitored by a number of differential pressure (dP) sensors. High wind gusts have resulted in momentary negative pressure on the leeward side of the building, causing a more positive pressure indication from one or more dP sensors. The secondary containment building pressure remains relatively constant during these 'wind events.'

"In December 2016, DTE implemented a software design change to display a 120-second rolling average for secondary containment dP indication. A 120-second rolling average recorded every second provides the operator a more accurate report of actual secondary containment conditions, while mitigating the signal noise and wind gust effects. The conditions associated with the subject event notification were re-reviewed in light of the improved secondary containment dP indication and it was determined that the Fermi 2 secondary containment was operable during this event. Specifically, the secondary containment pressure did not exceed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements during this event.

"In summary, the above event notification is retracted because the Fermi 2 secondary containment was determined to have been fully operable during the conditions identified in the subject report."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R3DO (Stoedter)

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 52205
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CHRIS MCEACHRAN
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 08/27/2016
Notification Time: 17:48 [ET]
Event Date: 08/27/2016
Event Time: 15:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/17/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 53 Power Operation 53 Power Operation

Event Text

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION NOT MET

"On August 27, 2016, at 1500 EDT a severe thunderstorm occurred in Monroe County, including the Fermi 2 site. Due to high winds encountered during the thunderstorm, the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary was not met numerous times. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately 1 second for each event.

"All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. At 1540 EDT, secondary containment vacuum was greater than the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) and steady, and the LCO was exited. There were no radiological releases associated with this event.

"Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

* * * RETRACTION AT 1922 EDT ON 3/17/2017 FROM DEREK ETUE TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

"In this event notification, DTE Electric Company (DTE) reported conditions whereby the Fermi 2 secondary containment was believed to have exceeded Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements due to high winds. DTE hereby retracts this event notification as the Fermi 2 secondary containment has been determined to have been operable during this event as described below.

"The Fermi 2 secondary containment pressure is maintained at a pressure less than the external pressure to contain, dilute, hold up, and reduce the activity level of fission products prior to release to the environment, and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during a Design Basis Accident or certain operations. Secondary containment pressure is monitored by a number of differential pressure (dP) sensors. High wind gusts have resulted in momentary negative pressure on the leeward side of the building, causing a more positive pressure indication from one or more dP sensors. The secondary containment building pressure remains relatively constant during these 'wind events.'

"In December 2016, DTE implemented a software design change to display a 120-second rolling average for secondary containment dP indication. A 120-second rolling average recorded every second provides the operator a more accurate report of actual secondary containment conditions, while mitigating the signal noise and wind gust effects. The conditions associated with the subject event notification were re-reviewed in light of the improved secondary containment dP indication and it was determined that the Fermi 2 secondary containment was operable during this event. Specifically, the secondary containment pressure did not exceed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements during this event.

"In summary, the above event notification is retracted because the Fermi 2 secondary containment was determined to have been fully operable during the conditions identified in the subject report."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R3DO (Stoedter).

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 52320
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JEFF YEAGER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 10/27/2016
Notification Time: 00:49 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/2016
Event Time: 23:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/17/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 98 Power Operation 98 Power Operation

Event Text

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION NOT MET

"On October 26, 2016, at 2300 EDT, high wind conditions encountered on site resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met numerous times. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately one second for each instance.

"All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. At 2300 EDT, secondary containment vacuum was greater than the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) and steady, and the LCO was exited. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. A review indicates that this condition occurred earlier this shift during the high wind condition.

"Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector ."

* * * RETRACTION AT 1922 EDT ON 3/17/2017 FROM DEREK ETUE TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

"In this event notification, DTE Electric Company (DTE) reported conditions whereby the Fermi 2 secondary containment was believed to have exceeded Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements due to high winds. DTE hereby retracts this event notification as the Fermi 2 secondary containment has been determined to have been operable during this event as described below.

"The Fermi 2 secondary containment pressure is maintained at a pressure less than the external pressure to contain, dilute, hold up, and reduce the activity level of fission products prior to release to the environment, and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during a Design Basis Accident or certain operations. Secondary containment pressure is monitored by a number of differential pressure (dP) sensors. High wind gusts have resulted in momentary negative pressure on the leeward side of the building, causing a more positive pressure indication from one or more dP sensors. The secondary containment building pressure remains relatively constant during these 'wind events.'

"In December 2016, DTE implemented a software design change to display a 120-second rolling average for secondary containment dP indication. A 120-second rolling average recorded every second provides the operator a more accurate report of actual secondary containment conditions, while mitigating the signal noise and wind gust effects. The conditions associated with the subject event notification were re-reviewed in light of the improved secondary containment dP indication and it was determined that the Fermi 2 secondary containment was operable during this event. Specifically, the secondary containment pressure did not exceed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements during this event.

"In summary, the above event notification is retracted because the Fermi 2 secondary containment was determined to have been fully operable during the conditions identified in the subject report."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R3DO (Stoedter).

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 52380
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GREG MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 11/20/2016
Notification Time: 04:56 [ET]
Event Date: 11/19/2016
Event Time: 21:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/17/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
MARK JEFFERS (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 96 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION NOT MET

"On November 19, 2016, starting at 2150 EST, high wind conditions encountered on site resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met numerous times. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately 1 second for each instance.

"All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. At 0430 EST, high wind conditions have subsided and secondary containment vacuum was greater than the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) and steady, and the LCO was exited. There were no radiological releases associated with this event.

"Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."


* * * UPDATE ON 11/20/16 AT 1416 EST FROM BRETT JEBBIA TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

"On November 20, 2016, starting at 0654 EST, high wind conditions encountered on site resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met on multiple different occasions as of event notification update time. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately 1 second for each instance.

"Fermi 2 continues to remain in a gale force wind advisory for the local area of Lake Erie.

"All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. There were no radiological releases associated with this event.

"Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

The R3DO (Jeffers) has been notified.


* * * UPDATE ON 11/20/16 AT 2104 FROM GREG MILLER TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

"On November 20, 2016, at 1426 EST, high wind conditions encountered on site resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately 1 second.

"The Fermi 2 local area of Lake Erie is no longer in a gale force wind advisory and the high wind conditions have subsided.

"All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. There were no radiological releases associated with this event.

"Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

The R3DO (Jeffers) has been notified.

* * * RETRACTION AT 1922 EDT ON 3/17/2017 FROM DEREK ETUE TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

"In this event notification, DTE Electric Company (DTE) reported conditions whereby the Fermi 2 secondary containment was believed to have exceeded Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements due to high winds. DTE hereby retracts this event notification as the Fermi 2 secondary containment has been determined to have been operable during this event as described below.

"The Fermi 2 secondary containment pressure is maintained at a pressure less than the external pressure to contain, dilute, hold up, and reduce the activity level of fission products prior to release to the environment, and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during a Design Basis Accident or certain operations. Secondary containment pressure is monitored by a number of differential pressure (dP) sensors. High wind gusts have resulted in momentary negative pressure on the leeward side of the building, causing a more positive pressure indication from one or more dP sensors. The secondary containment building pressure remains relatively constant during these 'wind events.'

"In December 2016, DTE implemented a software design change to display a 120-second rolling average for secondary containment dP indication. A 120-second rolling average recorded every second provides the operator a more accurate report of actual secondary containment conditions, while mitigating the signal noise and wind gust effects. The conditions associated with the subject event notification were re-reviewed in light of the improved secondary containment dP indication and it was determined that the Fermi 2 secondary containment was operable during this event. Specifically, the secondary containment pressure did not exceed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements during this event.

"In summary, the above event notification is retracted because the Fermi 2 secondary containment was determined to have been fully operable during the conditions identified in the subject report."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R3DO (Stoedter)

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 52398
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JEFF YEAGER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 11/29/2016
Notification Time: 01:41 [ET]
Event Date: 11/28/2016
Event Time: 21:05 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/17/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
KARLA STOEDTER (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION NOT MET

"On November 28, 2016, starting at 2105 hrs. EST, high wind conditions encountered on site resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met numerous times. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately 1 second for each instance.

"All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. At 0055 EST on November 29, 2016, high wind conditions had subsided and secondary containment vacuum was greater than the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) and steady, and the LCO was exited. There were no radiological releases associated with this event.

"Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

* * * UPDATE FROM CHRIS MCALLISTER TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1027 EST ON 11/29/16 * * *

"On November 29, 2016, at 0242 EST, high wind conditions encountered on site resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met numerous times following the initial event notification. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately 1 second for each instance.

"All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure to within TS limits. High wind conditions are expected to decrease throughout the day. If additional instances are identified that require entry into the Technical Specifications (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met, another follow up notification will be performed. There were no radiological releases associated with this event.

"Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

Notified R3DO (Stoedter).

* * * RETRACTION AT 1922 EDT ON 3/17/2017 FROM DEREK ETUE TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

"In this event notification, DTE Electric Company (DTE) reported conditions whereby the Fermi 2 secondary containment was believed to have exceeded Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements due to high winds. DTE hereby retracts this event notification as the Fermi 2 secondary containment has been determined to have been operable during this event as described below.

"The Fermi 2 secondary containment pressure is maintained at a pressure less than the external pressure to contain, dilute, hold up, and reduce the activity level of fission products prior to release to the environment, and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during a Design Basis Accident or certain operations. Secondary containment pressure is monitored by a number of differential pressure (dP) sensors. High wind gusts have resulted in momentary negative pressure on the leeward side of the building, causing a more positive pressure indication from one or more dP sensors. The secondary containment building pressure remains relatively constant during these 'wind events.'

"In December 2016, DTE implemented a software design change to display a 120-second rolling average for secondary containment dP indication. A 120-second rolling average recorded every second provides the operator a more accurate report of actual secondary containment conditions, while mitigating the signal noise and wind gust effects. The conditions associated with the subject event notification were re-reviewed in light of the improved secondary containment dP indication and it was determined that the Fermi 2 secondary containment was operable during this event. Specifically, the secondary containment pressure did not exceed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements during this event.

"In summary, the above event notification is retracted because the Fermi 2 secondary containment was determined to have been fully operable during the conditions identified in the subject report."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R3DO (Stoedter).

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 52432
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KELLY BELENKY
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 12/14/2016
Notification Time: 15:10 [ET]
Event Date: 12/14/2016
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/17/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT PRESSURE BOUNDARY OUT OF SPECIFICATION

"On December 14, 2016, at 1314 EST, the startup of the Reactor Building HVAC [Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning] system resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met for approximately 1 second. The maximum secondary containment pressure observed during that time was approximately 0.07 inches of vacuum water gauge.

"Secondary containment pressure was returned to within the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) by Reactor Building HVAC and Standby Gas Treatment System already in operation. There were no radiological releases associated with this event.

"Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

* * * RETRACTION AT 1922 EDT ON 3/17/2017 FROM DEREK ETUE TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

"In this event notification, DTE Electric Company (DTE) reported conditions whereby the Fermi 2 secondary containment was believed to have exceeded Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements due to high winds. DTE hereby retracts this event notification as the Fermi 2 secondary containment has been determined to have been operable during this event as described below.

"The Fermi 2 secondary containment pressure is maintained at a pressure less than the external pressure to contain, dilute, hold up, and reduce the activity level of fission products prior to release to the environment, and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during a Design Basis Accident or certain operations. Secondary containment pressure is monitored by a number of differential pressure (dP) sensors. High wind gusts have resulted in momentary negative pressure on the leeward side of the building, causing a more positive pressure indication from one or more dP sensors. The secondary containment building pressure remains relatively constant during these 'wind events.'

"In December 2016, DTE implemented a software design change to display a 120-second rolling average for secondary containment dP indication. A 120-second rolling average recorded every second provides the operator a more accurate report of actual secondary containment conditions, while mitigating the signal noise and wind gust effects. The conditions associated with the subject event notification were re-reviewed in light of the improved secondary containment dP indication and it was determined that the Fermi 2 secondary containment was operable during this event. Specifically, the secondary containment pressure did not exceed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements during this event.

"In summary, the above event notification is retracted because the Fermi 2 secondary containment was determined to have been fully operable during the conditions identified in the subject report."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R3DO (Stoedter)

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 52434
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GREG MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 12/15/2016
Notification Time: 03:40 [ET]
Event Date: 12/14/2016
Event Time: 23:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/17/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT MOMENTARY LOW PRESSURE DUE TO HIGH WINDS

"On December 14, 2016, starting at 2345 EST, high wind conditions encountered on site resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met numerous times. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately one second for each instance.

"All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. At 0300 EST on December 15, 2016, high wind conditions had subsided and secondary containment vacuum was greater than the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) and steady, and the LCO was exited. There were no radiological releases associated with this event.

"Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

* * * RETRACTION AT 1922 EDT ON 3/17/2017 FROM DEREK ETUE TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

"In this event notification, DTE Electric Company (DTE) reported conditions whereby the Fermi 2 secondary containment was believed to have exceeded Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements due to high winds. DTE hereby retracts this event notification as the Fermi 2 secondary containment has been determined to have been operable during this event as described below.

"The Fermi 2 secondary containment pressure is maintained at a pressure less than the external pressure to contain, dilute, hold up, and reduce the activity level of fission products prior to release to the environment, and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during a Design Basis Accident or certain operations. Secondary containment pressure is monitored by a number of differential pressure (dP) sensors. High wind gusts have resulted in momentary negative pressure on the leeward side of the building, causing a more positive pressure indication from one or more dP sensors. The secondary containment building pressure remains relatively constant during these 'wind events.'

"In December 2016, DTE implemented a software design change to display a 120-second rolling average for secondary containment dP indication. A 120-second rolling average recorded every second provides the operator a more accurate report of actual secondary containment conditions, while mitigating the signal noise and wind gust effects. The conditions associated with the subject event notification were re-reviewed in light of the improved secondary containment dP indication and it was determined that the Fermi 2 secondary containment was operable during this event. Specifically, the secondary containment pressure did not exceed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements during this event.

"In summary, the above event notification is retracted because the Fermi 2 secondary containment was determined to have been fully operable during the conditions identified in the subject report."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R3DO (Stoedter)

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 52437
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KELLEY BELENKY
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 12/15/2016
Notification Time: 11:47 [ET]
Event Date: 12/15/2016
Event Time: 10:10 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/17/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT MOMENTARY LOW PRESSURE

"On December 15, 2016, at 1010 EST, the startup of the Reactor Building HVAC [Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning] system resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met for approximately 1 second. The maximum secondary containment pressure observed during that time was approximately 0.044 inches of vacuum water gauge.

"Secondary containment pressure was returned to within the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4. 1.1) by Reactor Building HVAC and Standby Gas Treatment System already in operation. There were no radiological releases associated with this event.

"Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

* * * RETRACTION AT 1922 EDT ON 3/17/2017 FROM DEREK ETUE TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

"In this event notification, DTE Electric Company (DTE) reported conditions whereby the Fermi 2 secondary containment was believed to have exceeded Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements due to high winds. DTE hereby retracts this event notification as the Fermi 2 secondary containment has been determined to have been operable during this event as described below.

"The Fermi 2 secondary containment pressure is maintained at a pressure less than the external pressure to contain, dilute, hold up, and reduce the activity level of fission products prior to release to the environment, and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during a Design Basis Accident or certain operations. Secondary containment pressure is monitored by a number of differential pressure (dP) sensors. High wind gusts have resulted in momentary negative pressure on the leeward side of the building, causing a more positive pressure indication from one or more dP sensors. The secondary containment building pressure remains relatively constant during these 'wind events.'

"In December 2016, DTE implemented a software design change to display a 120-second rolling average for secondary containment dP indication. A 120-second rolling average recorded every second provides the operator a more accurate report of actual secondary containment conditions, while mitigating the signal noise and wind gust effects. The conditions associated with the subject event notification were re-reviewed in light of the improved secondary containment dP indication and it was determined that the Fermi 2 secondary containment was operable during this event. Specifically, the secondary containment pressure did not exceed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements during this event.

"In summary, the above event notification is retracted because the Fermi 2 secondary containment was determined to have been fully operable during the conditions identified in the subject report."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R3DO (Stoedter).

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Agreement State Event Number: 52603
Rep Org: MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: TEAM INDUSTRIAL SERVICES INC.
Region: 3
City: ROSEVILLE State: MN
County:
License #: 1192
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TYLER S. KRUSE
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 03/10/2017
Notification Time: 13:08 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2017
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/10/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
MARK JEFFERS (R3DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (NMSS)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIRE DURING RADIOGRAPHY OPERATIONS

The following information was provided by the State of Minnesota via email:

"A Team Industrial Services radiography crew was working at Flint Hills Refinery on March 9, 2017. Approximately 7 minutes after starting a 13 minute exposure, one of the radiographers (Radiographer 1) noticed a fire had started near the exposure device. Radiographer 1 instructed the other radiographer (Radiographer 2) to call the plant's fire department and notify the Team's lead radiographer at their Rosemount location. Radiographer 1 then attempted to retract the source and was unsuccessful. Radiographer 1 then successfully extinguished the fire however the fire started again shortly after. At this point Radiographer 1 exited the unit. [The Team's lead radiographer] instructed the crew to extend their boundaries and wait for assistance. [The Team's lead radiographer] contacted the Team's Radiation Safety Officer.

"The fire department arrived and was able to extinguish the fire from a ladder truck located outside the radiographer's boundaries. The Team's lead radiographer and [another individual] arrived on-site and assessed the situation. Other available radiographers were dispatched to the site to assist in monitoring the site boundaries. [The Team's lead radiographer] sent pictures of the site to [the Team's Radiation Safety Officer] who contacted QSA for assistance in planning the source retrieval. The retrieval team was able to identify that the drive cables conduit was melted, exposing the drive cable and separating the connection from the camera causing the crank to malfunction. They manually attempted to retract the drive cable and were able to confirm with survey meters that the source was still connected to the drive cable. The drive cable was manually retracted and the source was pulled into the shielded position. Surveys were taken to confirm the source was shielded, and the source was locked in position.

"The source has been leak tested and the sample was overnighted to QSA for analysis. The plant is assessing the situation and will issue a report regarding the cause of the fire. The pocket dosimeter readings for the crew were as follows:

Radiographer 1: 54 mR
Radiographer 2: 15 mR
Another individual: 13 mR
Team's lead radiographer: 5 mR

"The licensee is in the process of assessing the dose received by the fire fighters, however it is assumed that their doses were minimal based on the doses received by the radiography crew and their distance from the source. The licensee is preparing and will issue a written report within the required 30 day time frame.

"Exposure device: QSA 880 D. Source: A-424-9, Ir-192, 64 curies"

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Agreement State Event Number: 52604
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: NUTTING ENGINEERS
Region: 1
City: BOYNTON BEACH State: FL
County:
License #: 0934-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TIM DUNN
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 03/10/2017
Notification Time: 13:52 [ET]
Event Date: 03/10/2017
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/10/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TROXLER GAUGE

The following report was received from the State of Florida Bureau of Radiation Control via email:

"[The licensee] left the gauge on the tailgate of his truck and drove away from the jobsite. Realizing that he had forgotten to secure the gauge properly he retraced his travel back to the last known location, but could not find the missing gauge.

"Device Type: Moisture Density
Manufacture: Troxler
Model Number: 3430
Serial Number: 70824
Isotope and Activity: Cs-137, 8 mCi and AmBe 40 mCi.

"Florida Incident Number: FL17-074"

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Power Reactor Event Number: 52618
Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN McILNAY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 03/17/2017
Notification Time: 17:08 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2017
Event Time: 01:20 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/17/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
FRANK EHRHARDT (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

CONTAINMENT AIRLOCK FUNCTION LOST DUE TO EQUALIZING VALVE NOT CLOSING

"On March 9, 2017 at 0120 EST, the equalizing valve for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 upper containment airlock inboard door was found not closed while the outboard airlock door was open. This created a containment bypass with leakage potentially greater than allowed by the design. The operator immediately identified, after opening the outer door of the elevation 757 Air Lock, the pressure equalizing valve for the inner door was not fully closed. The outer door was promptly shut to isolate the airlock. The inner door was then cycled which closed the equalizing valve. The total time that a containment bypass was present is estimated at five minutes.

"This condition was initially recognized as being potentially reportable. However, the assessment performed at the time, based on operator control of the outer airlock door, concluded there was a reasonable assurance of meeting the safety function. A subsequent independent review of this condition identified that this should have been reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) within eight hours of the event.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this event."

The licensee is planning on replacing the equalizing valve in the near future.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 52619
Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: KEVIN LOWE
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 03/17/2017
Notification Time: 17:12 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/2017
Event Time: 15:17 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/17/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
FRANK EHRHARDT (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR

"At approximately 1517 [EDT], while restoring protective relay power to the 1B Reserve Auxiliary Transformer, a valid undervoltage actuation signal was sent to the 1B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). The 1B EDG automatically started and tied to the safety bus (1BA03). The 1BA03 bus was loaded by the automatic load sequencer. This actuation was identified by the Control Room Operators and the 1B EDG was locally monitored while in service.

"This actuation is reportable due to the automatic actuation of a system listed in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B).

"The reactor was not critical at the time of the event and not challenged throughout the event.

"Containment Cooler Number 8 did not automatically start in 'Fast Speed' as expected. Containment Cooler Number 8 was successfully started in 'Fast Speed' manually by the Control Room Operators.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 52621
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JAMES SPEICHER
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 03/18/2017
Notification Time: 12:09 [ET]
Event Date: 03/18/2017
Event Time: 11:19 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/18/2017
Emergency Class: ALERT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
FRANK EHRHARDT (R2DO)
LAURA DUDES (R2 D)
BILL DEAN (NRR)
BERNARD STAPLETON (IRD)
CHRIS MILLER (NRR)
MICHAEL F. KING (NRR)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

ALERT DECLARED FOR INDICATIONS OF FIRE IN SAFETY RELATED SWITCHGEAR

"Alert declared at 1119 EDT 3/18/17 based on EAL H.A.2 - Fire or Explosion affecting plant safety systems. Fire alarms in the Unit 3 4kV switchgear rooms resulting in a loss of the 3A 4kV bus and trip of all three Reactor Coolant Pumps. The reactor tripped and was stabilized in Mode 3. No actual fire was observed. The 3A 4kV is deenergized. The 3B Reactor Coolant Pump was restarted for forced circulation. All other safety systems functioned as required. A refueling outage was scheduled to begin on 3/20/17."

All control rods fully inserted on the reactor trip. Decay heat is being removed using feedwater and steam generator atmospheric steam dumps. One person was injured with a minor burn and possible sprained ankle and was taken to a local hospital.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified DHS SWO, DOE, FEMA, HHS, NICC, USDA, EPA, FDA (e-mail), NWC (e-mail), NNSA (e-mail), and NRCC SASC (e-mail).

* * * UPDATE AT 1426 EDT ON 3/18/2017 FROM DAN HAGARDY TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

"Unit 3 was determined by the Emergency Coordinator to be in a safe and stable condition, the Emergency Plan personnel at the Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility were no longer required for support, the Operations Support Center was staffed for recovery efforts, and plant personnel were sufficient and capable for continuing mitigation efforts.

"Investigation of the fault on the 3A 4kV bus is ongoing.

"Based on the above conditions, the Alert was exited at 1420 hours [on 3/18/2017]."

The injured electrician was taken to an offsite hospital to treat minor burns and possible sprained ankle.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R2DO (Ehrhardt), NRR EO (Miller and King), IRD MOC (Stapleton), DHS SWO, DOE, FEMA, HHS, NICC, USDA, EPA, FDA (e-mail), NWC (e-mail), NNSA (e-mail), and NRCC SASC (e-mail).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 52623
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: PAUL CZAYA
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 03/18/2017
Notification Time: 15:07 [ET]
Event Date: 03/18/2017
Event Time: 11:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/18/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
FRANK EHRHARDT (R2DO)
CHRIS MILLER (NRR)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

REACTOR TRIP AND LOSS OF ABILITY FOR UNIT 4 TO SUPPLY POWER TO UNIT 3

"On 3/18/17 at 1107 [EDT], the Unit 3 reactor tripped as a result of the loss of the 3A 4kV bus. All three reactor coolant pumps (RCP) tripped and the 3B RCP was restarted for forced recirculation. The reactor is stable in Mode 3. The 3A 4kV bus remains deenergized until troubleshooting and repairs are complete. In addition, Technical Specification 3.8.1.1, Action C requires a four hour report for the concurrent inoperability of the Unit 4 startup transformer to Unit 3 via the 3A 4kV bus and the Unit 3 3A diesel generator.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector will be notified."

* * * UPDATE ON 3/18/2017 AT 1854 EDT FROM JAMES SPICHER TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

"Update to previous report (EN 52623) to include additional reporting criteria.

"On 3/18/17 at 1107 [EDT] the Unit 3 reactor tripped as a result of the loss of the 3A 4kV bus. The 3A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) started on the loss of power signal but did not load, as designed, due to the bus fault. The 3A EDG was manually stopped at 1332. The Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System also initiated as expected. AFW was stopped at 1135. The actuations of the 3A EDG and AFW are reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

"A loss of safety function affecting Units 3 and 4 occurred due to the loss of the 3A high head safety injection (HHSI) pump because it could not be powered from the faulted 3A 4kV bus with both Unit 4 HHSI pumps earlier (0624) removed from service due to planned maintenance. This caused three of the four HHSI pumps to be inoperable. The four HHSI pumps are shared by both Units 3 and 4. The safety function is achieved by two of the four HHSI pumps. Both Unit 4 HHSI pumps were restored to operable status at 1336. The loss of safety function is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

"The Unit 3 reactor is stable in Mode 3. The 3A 4kV bus remains deenergized until troubleshooting and repairs are complete. Unit 4 remains operating at 100% power."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt) and NRR EO (Miller).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 52624
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: NOAH LACY
HQ OPS Officer: DAN LIVERMORE
Notification Date: 03/20/2017
Notification Time: 04:40 [ET]
Event Date: 03/20/2017
Event Time: 02:27 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 M Y 4 Startup 0 Hot Shutdown

Event Text

MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO PRESSURE OSCILLATIONS

"On March 20, 2017 at 0227, Nine Mile Point Unit1 was manually scrammed due to pressure oscillations. The Unit was offline and reactor shutdown was in-progress at the time of the scram. The scram was inserted at approximately 4% reactor power when pressure oscillations occurred exceeding the procedurally required limit for pressure oscillations. The cause of the scram was due to Operators manually inserting the scram. The cause of the pressure oscillations is being investigated."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R1DO (Gray).

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Monday, March 20, 2017
Monday, March 20, 2017