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Event Notification Report for March 10, 2017

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
03/09/2017 - 03/10/2017

** EVENT NUMBERS **


52584 52601

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Agreement State Event Number: 52584
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: HEURESIS CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: NEWTON State: MA
County:
License #: 55-0702
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSHUA DAEHLER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 03/01/2017
Notification Time: 12:57 [ET]
Event Date: 02/28/2017
Event Time: 14:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/01/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TWO SEALED SOURCES TESTED POSITIVE FOR LEAKAGE

The following information was received via email from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts:

"The licensee reported on February 28, 2017 that licensee learned from its licensed leak test service provider that two 6 milliCurie, Cobalt-57, sealed sources, of 20 sources received in a package from the source manufacturer, Isotope Products Laboratories, tested positive for leakage.

"The leak test result for one of the sealed sources was reported to be at least 0.4 microCuries which is the maximum activity that the instrument used can measure. The leak test result for the other sealed source was reported to be below the reporting requirement of 0.005 microCuries.

"The sealed sources are each Isotope Products Laboratories Model 3901-2 sources. The serial number attributed to the source having leak test result of at least 0.4 microCuries was reported to be P3-682. The serial number attributed to the source having leak test result of below 0.005 microCuries was reported to be P3-689.

"The licensee reported that each of the sources is contained and secured in a separate plastic bags; that there is no facility contamination based on area surveys performed; that the external surfaces of the package received, that had contained the sources, had been wipe tested and that the package was not contaminated; and that the sources were not used pending leak test results.

"The licensee reports that it will notify the source manufacturer, to inquire about proper return of the sources back to the source manufacturer.

"The Agency [Massachusetts Radiation Control Program] considers this event to be open."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 52601
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: LUKE ECHOLS
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 03/09/2017
Notification Time: 10:57 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2017
Event Time: 03:19 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/09/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
MARK JEFFERS (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 99 Power Operation 99 Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO RELAY FAILURE

"On March 7, 2017, Division 2 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system was inoperable due to a scheduled maintenance system outage window. At 2258 [CST], Operations identified a Division 1 Unit Substation Switchgear relay was cycling, which is part of the Division 1 AC Power system. The specific relay could not be identified at the time. Division 1 AC Power systems were protected.

"On March 8, 2017 at 1830 hours, Division 2 RHR was restored to operable status.

"On March 9, 2017 at 0319 hours, Operations declared Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) inoperable due to the [identification of the] Division 1 relay as related to properly tripping non-essential loads on a bus under-voltage condition. The relay would not have actuated to trip non-essential loads. The proper tripping of non-essential loads is a requirement for Division 1 EDG.

"The Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) analysis specifies with the Division 1 DG failure, the remaining systems available are: Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS), and 2 Low Pressure Core Injection (LPCI) systems.

"As a result of Division 2 RHR [being] inoperable at the same time Division 1 EDG was inoperable, an unanalyzed condition existed. While Division 2 RHR was inoperable, Division 1 EDG was inoperable. Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, was not met. Condition B, One Required DG Inoperable, Required Action B.2 declares required features, [normally] supported by the inoperable DG, inoperable when the redundant required features are inoperable, with a completion time of 4 hours. The action would have required declaring Division 1 ECCS inoperable, which includes Division 1 RHR and Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS).

"With Division 1 EDG, Division 1 RHR, and Division 2 RHR inoperable, the station did not satisfy the USAR ECCS analysis and was in an unanalyzed condition. This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition, since the condition occurred within three years of the date of discovery.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, March 10, 2017
Friday, March 10, 2017