Event Notification Report for February 03, 2017

LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGN

An inventory of the tritium exit signs at US Coast Guard Air Station Barbers Point, Kapolei, HI determined that one sign was missing.

Last test date: January 2001
Quantity of tritium: 7.5 Ci
Manufacturer: Isolite
Model: 2040
Serial Number: A071367

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

UNANALYZED CONDITION - APPENDIX R FIRE ANALYSIS

"In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10CFR50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10CFR50.48(c) (NFPA 805), a weak-link and operator manual action (OMA) analysis for Information Notice (IN) 92-18 type hot shorts on motor-operated valves (MOVs) was performed to support the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis. As a result of the analysis, it was identified that cable impacts can bypass valve limit and torque switches, resulting in physical damage to valves required for Safe Shutdown. This would prevent the valves from being operated locally or being operated from the remote shutdown panel. These cable failures could also cause the valve motors to fail. This updated analysis has identified circuit configuration deficiencies in Fire Areas 0024 A & C (Main Control Room & Cable Spread Room), 1203F (U1 Reactor Building SE), 1205F (U1 Reactor Building NE), and 2203F (U2 Reactor Building NE). Therefore, due to the identified deficient conditions, it was determined that in the event of a postulated fire in the affected fire areas, the paths of safe shutdown on the affected unit(s) could be compromised and impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions.

"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions in these same fire areas. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions can be repaired.

"CRs 10326399, 10326401, 10326402, 10326404 and 10326405"

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

The unanalyzed condition is applicable to 10CFR50.48(b) Appendix R and not to 10CFR50.48(c) (NFPA 805).

AIR EFFLUENT CONCENTRATION EXCEEDED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

"[The following] is a required notification per MURR [University of Missouri Research Reactor] Technical Specification (TS) 6.6.c.(1) to report to the NRC Operations Center that an Abnormal Occurrence as defined by MURR TS 1.1.b occurred on February 3, 2017. Specifically, MURR was not in compliance with the Limiting Condition for Operations TS 3.7.b.

"On February 3, 2017, MURR released the radioisotope Iodine-131 from the ventilation exhaust stack at a concentration equal to 1.07 times AEC [Air Effluent Concentration] which exceeds the one (1) AEC Maximum Controlled Instantaneous Release Concentration for 'Particulates and halogens with half-lives greater than 8 days'. The Iodine-131 originated from the MURR Iodine-131 Processing Hot Cells, not from the reactor. By February 4, 2017, the ventilation exhaust stack radioisotope concentration was within TS limits.

"Currently, all Iodine-131 processing activities have ceased and will not resume until corrective actions are implemented and permission from the Facility Director is obtained. MURR has convened an Event Review per MURR procedure AP-RR-026 to identify the causes and corrective actions for this departure from specification.

"A detailed event report will follow within 14 days as required by MURR TS 6.6.c.(3)."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MOISTURE DENISTY GAUGE SHIPMENT LOST IN TRANSIT

The following report was received via e-mail:

"Texas licensee, Amarillo Testing and Engineering, reported that two moisture density gauges being shipped to them from Qal Tek in Idaho Falls had gone missing during shipment. The trucking company, has been unable to locate the packages and last identified them in Pocatello, Idaho. The gauges are Troxler model 3411 and 3440 and each contain an 8 mCi Cs-137 and a 40 mCi Americium- 241 source. The packages were delivered to the carrier on 01/18/2017."

Texas Incident: I-9460

See also Event Notification 52532 for this event reported from Qual-Tek in Idaho.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

UNIT 1 MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOOP 1 MSIV STARTING TO FAIL CLOSED

"At 1545 EST on 2/3/17, Vogtle Unit 1 was manually tripped from 100% power when loop 1 Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) started to fail closed. Non-Safety Related 4160V bus 1NA01 failed to transfer to alternate incoming power supply automatically and was successfully manually energized.

"All control rods fully inserted and AFW [Auxiliary Feedwater] and FWI [Feedwater Isolation] actuated as expected.

"Unit 1 is in Mode 3 and stable with decay heat being removed by AFW."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO UNACCOUNTED LOADS IN SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS

"On February 3rd, 2017, during engineering modification reviews of electrical busses for a station switchyard transformer, electrical loads were identified on 4kV breakers that are not accounted for in the current safe shutdown analysis. Further reviews revealed the unanalyzed loads are associated with 26 cables that are routed through multiple fire zones in the Turbine Building and both Unit 1 and Unit 2 4kV rooms that have the potential to be affected from a fire event. Per NFPA 805 requirements, the cables need to be analyzed for overcurrent trip capability to demonstrate that the breakers will isolate a fault for a fire.

"Hourly Fire Watch tours have been established in the identified fire zones. The public health and safety is not impacted. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition.

"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. This is a late notification for the 8 hour report."

* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY ERIK LANKHEET TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1522 ON 04/04/2017 * * *

"The condition reported in EN# 52544 pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) has been evaluated, and determined not to be an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety and is being retracted.

"Fire Protection Engineering performed circuit analysis of the discovered loads and determined that the Fire Safety Analysis credited power supply for an established recovery action was lost due to a Turbine Building fire. This was determined to not be a significant impact to plant safety due to the availability of an alternate offsite 4kV power supply that was not impacted by this fire. Emergency Operating Procedures already contain guidance that directs operators to align the 4kV busses to this offsite power circuit and that can be accomplished within the time necessary to perform the recovery action. During periods when this offsite power circuit was removed from service over the past three years, risk was managed using the online risk management process and no additional actions would have been required for its use as the credited power source in the Fire Safety Analysis.

"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction."

Notified the R3DO (Skokowski).