United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment
Home > NRC Library > Document Collections > Reports Associated with Events > Event Notification Reports > 2016 > December 22

Event Notification Report for December 22, 2016

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
12/21/2016 - 12/22/2016

** EVENT NUMBERS **


52428 52429 52431 52451 52452 52454 52455

To top of page
Agreement State Event Number: 52428
Rep Org: NE DIV OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Licensee: DOANE COLLEGE
Region: 4
City: CRETE State: NE
County:
License #: GL0258
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MALISA McCOWN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 12/14/2016
Notification Time: 09:23 [ET]
Event Date: 11/23/2016
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/14/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS

The following report was received via e-mail:

"Doan College contacted our office [Nebraska Office of Radiological Health] by phone on November 23, 2016 to notify our office of two lost exit signs. Licensee was notified they would need to send in written notification. In a letter dated November 29, 2016, the licensee indicated that multiple renovations were made to the building housing the exit signs between 2006 and 2016. The exit signs were likely removed during one of these renovations. They also estimate that the incident was not caught prior to this due to personnel changes."

Manufacturer: Safety Light Corp.
Model: 880-12-6-10
Source Activity: 7.5 Ci

Nebraska Event: NE160002

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

To top of page
Agreement State Event Number: 52429
Rep Org: NE DIV OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Licensee: GATEWAY MALL
Region: 4
City: LINCOLN State: NE
County:
License #: GL0457
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MALISA McCOWN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 12/14/2016
Notification Time: 10:14 [ET]
Event Date: 12/08/2016
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/14/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGN

The following report was received via e-mail:

"During an annual inventory review, the licensee discovered a tritium exit sign was missing/lost. The licensee notified our office [Nebraska Office of Radiological Health] via phone call on 12/8/16 and followed it up with an e-mail the same day. The licensee stated there has been new construction in the area and assumes the sign went missing during this time."

Manufacturer: Safety Light Corp
Model: 880-12-6R-20
Source Activity: 11.5 Ci

Nebraska Event: NE160003

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

To top of page
Agreement State Event Number: 52431
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: CAL LAND ENGINEERING, INC.
Region: 4
City: BREA State: CA
County:
License #: 6951-30
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONALD OESTERLE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 12/14/2016
Notification Time: 14:39 [ET]
Event Date: 12/13/2016
Event Time: [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/14/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED DENSITY GAUGE

The following report was received from the State of California via email:

On December 13, 2016, the RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] of Cal Land Engineering, contacted the RHB [California Radiologic Health Branch] at the Brea, CA office about a gauge that had been run over. The gauge was a CPN MC-3, S/N M310706239 (10 mCi Cs-137, 50 mCi Am:Be-241). The gauge operator had removed the gauge from it's transport case, but had not set up or used the gauge at the site (the Cs-137 source was still in the shielded position). The operator then stepped away from the gauge to answer his cell phone. While the operator was on the phone, a pickup truck backed into the gauge. The gauge body remained intact, but the guide tube and source rod had been sheared off the body of the gauge. After the incident, the area was isolated and the operator contacted the RSO, who then contacted RHB. Pictures were provided by the gauge operator and forwarded to RHB for review. After the pictures confirmed that the gauge body was intact, the RHB inspector authorized the operator to place the gauge in the storage case, secure it for transport, and then return the gauge to their [licensee's] office.

An RHB inspector met the operator at their office to inspect the gauge. A Canberra Inspector 1000 with the LaBr (IPROL-1) and neutron (IPRON-N) probes was used to verify the sources remained in the gauge. The Cs-137 source was identified by the Inspector 1000 and a neutron dose of 20 counts per second (with a background of 0 counts per second) confirmed the Am:Be-241 source was present. A Victoreen 450 CHP was used to survey the gauge. The contact dose rate was 20 mR/hr (background 0.01 mR/hr), which is consistent for an MC-3 gauge. The gauge will remain in storage until disposal can be arranged. Maurer Technical Services will be used to assist in the disposal.

California 5010 number: 121316

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 52451
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RON BLENKER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 12/21/2016
Notification Time: 16:38 [ET]
Event Date: 10/24/2016
Event Time: 17:45 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/21/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION OF INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION

"This 60-day telephone notification is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to report an invalid actuation of the 12 Emergency Diesel Generator Emergency Service Water pump (12 ESW pump).

"At 1745 [CST] on October 24, 2016, an unexpected auto-start of the 12 ESW pump occurred. The 12 Emergency Diesel Generator (12 EDG), was previously properly removed from service and isolated for scheduled maintenance. Upon investigation, is was determined that no valid start signal was present and actuation occurred during relay replacement activities on the 12 EDG in C-92 (12 EDG (G-38) electrical control panel) cabinet when electricians inadvertently bumped a 12 EDG start relay. During this period, the Control Room received annunciators indicating the 12 EDG engine was running/cranking and the 12 ESW pump started. Due to being isolated, the 12 EDG did not actually start.

"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 52452
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID RENN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 12/21/2016
Notification Time: 16:55 [ET]
Event Date: 12/21/2016
Event Time: 11:20 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/21/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION - 480V BUS VOLTAGE LOWER THAN ANALYZED

"On October 8, 2016, it was initially discovered that the voltage tap changer settings for the 480V Shutdown Board Transformers 1-XFA-231-TS1A (TS1A) and 1-XFA-231-TS1B (TS1B) were incorrect (4160/480V instead of 3952/480V). This could potentially result in lower than minimum required voltages at the electrically downstream buses and equipment during a postulated loss of coolant accident coincident with design minimum voltage conditions. An initial Licensee Event Report (LER 50-259/2016-004-00) was submitted on December 7, 2016 following the initial review. This LER identified that a supplement would be required pending additional technical evaluation. While comprehensive analysis is not complete, the initial aggregate dynamic loading evaluation does not provide assurance that sufficient voltage would be available for various loading scenarios during postulated accident conditions. This condition was determined to have existed since a Unit 1 Design Change was implemented in 2004.

"This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), as any event or condition that resulted in the nuclear plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.

"On October 9, 2016, and October 12, 2016. the transformer taps for TS1B and TS1A, respectively, were set in accordance with the applicable drawing, which specify the correct tap settings.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

In October 2016, the licensee validated that this problem did not exist on units two and three.

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 52454
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RON BLENKER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 12/21/2016
Notification Time: 18:00 [ET]
Event Date: 12/21/2016
Event Time: 09:35 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/21/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM INOPERABLE

"At 0935 [CST] on 12/21/2016, while performing the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Comprehensive Pump and Valve Tests for post-maintenance testing following scheduled maintenance, the HPCI turbine did not start as expected due to the HPCI turbine stop valve failing to open. This issue is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function at the time of discovery. Investigation into the failure of the HPCI system to start is in progress. The plant remains at 100% power with no challenges to the health and safety of the public.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The plant is in a 14-day action statement under LCO 3.5.1, 'ECCS - Operating' due to the HPCI turbine stop valve failure.

The licensee notified the Minnesota State Duty Officer.

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 52455
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MATTHEW BONANNO
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 12/21/2016
Notification Time: 19:45 [ET]
Event Date: 12/21/2016
Event Time: 13:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/21/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
JAMES NOGGLE (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO VALVE FAILURE

"During review of the Limerick future modification list, a concern was raised with a proposed modification for HV-011-015A, ESW [Emergency Service Water] 'A' Discharge to 'B' RHR Service Water Return, which failed to fully close during routine testing.

"As a result of the failure to close, a clearance was applied and a 10CFR50.59 screening was performed to close and de-energize HV-011-015A and open and de-energize valve HV-011-011A, ESW 'A' Discharge to 'A' RHR [Residual Heat Removal] Service Water Return. This clearance isolated one of the two ESW return flow paths so that only one flow path is available to return cooling water flow to the spray pond.

"The 10CFR50.59 screening did not address that fire areas 12 (Unit 1 4kV D13 switch gear room) and 18 (Unit 2 4kV D23 switch gear room) are not in compliance with the existing fire safe shutdown (FSSD) analysis. The FSSD analysis credits both flow paths so that Emergency Service Water can be returned to the spray pond. With only one of the two return flow paths available, a single spurious fire induced valve operation can result in deadheading an ESW pump and starving an operating emergency diesel generator of cooling water. Running the emergency diesel generator with a loss of cooling water will initiate a diesel protective trip on high temperature.

"Compensatory measures are in place for the specific fire areas listed above."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, December 22, 2016
Thursday, December 22, 2016