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Event Notification Report for October 6, 2016

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
10/05/2016 - 10/06/2016

** EVENT NUMBERS **


52090 52265 52268

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 52090
Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2)
                   COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
Region: 2
City: COLUMBIA State: SC
County: RICHLAND
License #: SNM-1107
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001151
NRC Notified By: NANCY PARR
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 07/14/2016
Notification Time: 18:49 [ET]
Event Date: 07/13/2016
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/05/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (a)(4) - ALL SAFETY ITEMS UNAVAILABLE
PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
DANIEL RICH (R2DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

DEGRADED SAFETY ITEMS CAUSED BY URANIUM BUILDUP

"On July 13, 2016, it was determined by the Environment, Health and Safety (EH&S) department that scrubber clean-out material, found in the S-1030 scrubber transition section during the annual maintenance shutdown that occurred in late May, potentially exceeded the uranium mass limit for the scrubber transition.

"(IROFS [Items Relied on for Safety] VENT-S1030-110) requires annual inspection and removal of significant solids buildup in the transition section. Upon inspection, significant buildup was found, and the ductwork was opened to permit extensive cleanout. 36 containers of material with a total gross weight of 210.4 kg was removed from the inlet transition during the cleanout on May 28th to May 29th. Grab samples were subsequently taken from each container and analyzed for uranium concentration. On July 13th, the EH&S department was made aware that the grab sample results averaged 47.8% U. Although the exact uranium mass cannot be determined until the material is dissolved and representatively sampled, available evidence suggests that the mass limit of 29 kg U in the inlet transition was exceeded. The 29 kg U limit is based on an optimally moderated, fully reflected spherical geometry which very conservatively bounds the conditions in the inlet transition of the scrubber. IROFS remained to limit the quantity of uranium available to the scrubber (IROFS VENT-S1030-101, -102, -103 & -104), which are physical barriers designed to minimize uranium in the airflow entering the transition area. Continuous liquid spraying in the inlet transition section to limit solids accumulation (IROFS VENT-S1030-109) was also in place.

"The inlet transition and scrubber were thoroughly cleaned, and the uranium bearing solids were placed into favorable geometry containers. Also, the inspection and cleanout of the transition frequency was increased to monthly.

"Based on available but degraded IROFS, this accident sequence was unlikely. Therefore, this mass accident sequence does not meet the performance requirements of 10CFR70.61. The actual configuration remained safe at all times. Also, no external conditions affected the event.

"Immediate Corrective Actions:
NRC Region II personnel, who were onsite at the CFFF [Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility], were made aware of the discovery.

"The Conversion area was shutdown to plan for a second extensive scrubber clean-out to validate that the accumulation of solids is a slow buildup over time. The last extensive cleanout was performed in 2009.

"An extent of condition was performed to determine if other scrubbers potentially had significant uranium buildup. Inspection data indicated that this material accumulation issue was limited to the S-1030 scrubber.

"This event has been entered into the facility Corrective Action Prevention And Learning system (CAPAL) #100397353."

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY NANCY PARR TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1025 EDT ON 07/26/2016 * * *

"Onsite chemical analysis confirmed that uranium mass limit for the scrubber transition piece was exceeded. The accumulated material contained 87 kgs of Uranium.

"The Criticality Safety Evaluation for this system was revised and implemented on July 20, 2016 to add Items Relied on For Safety to prevent recurrence of a mass exceedance while the causal analysis and additional corrective actions are completed."

Notified R2DO (Nease) and NMSS Events Notification Group via email.

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY NANCY PARR TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1749 EDT ON 07/31/2016 * * *

"On July 31, 2016, it was determined by the Environment, Health and Safety (EH&S) department that clean-out material found in the S-1030 scrubber packing and floor also potentially exceeded the uranium mass limit for the scrubber criticality safety evaluation. Over years of operations, the same available but degraded mass prevention and inspection/clean-out IROFS did not prevent exceedance of the mass limit.

"This report is being upgraded to a 1 Hour Event Notification based on 10CFR70 Appendix A(a)(4).

"There was no consequence to the public, the workers or the environment.

"The scrubber process will remain in a safe shutdown mode until further investigation and corrective actions are completed."

Notified R2DO (Rose), IRD (Grant), NMSS EO (Kotzalas) and NMSS Events Notification via email.

* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN HOWELL TO VINCE KLCO AT 1620 EDT ON 8/7/2016 * * *

"On August 6, 2016 at 1700, it was reported to the Environment, Health and Safety (EH&S) department that residual material located within the abandoned S-1056 scrubber was sampled and confirmed to contain Uranium.

"24 Hour Event Notification based on 10CFR70 Appendix A(b)(1) 'Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of 10CFR70.61.'

"The S-1056 is an out-of-service scrubber. When operational, it scrubbed the acid fumes from the Conversion area. It currently is an unanalyzed system without IROFS or controls. The reported volume of approximately 15 kg is well within safety margins.

"It was taken out of service in 2002, when the S-1030 scrubber replaced it. The material in the S-1056 was discovered as an extent of condition for the S-1030 event.

"The discovery and sampling were documented in Redbook 71409. At no time was there any actual or potential health and safety consequence to the workers, the public, or the environment."

The licensee notified the NRC Regional Inspector (Lopez).

Notified the R2DO (Suggs), R2RA (Haney) and NMSS Events Notification Group via email.

* * * UPDATE AT 1546 EDT ON 8/23/16 FROM NANCY PARR TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

"On August 23, 2016, during the extent of condition for this S-1030 scrubber system event, a review of inspection video for the S-1030 ductwork in Conversion identified material accumulation in an elbow which potentially could exceed the uranium mass limit for the elbow section (36.5 kgU).

"This report is being updated based on a potential to meet the 10 CFR 70 Appendix A(a)(4) in the ductwork.

"There was no consequence to the public, the workers or the environment.

"The scrubber process will remain in a safe shutdown mode until further investigation and corrective actions are completed."

The Region IV Project Managers were notified.

Notified the R2DO (Michel), IRDMOC (Stapleton) and NMSS Events Notification Group (via email).

* * * UPDATE AT 1810 EDT ON 9/15/16 FROM NANCY PARR TO DANIEL MILLS * * *

"24-Hour Event Notification based on 10 CFR 70 Appendix A(b)(1) 'Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61.'

"On September 15, 2016 at 1204 EDT, it was reported to the Environment, Health and Safety (EH&S) department that residual material was located within the abandoned 3A/3B ventilation system. Based on gamma radiation surveys, the material contains Uranium.

"The 3A/3B system was taken out of service in 2002, when the S-1030 scrubber replaced it. When operational, it removed chemical fumes and particulate matter from the Conversion area. The material in the system was discovered as an extent of condition for the S-1030 event.

"When taken out of service, the system was isolated from the introduction of any additional material and/or moderator. However, because the system is out of service, it is considered an unanalyzed system without IROFS or controls. The reported depth of material in the duct appears well within analyzed safety margins for similar systems.

"At no time was there any actual or potential health and safety consequence to the workers, the public, or the environment.

"UPDATED INFORMATION FROM AUGUST 23, 2016 NOTIFICATION:
This notification also serves to update previously reported information provided on August 23, 2016 where a review of inspection video for the S-1030 ductwork in Conversion identified material accumulation in an elbow which potentially could exceed the uranium mass limit for the elbow section (36.5 kg U). This report was made based on a potential to meet the 10 CFR 70 Appendix A(a)(4) in the ductwork. The material was removed from the ductwork and weighed. The total weight of the material removed was 5.5 kgs in the elbow and 3.0 kgs in a horizontal section of the duct, which is well below the mass limit in the safety basis. Therefore, the information from the August 23, 2016 potential report is retracted."

Notified the R2DO (Walker) and NMSS Events Notification Group (via email).

* * * UPDATE AT 1701 EDT ON 10/05/16 FROM NANCY PARR TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

"On October 4, 2016 at approximately 1700 EDT, while performing housekeeping and cleanout activities on the out of service 3A and 3B ductwork, degradation was discovered in an area not routinely or readily accessed in the bottom of the out of service filter house system. This discovery was made while performing clean-out activities covered under a Radiation Work Permit (RWP).

"The work was stopped, and Health Physics (HP) performed contamination surveys of the area. The degraded area was sealed and isolated. No additional radiological controls were needed, and access to the area was not restricted.

"No degradation was found in other out of service systems on the roof. A comprehensive extent of condition is ongoing.

"There was no actual or potential health and safety consequence to the workers, the public, or to the environment during this time."

Notified the R2DO (Bonser) and NMSS Event Notification Group (via email).

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Agreement State Event Number: 52265
Rep Org: KENTUCKY DEPT OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: GEM ENGINEERING, INC.
Region: 1
City: LOUISVILLE State: KY
County:
License #: 201-642-51
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHRISTOPHER KEFFER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 09/27/2016
Notification Time: 12:52 [ET]
Event Date: 09/26/2016
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/27/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

KENTUCKY AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN THEN RECOVERED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was obtained from the Commonwealth of Kentucky via facsimile:

"KY RHB [Kentucky Department for Public Health & Safety, Radiation Health Branch] was notified on September 27th, 2016 by the Radiation Safety Officer of Gem Engineering, Inc. that a theft of material had occurred sometime during the night of September 26th unto the morning of the 27th. A Troxler 3411 series moisture density gauge that was stored in the back of a vehicle was stolen along with the vehicle. The licensee reported the theft to the police on the morning of the 27th when it was noticed by the authorized user that the vehicle was missing. The device has been recovered by police and returned to the licensee. The individuals responsible have been apprehended as well. The State will continue to keep NRC informed of the status of our investigation."

The Troxler contains a nominal 9 mCi of Cs-137 and 44 mCi of AmBe.

KY Event Report ID No.: KY160008

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Non-Agreement State Event Number: 52268
Rep Org: MONSANTO
Licensee: MONSANTO
Region: 4
City: SODA SPRINGS State: ID
County:
License #: 11-27361-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVE MATYUS
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 09/28/2016
Notification Time: 13:51 [ET]
Event Date: 09/27/2016
Event Time: 14:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
JEREMY GROOM (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

Event Text

SAFETY EQUIPMENT POTENTIALLY FAILS TO FUNCTION

Maintenance was being performed on a Berthold moisture analyzer in a coke bin vessel because a moisture tube inside of the vessel was damaged. Two maintenance technicians took the source holder off the vessel and then proceeded to work on the vessel. The source holder was placed nearby the work area and the source was not able to be fully retracted back into the gauge during the maintenance evolution. Maintenance then re-mounted the source holder back onto the vessel. The licensee contacted the manufacturer in order to investigate the maintenance evolution and assist estimating dosage to the two technicians. The licensee contacted Region 4 (Janine Katanic). The licensee investigation continues.

* * * UPDATE AT 1115 EDT ON 09/30/16 FROM DAVE MATYUS TO S. SANDIN * * *

On 09/29/16 Berthold Technologies was onsite to assist in the investigation. A leak test was performed and the contractors involved were interviewed. The information will be provided to the Berthold RSO in order to estimate the dose received. NRC R4 (Dykert) was also present to observe the investigation. The licensee does not anticipate receiving the results until next week.

Notified R4DO (Groom) and NMSS Events Notification by email.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, October 06, 2016
Thursday, October 06, 2016