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Event Notification Report for August 26, 2016

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
08/25/2016 - 08/26/2016

** EVENT NUMBERS **


51915 52189 52190 52201 52202

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Part 21 Event Number: 51915
Rep Org: ELECTROSWITCH
Licensee: ELECTROSWITCH
Region: 1
City: WEYMOUTH State: MA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket: 99900833
NRC Notified By: LARRY FRIEDMAN
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 05/10/2016
Notification Time: 15:59 [ET]
Event Date: 05/10/2016
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/25/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
JAMIE HEISSERER (R2DO)
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTO (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 REPORTING OF DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE

The following is a synopsis of information received via fax:

"Various Electroswitch products - Series 24 Instrument & Control (Part #24XX, 24XXX, 243XX, 74XXX), Series 24 LOR (part #78XX), Series 24 LOR/ER (part #78XX), Series 24 CSR (part #88XX), Series 24 LSR (part #92XX), Series 31 Instrument & Control (part #31XXX, 65XXX, 75XXX), Series 31 TR/LSR (part #93XX), Series 20 Cam (part #20KB, 20KD, 20LB, 20LD, 20MB, 20MD, 20MF, 20MG, 20PF, 20PG, 20PH, 20PJ, 20PL, 20PY), Series 20 Module (part #10XXX, 17XXX, 18XXX, 19XXX, 29XXX, 30XXX, 32XXX,38XXX,40XXX, 60XXX, 61XXX, 62XXX, 63XXX) [have a potential deviation (departure from the technical requirements included in the procure document)]

"It was determined on May 10, 2016 that Electroswitch does not have the capability to perform the evaluation to determine if a defect, which could create a substantial safety hazard, exists.

"Any Electroswitch product that has a part number listed above and was sold as a Safety-Related Class 1E product [may contain the deviation].

The two nonconformance issues are:

"Initial Product Qualification Tests for Dielectric Withstanding Voltage, Insulation Resistance and Contact Resistance as defined in Electroswitch's ESC-STD-1000 Rev. 3 dated 9/3/1984 General Specifications for Rotary Switches and Auxiliary Relays for Utility Applications including Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations was found to be in contradiction to IEEE C37.90-1978 Relays and Relay Systems Associated with Electric Power Apparatus.

"Electroswitch did not procure materials, parts, equipment and/or services from an Appendix B supplier nor were applicable Commercial Grade Surveys, Source Inspections and Material Analyses performed for the following materials:
Precious metal blade overlay material
Red metal blade material
Precious metal overlay thickness of switch blade material
Molding compound of switch insulators (terminal decks and barriers)
Carbon steel for securing rods
Solenoids
Relays
Services (test labs) pertaining to product qualification

Electroswitch is attempting to determine which NRC licensees are potentially affected.

"The following personnel may be contacted regarding this notification:

Larry Friedman
Quality Assurance Manager
781-607-3309

Ed Reszenski
Engineering Manager
781-607-3341"


* * * UPDATE FROM LARRY FRIEDMAN TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1656 EDT ON 5/11/2016 * * *

The following information was received via fax:

Below is the list of utilities (and plants where specified) which were notified of Electroswitch's decision to end the Appendix B Quality Assurance Program:

Ameren Energy

Dominion Energy

Duke Energy

Energy Northwest

Entergy Nuclear (Waterford 3 Nuclear)

Entergy Nuclear (Pilgrim Power Plant)

Entergy Nuclear (Indian Point Energy)

Xcel Energy (Monticello Nuclear)

MPR Associates for FPL

Nebraska Public Power (Cooper Nuclear)

Nextera (Point Beach Nuclear)

Xcel Energy (Prairie Island Gen)

Southern Power (Hatch)

Southern Power (Vogtle)

TVA

TVA (Watts Bar Nuclear)

Wolf Creek Nuclear

Notified R1DO (Burritt), R2DO (Heisserer), R3DO (Duncan) and R4DO (Campbell) and via E-mail Part 21/50.55 Reactors Group.

* * * UPDATE FROM LARRY FRIEDMAN TO DONG HWA PARK AT 1617 EDT ON 8/25/2016 * * *

The following information was received via fax:

"Electroswitch is formally requesting a thirty (30) day extension to complete the evaluation by Sept. 24, 2016 in order to provide detailed answers to the questions and provide any needed updates to the Part 21 notification report."

Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis), R2DO (Michel), R3DO (Cameron) and R4DO (Kellar) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors Group via E-mail.

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Agreement State Event Number: 52189
Rep Org: NV DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: DESERT SOILS GEOTECHNICAL
Region: 4
City: LAS VEGAS State: NV
County:
License #: 00-11-0726-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE SCHMIDT
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 08/18/2016
Notification Time: 13:23 [ET]
Event Date: 08/11/2016
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/18/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TWO MOISTURE-DENSITY GAUGES STOLEN

"On August 11, 2016 at 1240 [PDT], it was reported to the State of Nevada, Radiation Control Program (RCP) that two Troxler model 3440, Serial No. 24693 and model 3430, Serial No. 31409 portable gauges had been stolen from a storage location in Las Vegas, Nevada. The storage location is in a residential location. The RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] reported that at 0800 he removed the gauges from storage for routine maintenance. The gauges were in the lab with the door open and not secured or under surveillance for approximately three hours. When he returned the gauges were missing, no other equipment was missing. The RSO is the only employee. The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police, ARMOR division went to the storage address and took a police report. The RCP is following the incident and working with local authorities to recover the missing/stolen portable gauges. Follow-up information will be provide to the NRC as it becomes available. A press release was dispersed through law enforcement and the media."

Troxler 3440: 40 mCi Am-241 and 8 mCi Cs-137
Troxler 3430: 40 mCi Am-241 and 8 mCi Cs-137

NMED NV160013

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 52190
Facility: NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICES INC.
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU CONVERSION & SCRAP RECOVERY
                   NAVAL REACTOR FUEL CYCLE
                   LEU SCRAP RECOVERY
Region: 2
City: ERWIN State: TN
County: UNICOI
License #: SNM-124
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07000143
NRC Notified By: RANDY SHACKELFORD
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 08/18/2016
Notification Time: 16:32 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2016
Event Time: 17:39 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/18/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
70.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
SHANE SANDAL (R2DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
FUELS GROUP (EMAI)

Event Text

FAILURE OF A SPEAKER IN AN AREA POTENTIALLY REQUIRING PERSONNEL EVACUATION

"On August 17, 2016 at approximately 1739 hours (EDT), one speaker in Building 120 was identified as non-operational while performing a functional test of the system. This speaker is designed to annunciate alarms generated from the Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) required by 10CFR70.24, alarms generated from the Fire Alarm Control Panel, and Public Address System announcements. Additional functional testing identified that no redundant speaker could adequately provide speaker coverage for all affected areas of this building. Special Nuclear Materials are not processed, handled, or stored within the area where the speaker failed; however, this area requires evacuation in the unlikely event of a nuclear criticality accident as described in the NFS Emergency Plan. There were no actual radiological or other nuclear safety consequences. The potential consequence was that in the event of a nuclear criticality accident, evacuation could have been delayed for those personnel within Building 120 with a resultant increase of postulated doses. A series of compensatory actions were taken to restore compliance including installation of a temporary speaker and limiting equipment operation to limit background noise. On August 18, 2016, at approximately 1100 hours (EDT), full compliance was restored as demonstrated by successfully performing a speaker test in the affected area.

"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector on August 18, 2016."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 52201
Facility: FORT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: CHARLES SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 08/25/2016
Notification Time: 21:11 [ET]
Event Date: 08/25/2016
Event Time: 15:23 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/25/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION INVOLVING POTENTIAL TORNADO MISSILE DAMAGE

"On August 25, 2016, Engineering staff were reviewing a proposed modification to install additional internal flooding protection for the Intake Building staircase down to the Raw Water Pump vault. Fort Calhoun Station determined that the existing Intake Building internal flooding and tornado-borne missile analyses did not sufficiently account for the potential of tornado-borne missiles striking Fire Protection piping in the Intake Building. A tornado-borne missile strike could potentially cause a double-ended rupture of Fire Protection piping in the vicinity of the stairwell down to the Raw Water Pump vault, which could cause flooding and subsequent failure of all four Raw Water Pump motors more quickly than bounded by the Engineering Analysis. The Engineering Analysis uses a postulated crack from a Moderate Energy Line Break per USNRC Branch Technical Position MEB 3-1, vice postulating a double ended pipe rupture. The resulting flow rate from this postulated crack is less than that possible from a tornado-borne missile strike.

"This condition creates a potential loss of safety function from the Fort Calhoun Station Raw Water System (ultimate heat sink). All four Raw Water Pump motors could potentially become inoperable from flooding caused by a tornado-borne missile impacting the Fire Protection System Piping near the Raw Water vault stairwell prior to operator action to secure both Fire Pumps.

"This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"Interim compensatory measures are to isolate the Fire Protection piping in the vicinity of the Raw Water Pump vault stairwell when severe weather is forecast."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 52202
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BRETT JEBBIA
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 08/25/2016
Notification Time: 21:39 [ET]
Event Date: 08/25/2016
Event Time: 16:29 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/25/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 53 Power Operation 53 Power Operation

Event Text

MECHANICAL DRAFT COOLING TOWER DECLARED INOPERABLE

"At 1629 EDT on August 25, 2016, it was determined that a Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) fan should be declared inoperable if its associated fan brake is nonfunctional. The MDCT fan brake is required to prevent fan over speed from a design basis tornado. The MDCT fans are required to support the operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). Currently, the MDCT fans and fan brakes are operable. A past operability evaluation is being performed and has initially identified that from 0855 EDT to 1738 EDT on April 6, 2016, the Division 1 'A' fan brake was nonfunctional due to a nitrogen bottle being below the required pressure. Additionally, from 0856 EDT on April 6, 2016, to 1641 EDT on April 7, 2016, the Division 1 'C' fan brake was also nonfunctional due to a nitrogen bottle being below the required pressure. Therefore, the Division 1 UHS and associated Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) would have been inoperable. During this time, at 1347 EDT on April 6, 2016, the Division 2 EDG 14 was inoperable for 22 seconds for a planned testing.

"This resulted in an unanalyzed condition because the plant configuration during the 22 seconds when EDG 14 was inoperable would not support safe shutdown capability in the event of a tornado. A past operability review is in progress to determine if declaring a MDCT fan inoperable due to a fan brake being nonfunctional results in any additional instances of unanalyzed condition within the past three years. This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), as an event or condition that results in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. There was no adverse impact to public health and safety or to plant employees.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, August 26, 2016
Friday, August 26, 2016