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Event Notification Report for August 24, 2016

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
08/23/2016 - 08/24/2016

** EVENT NUMBERS **


52090 52182 52185 52186 52194

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 52090
Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2)
                   COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
Region: 2
City: COLUMBIA State: SC
County: RICHLAND
License #: SNM-1107
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001151
NRC Notified By: NANCY PARR
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 07/14/2016
Notification Time: 18:49 [ET]
Event Date: 07/13/2016
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/23/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (a)(4) - ALL SAFETY ITEMS UNAVAILABLE
PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
DANIEL RICH (R2DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

DEGRADED SAFETY ITEMS CAUSED BY URANIUM BUILDUP

"On July 13, 2016, it was determined by the Environment, Health and Safety (EH&S) department that scrubber clean-out material, found in the S-1030 scrubber transition section during the annual maintenance shutdown that occurred in late May, potentially exceeded the uranium mass limit for the scrubber transition.

"(IROFS [Items Relied on for Safety] VENT-S1030-110) requires annual inspection and removal of significant solids buildup in the transition section. Upon inspection, significant buildup was found, and the ductwork was opened to permit extensive cleanout. 36 containers of material with a total gross weight of 210.4 kg was removed from the inlet transition during the cleanout on May 28th to May 29th. Grab samples were subsequently taken from each container and analyzed for uranium concentration. On July 13th, the EH&S department was made aware that the grab sample results averaged 47.8% U. Although the exact uranium mass cannot be determined until the material is dissolved and representatively sampled, available evidence suggests that the mass limit of 29 kg U in the inlet transition was exceeded. The 29 kg U limit is based on an optimally moderated, fully reflected spherical geometry which very conservatively bounds the conditions in the inlet transition of the scrubber. IROFS remained to limit the quantity of uranium available to the scrubber (IROFS VENT-S1030-101, -102, -103 & -104), which are physical barriers designed to minimize uranium in the airflow entering the transition area. Continuous liquid spraying in the inlet transition section to limit solids accumulation (IROFS VENT-S1030-109) was also in place.

"The inlet transition and scrubber were thoroughly cleaned, and the uranium bearing solids were placed into favorable geometry containers. Also, the inspection and cleanout of the transition frequency was increased to monthly.

"Based on available but degraded IROFS, this accident sequence was unlikely. Therefore, this mass accident sequence does not meet the performance requirements of 10CFR70.61. The actual configuration remained safe at all times. Also, no external conditions affected the event.

"Immediate Corrective Actions:
NRC Region II personnel, who were onsite at the CFFF [Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility], were made aware of the discovery.

"The Conversion area was shutdown to plan for a second extensive scrubber clean-out to validate that the accumulation of solids is a slow buildup over time. The last extensive cleanout was performed in 2009.

"An extent of condition was performed to determine if other scrubbers potentially had significant uranium buildup. Inspection data indicated that this material accumulation issue was limited to the S-1030 scrubber.

"This event has been entered into the facility Corrective Action Prevention And Learning system (CAPAL) #100397353."

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY NANCY PARR TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1025 EDT ON 07/26/2016 * * *

"Onsite chemical analysis confirmed that uranium mass limit for the scrubber transition piece was exceeded. The accumulated material contained 87 kgs of Uranium.

"The Criticality Safety Evaluation for this system was revised and implemented on July 20, 2016 to add Items Relied on For Safety to prevent recurrence of a mass exceedance while the causal analysis and additional corrective actions are completed."

Notified R2DO (Nease) and NMSS Events Notification Group via email.

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY NANCY PARR TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1749 EDT ON 07/31/2016 * * *

"On July 31, 2016, it was determined by the Environment, Health and Safety (EH&S) department that clean-out material found in the S-1030 scrubber packing and floor also potentially exceeded the uranium mass limit for the scrubber criticality safety evaluation. Over years of operations, the same available but degraded mass prevention and inspection/clean-out IROFS did not prevent exceedance of the mass limit.

"This report is being upgraded to a 1 Hour Event Notification based on 10CFR70 Appendix A(a)(4).

"There was no consequence to the public, the workers or the environment.

"The scrubber process will remain in a safe shutdown mode until further investigation and corrective actions are completed."

Notified R2DO (Rose), IRD (Grant), NMSS EO (Kotzalas) and NMSS Events Notification via email.

* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN HOWELL TO VINCE KLCO AT 1620 EDT ON 8/7/2016 * * *

"On August 6, 2016 at 1700, it was reported to the Environment, Health and Safety (EH&S) department that residual material located within the abandoned S-1056 scrubber was sampled and confirmed to contain Uranium.

"24 Hour Event Notification based on 10CFR70 Appendix A(b)(1) 'Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of 10CFR70.61.'

"The S-1056 is an out-of-service scrubber. When operational, it scrubbed the acid fumes from the Conversion area. It currently is an unanalyzed system without IROFS or controls. The reported volume of approximately 15 kg is well within safety margins.

"It was taken out of service in 2002, when the S-1030 scrubber replaced it. The material in the S-1056 was discovered as an extent of condition for the S-1030 event.

"The discovery and sampling were documented in Redbook 71409. At no time was there any actual or potential health and safety consequence to the workers, the public, or the environment."

The licensee notified the NRC Regional Inspector (Lopez).

Notified the R2DO (Suggs), R2RA (Haney) and NMSS Events Notification Group via email.

* * * UPDATE AT 1546 EDT ON 8/23/16 FROM NANCY PARR TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

"On August 23, 2016, during the extent of condition for this S-1030 scrubber system event, a review of inspection video for the S-1030 ductwork in Conversion identified material accumulation in an elbow which potentially could exceed the uranium mass limit for the elbow section (36.5 kgU).

"This report is being updated based on a potential to meet the 10CFR70 Appendix A(a)(4) in the ductwork.

"There was no consequence to the public, the workers or the environment.

"The scrubber process will remain in a safe shutdown mode until further investigation and corrective actions are completed."

The Region IV Project Managers were notified.

Notified the R2DO (Michel), IRDMOC (Stapleton) and NMSS Events Notification Group (via email).

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Non-Agreement State Event Number: 52182
Rep Org: KNIK CONSTRUCTION
Licensee: KNIK CONSTRUCTION
Region: 4
City: ANCHORAGE State: AK
County:
License #: 50-35114-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ERYN JONES
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 08/15/2016
Notification Time: 21:13 [ET]
Event Date: 08/15/2016
Event Time: 16:30 [YDT]
Last Update Date: 08/16/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

Event Text

DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

While at a construction jobsite at Kenai Airport, a technician using a Troxler moisture density gauge observed a large equipment grader approaching in reverse mode. The technician retreated from the area and the gauge was run over by the grader. Personnel roped off the damaged gauge area and proceeded to monitor for any contamination. The gauge is a Troxler, Model 3440; S/N 37310; Sources: Cs-137 (8 mCi) and Am-241/Be (44 mCi).

* * * UPDATE FROM ERYN JONES TO VINCE KLCO ON 8/16/2016 AT 1348 EDT * * *

The licensee placed the damaged gauge into an over pack container loaded with sand and transported the damaged gauge to a local office permanent storage facility. The storage area is barricaded and is being monitored. The licensee is consulting with the manufacturer for final damaged gauge disposition.

Notified the R4DO (Proulx) and NMSS Events via email.

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Non-Agreement State Event Number: 52185
Rep Org: NIST
Licensee: NIST
Region: 1
City: GAITHERSBURG State: MD
County: MONTGOMERY
License #: SNM-362
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TOM OBRIEN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 08/16/2016
Notification Time: 15:50 [ET]
Event Date: 08/15/2016
Event Time: 16:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/16/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
70.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
DON JACKSON (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

Event Text

IRRADIATOR SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE

The NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) irradiator has several Cs-137 sources used to calibrate instruments. During a calibration process, a 3.6 Ci source did not return to its shielded position. The event occurred in a portion of the building where such events are expected, therefore there were no health or safety consequences to employees, public or the environment. Licensee corrective actions include manually installing a lead plug into the beam port (opening) of the irradiator. The licensee is contacting the manufacturer in order to assist with troubleshooting and repairs. The irradiator (Model 81-12; JL Shepherd; S/N 7132) is currently in a safe and stable configuration. It is noted that the irradiator is NOT a Part 36 irradiator.

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Agreement State Event Number: 52186
Rep Org: NJ RAD PROT AND REL PREVENTION PGM
Licensee: BL ENGLAND GENERATING STATION
Region: 1
City: MARMORA State: NJ
County:
License #: 444566
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE POWER
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 08/16/2016
Notification Time: 15:49 [ET]
Event Date: 08/15/2016
Event Time: 21:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/16/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
DON JACKSON (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED FIXED GAUGE

The following information was received from the State of New Jersey by email:

"Event Narrative: During a walkthrough of the facility, the night shift RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] discovered that an ABB Industrial Systems, Ltd model LS100 fixed measuring gauge had fallen off of a coal feeder to which it was attached. The area, which is not normally accessed by staff, was cordoned. Readings were taken directly on top of the device, and measured 0.5 to 1.0 mR/h. The device does not have a shutter mechanism. The direct beam was surrounded with lead that was available for shielding.

"Root cause(s) and contributing factors: Vibration from coal feeder caused the metal mounting bracket to shear. Semiannual preventative maintenance did not identify the issue. Scaffolding is required to reach the gauge for maintenance, which makes it difficult to do more regularly.

"Isotope and activity; manufacturer, model and serial number: Ra-226, 0.5 mCi, ABB Industrial Systems, Ltd model LS100, serial number R868."

New Jersey Incident Number: C612607

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Power Reactor Event Number: 52194
Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID ALLEN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 08/23/2016
Notification Time: 15:30 [ET]
Event Date: 08/23/2016
Event Time: 13:56 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/23/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ERIC MICHEL (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 M/R Y 43 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

MANUAL TRIP DUE TO A LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER

"On August 23, 2016, at 1356 EDT, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant [WBN] Unit 2 reactor was manually tripped due to a loss of main feedwater.

"Concurrent with the reactor trip, the Auxiliary Feedwater system actuated as designed.

"All control and shutdown rods fully inserted. All safety systems responded as designed. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3, with decay heat removal via Auxiliary Feedwater and main steam dump systems. Unit 2 is in a normal shutdown electrical alignment.

"The cause is currently under investigation.

"This is being reported under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).

"There was no effect on WBN Unit 1.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, August 24, 2016
Wednesday, August 24, 2016