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Event Notification Report for July 27, 2016

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
07/26/2016 - 07/27/2016

** EVENT NUMBERS **


52090 52105 52126 52127

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 52090
Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2)
                   COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
Region: 2
City: COLUMBIA State: SC
County: RICHLAND
License #: SNM-1107
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001151
NRC Notified By: NANCY PARR
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 07/14/2016
Notification Time: 18:49 [ET]
Event Date: 07/13/2016
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(2) - LOSS OR DEGRADED SAFETY ITEMS
Person (Organization):
DANIEL RICH (R2DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

DEGRADED SAFETY ITEMS CAUSED BY URANIUM BUILDUP

"On July 13, 2016, it was determined by the Environment, Health and Safety (EH&S) department that scrubber clean-out material, found in the S-1030 scrubber transition section during the annual maintenance shutdown that occurred in late May, potentially exceeded the uranium mass limit for the scrubber transition.

"(IROFS [ Items Relied on for Safety] VENT-S1030-110) requires annual inspection and removal of significant solids buildup in the transition section. Upon inspection, significant buildup was found, and the ductwork was opened to permit extensive cleanout. 36 containers of material with a total gross weight of 210.4 kg was removed from the inlet transition during the cleanout on May 28th to May 29th. Grab samples were subsequently taken from each container and analyzed for uranium concentration. On July 13th, the EH&S department was made aware that the grab sample results averaged 47.8% U. Although the exact uranium mass cannot be determined until the material is dissolved and representatively sampled, available evidence suggests that the mass limit of 29 kg U in the inlet transition was exceeded. The 29 kg U limit is based on an optimally moderated, fully reflected spherical geometry which very conservatively bounds the conditions in the inlet transition of the scrubber. IROFS remained to limit the quantity of uranium available to the scrubber (IROFS VENT-S1030-101, -102, -103 & -104), which are physical barriers designed to minimize uranium in the airflow entering the transition area. Continuous liquid spraying in the inlet transition section to limit solids accumulation (IROFS VENT-S1030-109) was also in place.

"The inlet transition and scrubber were thoroughly cleaned, and the uranium bearing solids were placed into favorable geometry containers. Also, the inspection and cleanout of the transition frequency was increased to monthly.

"Based on available but degraded IROFS, this accident sequence was unlikely. Therefore, this mass accident sequence does not meet the performance requirements of 10CFR70.61. The actual configuration remained safe at all times. Also, no external conditions affected the event.

"Immediate Corrective Actions:
NRC Region II personnel, who were onsite at the CFFF [Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility], were made aware of the discovery.

"The Conversion area was shutdown to plan for a second extensive scrubber clean-out to validate that the accumulation of solids is a slow buildup over time. The last extensive cleanout was performed in 2009.

"An extent of condition was performed to determine if other scrubbers potentially had significant uranium buildup. Inspection data indicated that this material accumulation issue was limited to the S-1030 scrubber.

"This event has been entered into the facility Corrective Action Prevention And Learning system (CAPAL) #100397353."

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY NANCY PARR TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1025 EDT ON 07/26/2016 * * *

"Onsite chemical analysis confirmed that uranium mass limit for the scrubber transition piece was exceeded. The accumulated material contained 87 kgs of Uranium.

"The Criticality Safety Evaluation for this system was revised and implemented on July 20, 2016 to add Items Relied on For Safety to prevent recurrence of a mass exceedance while the causal analysis and additional corrective actions are completed."

Notified R2DO (Nease) and NMSS Events Notification Group via email.

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Agreement State Event Number: 52105
Rep Org: MISSISSIPPI DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: TERRACON CONSULTING, INC.
Region: 4
City: LELAND State: MS
County:
License #: MS-724-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: HARRY CULPEPPER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 07/19/2016
Notification Time: 17:31 [ET]
Event Date: 07/17/2016
Event Time: 07:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/19/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following report was received via e-mail:

"At 0730 [CDT], July 17, 2016, an incident occurred at a temporary job site. The incident occurred when a water truck operating on the construction site came into contact with the moisture density gauge, causing damage to the source rod and casing. Licensee and Corporate RSO notified Mississippi Department of Health on July 18, 2016 about the incident.

"With Terracon having taken their gauge back to Little Rock, Arkansas, the Mississippi Department of Health sought out inspectors from Arkansas Department of Health to gather information from Terracon's local office.

"According to the inspectors sent by Arkansas Department of Health, the individual at the site of the incident had established a 15 foot radius around the gauge. The water truck and driver were requested to stay at the site until the Corporate Radiation Safety Officer was notified. Another employee was sent to the incident site with a TroxAlert meter. The radiation survey meter was current on calibration.

"The gauge involved in this incident is a Troxler Model 3440 Serial Number 25123 with an Am-241 [source], Serial Number: 47-21331 and Cs-137 [source], Serial Number: 75-7299. The readings were completed by Arkansas Department of Health with a Ludlum Model 3, SN 62645, and calibration date: 02/03/2016.

"Once readings were complete, the Corporate RSO allowed the water truck and driver to leave and to bring the gauge back to Little Rock, AR. The gauge was then put back together and stored in their secured storage location inside the Terracon building. Additional readings were taken on July 18, 2016 at approximately 0830."

Sources: Am-241 - 40 mCi: Cs-137 8 mCi

Incident Number: MS-16004

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Power Reactor Event Number: 52126
Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MATTHEW MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 07/26/2016
Notification Time: 16:39 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2016
Event Time: 15:36 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
STEVE ROSE (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 79 Power Operation 79 Power Operation
2 N Y 74 Power Operation 74 Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO OIL SHEEN IN COOLING TOWER BASIN

"On 7/26/2016 at 1536 EDT, TVA [Tennessee Valley Authority] notified the National Response Center that Watts Bar Nuclear Plant had noted an oil sheen on the Cooling Tower Basin. An oil sheen was observed within the U1 Cooling Tower basin at WBN. The sheen did not cover the entire Cooling Tower basin. The sheen covered approximately two square feet. Estimate of oil released into the Cooling Tower basin is less than four ounces. No oil sheen was visible in the Tennessee River from the bank above the diffuser pipes.

"Notifications were also made to TEMA [Tennessee Emergency Management Agency]. Follow-up observations within 20 minutes of the sheen being reported indicated that the oil sheen had dissipated and was no longer visible. Oil levels from the suspected source did not indicate any change in oil reservoir levels.

"Unit 1 remains in Mode 1 at 79 percent power - reduced power due to main condenser back pressure limits. Unit 2 remains in Mode 1 at 74 percent power - initial startup testing

"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as a condition that was reported to an outside Government Agency.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 52127
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: CLIFFORD STEINER
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 07/26/2016
Notification Time: 18:12 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2016
Event Time: 12:52 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM INOPERABLE

"On July 26, 2016 at 1252 hours (CDT), the Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) system was declared inoperable due to a toxic gas analyzer spurious alarm which resulted in the 'B' Air Filtration Unit (AFU) being inadvertently isolated. In this condition, Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) system cannot be guaranteed to achieve required design flow rate. Tech Spec 3.7.4, Condition A was entered which requires the CREV system to be restored to an operable status in seven (7) days.

"The CREV system maintains a habitable control room environment and ensures the operability of components in the control room emergency zone during accident conditions as well as protection of the operators from a high dose environment assumed during a design basis accident.

"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function,' because the CREV system is a single train system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, July 27, 2016
Wednesday, July 27, 2016