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Event Notification Report for April 20, 2016

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
04/19/2016 - 04/20/2016

** EVENT NUMBERS **


51795 51828 51869 51871 51872

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 51795
Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID ALLEN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 03/17/2016
Notification Time: 08:02 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/2016
Event Time: 01:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
SHAKUR WALKER (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF EMERGENCY AND AUXILIARY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEMS

"On March 17, 2016, at 0115 [EDT], Watts Bar Unit 1 (WBN1) entered Technical Specification Limiting Condition of Operation (TS LCO) 3.0.3 due to the inoperability of both trains of the Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS). TS LCO 3.7.12 Condition B was also entered at this time due to the inoperability of both trains of the Auxiliary Gas Treatment System (ABGTS). The train B EGTS and train B ABGTS had been removed from service for scheduled maintenance, when at 0115, the train A Auxiliary Air Compressor became inoperable. On March 17, 2016, at 0133, the train A Auxiliary Air Compressor was declared OPERABLE, and TS LCO 3.0.3 and 3.7.12 Condition B were exited.

"The auxiliary air system supports the EGTS by providing a safety grade air supply. When train A auxiliary air became inoperable, the supported train A EGTS and ABGTS became inoperable, creating a condition where both trains of EGTS and ABGTS were unavailable. In the event of an accident, the EGTS establishes a negative pressure in the annulus between the shield building and the steel containment vessel and the ABGTS establishes a negative pressure in the Auxiliary Building Secondary Containment Enclosure (ABSCE). Filters in these system mitigate the release of radioactive contaminants to the environment.

"WBN1 remained in Mode 1 at 100% power and no safety functions were required during the event.

"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * RETRACTION AT 1518 EDT ON 04/19/16 FROM BRIAN MCILNAY TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

"The purpose of this notification is to retract event report no. 51795 made on 3/17/16 at 0802 (EDT). Previously, Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) reported a loss of the Emergency and Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment Systems (EGTS/ABGTS) at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (WBN1). Both trains of EGTS and ABGTS were declared INOPERABLE when the train A auxiliary air system cooling water supply bypass valve was isolated, prior to completing the requisite post maintenance testing following repairs to the normal cooling water supply solenoid valve. Upon recognition, WBN1 operations personnel declared the train A auxiliary air system INOPERABLE, resulting in inoperability of Train A EGTS and ABGTS and forcing entry into TS LCO [Limiting Condition for Operation] 3.0.3 (from TS LCO 3.6.9 EGTS) and 3.7.12 Condition B for ABGTS. At the time the condition was recognized, train B EGTS and train B ABGTS were INOPERABLE for scheduled maintenance.

"Subsequently, TVA completed the post maintenance testing of the train A auxiliary air system ERCW [Emergency Raw Cooling Water] normal supply solenoid valve and determined that the valve, while not fully qualified at the time, was in fact operable and capable of performing its safety function. Therefore, entry into TS LCO 3.0.3 and 3.7.12 Condition B was not necessary and the event is no longer reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified the R2DO (McCoy).

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 51828
Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BILL MASON
HQ OPS Officer: RICHARD SMITH
Notification Date: 03/29/2016
Notification Time: 16:31 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2016
Event Time: 19:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
DAVID AYRES (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Defueled
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF POWER TO METEOROLOGICAL TOWER

"At approximately 1900 EDT on March 28, 2016, an unplanned loss of retail power to the McGuire Meteorological tower occurred. This loss of power impacted communication between the Meteorological tower and the control room, which resulted in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. Compensatory measures existed within the site's emergency planning procedures to obtain meteorological data from the National Weather Service. Meteorological information could have been provided via the emergency notification system to the NRC operations center.

"Power was restored at 2245 EDT on March 28, 2016.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. There was no impact to the public."

* * * RETRACTION AT 1423 EDT ON 4/19/2016 FROM SCOTT SLIETER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

"This notification is being made to retract event EN 51828 that was reported March 29, 2016. Based on further investigation, Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures provide acceptable alternative methods to perform emergency assessment that are in addition to the control room indications from the meteorological tower. Furthermore, it was determined that the meteorological tower data was valid and available in the control room during the applicable period. It was therefore determined that no actual or potential major loss of emergency assessment capability existed per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). This is consistent with NUREG 1022, rev 3, supplement 1 and NEI 13-01, rev 0. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the retraction."

Notified the R2DO (McCoy).

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Part 21 Event Number: 51869
Rep Org: EMERSON PROCESS MANAGEMENT, FISHER
Licensee: FISHER CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL LLC
Region: 3
City: MARSHALLTOWN State: IA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KIM SAGAR
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 04/19/2016
Notification Time: 17:31 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2016
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTO (EMAI)
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)

Event Text

PART 21 FISHER 3582G POSITIONERS ESSENTIAL TO FUNCTION TRAVEL PIN LOCK PROVIDED AS COMMERCIAL GRADE

"Items subject to this Fisher Information Notice (FIN) were provided to Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSEG) per PSEG Order 4500798699 (Fisher Order Number 003 - V028245881) (Order). Specifically, this FIN pertains to Fisher Controls International LLC (Fisher) supplied safety-related Type 3582G positioners, serial numbers F000516516-517 ('Equipment') provided per the Order. In these assemblies, the essential-to-function travel pin lock was erroneously provided as commercial-grade."

Fisher information Notice: (FIN) 2016-04

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51871
Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT DANIELS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 04/19/2016
Notification Time: 19:54 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2016
Event Time: 13:43 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
HEATHER GEPFORD (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

MAIN STEAM LINE RADIATION DETECTOR DETERMINED TO BE NON FUNCTIONAL

"While performing a monthly check source on radiation monitor 1-RE-2328 (Main Steamline 1-04 Radiation Detector), the monitor was determined to be non-functional. With this radiation monitor non-functional, all of the emergency action levels for a steam generator tube rupture in steam generator 1-04 could neither be evaluated nor monitored. This unplanned condition is reportable as a major loss of assessment capability per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant [CPNPP] has assurance of steam generator integrity and fuel cladding integrity and there is a negligible safety significance to the current condition from a public health and safety perspective.

"Additionally, compensatory measures are in place to assure adequate monitoring capability is available to implement the CPNPP emergency plan in the unlikely event of challenges to the steam generator or fuel cladding.

"Until this radiation monitor can be restored, Operations has implemented compensatory measures to monitor main steamline 1-04 N16 Radiation Monitor for early signs of a steam generator tube leak/rupture, pre-brief radiation protection technicians on taking local readings with a geiger-mueller tube on main steam line 1-04 and reporting the reading to the Control Room.

"Corrective actions are being pursued to restore 1-RE-2328 to functional status."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51872
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RON FRY
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 04/20/2016
Notification Time: 01:52 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2016
Event Time: 21:59 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/20/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

INOPERABLE SECONDARY CONTAINMENT

"On April 19th, 2016 at 2159 [EDT], Secondary Containment became inoperable due to failure to meet Surveillance Requirement (SR 3.6.4.1.1) on Unit 1 and Unit 2.

"The inoperability was caused when Reactor Building differential pressure was discovered to be less than Technical Specification requirements [-0.25 inches of water gauge].

"Secondary Containment was restored April 19, 2016 at 2222 by adjusting intake louvers in accordance with off normal operating procedure ON-RBHVAC-201.

"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment system."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, April 20, 2016
Wednesday, April 20, 2016