Event Notification Report for March 29, 2016

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS

The following information was received from the State of California via email:

"Torrance Unified School District (TUSD) reported to the RHB [Radiation Health Branch] via email on March 29. 2016 regarding nine tritium exit signs the school district is unable to account for after construction at two of their sites (5 signs at South High School located at 4801 Pacific Coast Highway, Torrance, CA 90505 and 4 signs at North High School located at 3620 W 182nd St, Torrance, CA 90504). TUSD has notified the contracted construction company, Balfour Beatty Construction, regarding the incident and requested removal documentation for the 9 exit signs, which to date has not been provided.

"The four Tritium Exit Signs from North High School located at 3620 W. 182nd St Torrance, CA 90504:
ISOLITE 2040-50G-20-BK Expiration date 1/1/23 received around 2/27/02 11.5 Curies Tritium
ISOLITE 2040-50G-20-BK Expiration date 1/1/23 received around 2/27/02 11.5 Curies Tritium
ISOLITE 2040-50G-20-BK Expiration date 1/1/23 received around 2/27/02 11.5 Curies Tritium
ISOLITE 2040-50G-20-BK Expiration date 1/1/23 received around 2/27/02 11.5 Curies Tritium

"The five Tritium Exit Signs from South High School located at 4801 Pacific Coast Hwy Torrance, CA 90505:
ISOLITE 2040-70G-20-BA Expiration date 4/20/22 Received around 1/15/02 11.5 Curies Tritium
ISOLITE 2040-70G-20-BA Expiration date 4/20/22 Received around 1/15/02 11.5 Curies Tritium
ISOLITE 2040-70G-20-BA Expiration date 4/01/22 Received around 1/15/02 11.5 Curies Tritium
ISOLITE SLX-60-S-G-20-B Expiration date 4/01/25 Received around 3/22/05 Est. 11.5 Curies Tritium
ISOLITE SLX-60-S-G-20-B Expiration date 4/01/25 Received around 3/22/05 Est. 11.5 Curies Tritium"

California 5010 Number: 032916 / TUSD

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE/DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was received from the State of California via email:

"On 03/29/16, the California Office of Emergency Services (OES) contacted the RHB [Radiation Health Branch] via an email to notify them of a damaged moisture/density gauge. The gauge was a Troxler gauge, Model 3440, S/N 38618 containing 9 mCi of Cs-137 and 44 mCi of Am-241. The gauge had been run over by an excavator while the operator was taking a reading along the side of the road where the incident occurred. Per the licensee, the Cs-137 source was in the shielded position (at the time of the incident readings were taken over a standard block for counts) when the gauge was damaged. The licensee stated that a 20 foot area was cordoned off until the gauge was removed. Fire Department personnel were at the scene.

"Per the licensee, a Pacific Nuclear Technology (PNT) RSO arrived at the site, and confirmed a survey meter reading of 0.5 mRems at one meter from the gauge, which is considered normal for this type of gauge. It was also noted that the Cs-137 and Am-241 sources were intact. Survey of the area after removal of the gauge indicated background readings. The gauge was placed inside the transit cage and returned to the licensee's storage location. A leak test will be performed and the gauge will be disposed of in the near future. RHB will be following up on this incident."

California 5010 Number: 032916 / Kleinfelder

BAFFLE BOLT INDICATIONS IDENTIFIED DURING INSERVICE INSPECTION

"This is a non-emergency report. Indian Point Unit 2 is shut down for a scheduled refueling outage and is performing an industry required MRP-227-A inspection of the reactor vessel internals. During this inspection, Entergy identified baffle/former bolts with either visual anomalies or ultrasonic indications. All vessel internal examinations have been successfully completed with no anomalies other than the baffle/former bolts. Entergy will be developing a repair plan that will be implemented prior to startup. The unit is in a safe and stable condition. No leakage was detected as a result of this condition.

"On March 29, 2016, this event was determined to be reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), since the as-found conditions were not previously analyzed.

"Entergy is planning a press release to communicate this condition to our stakeholders. Therefore this is also being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) since a news release is planned.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."

The licensee will notify State and local government agencies as appropriate.

LOSS OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE

"On March 29, 2016 at 2256 [EDT], Secondary Containment Zone 2 (Unit 2 Reactor Building) differential pressure lowered to 0.0 [inches] WG [water gauge] due to a failed closed discharge damper on the in service Zone 2 exhaust fan. Required differential pressure per SR 3.6.4.1.1 could not be maintained. Zone 2 ventilation was restored by starting the standby Zone 2 exhaust fan. Zone 2 differential pressure recovered to [greater than] 0.25 [inches] WG at 2321 hours. Zone 3 (Unit 1&2 Reactor Buildings) ventilation remained in service and stable. Zone 1(Unit 1 Reactor Building) ventilation remained in service however it is not required in this mode of Operation.

"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT INVOLVING A NON-LICENSED SUPERVISOR

A non-licensed, licensee supervisory employee had a confirmed positive test for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been removed.

The licensee notified the NRC Region I.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL EVENT

The following information was received from the State of New York via facsimile:

"The Licensee's Radiation Safety Officer called on March 29, 2016 to report that during the administration of Y90 to the liver of patient in the Interventional Radiology suite earlier in the day, only 3.9 mCi of the intended 11.7 mCi was administered due to a clogged catheter. [NY State Department of Health] will update after receiving report from the licensee."

NY State Incident No.:1136

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO TURBINE TRIP

"A Reactor Scram occurred at 1123 CDT on 03/29/2016 from 35% CTP [core thermal power]. The cause of the Scram appears to be a Turbine Generator trip. The station's procedures, '05-S-01-EP-2 RPV [Reactor Pressure Vessel] Control, 05-1-02-I-1 Reactor Scram ONEP [Off Normal Event Procedure] and 05-1-02-l-2 Turbine Generator Trip ONEP,' were entered to mitigate the transient with all systems responding as designed. No loss of offsite or ESF [engineered safety feature] power occurred. No ECCS [emergency core cooling systems] initiation signals were reached and no ESF or Diesel Generator initiations occurred. All control rods fully inserted. MSIVs [main steam isolation valves] remained open, no SRVs [safety relief valves] lifted, and no containment isolation signals were generated.

"Currently, reactor water level is being maintained by the Condensate and Feedwater System in normal band and reactor pressure and temperature are being maintained by the Reactor Water Cleanup System. The main condenser is available. There are no challenges to Primary or Secondary Containment at this time.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."