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Event Notification Report for March 15, 2016

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
03/14/2016 - 03/15/2016

** EVENT NUMBERS **


51767 51768 51774 51776 51787 51788 51789

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 51767
Facility: NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICES INC.
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU CONVERSION & SCRAP RECOVERY
                   NAVAL REACTOR FUEL CYCLE
                   LEU SCRAP RECOVERY
Region: 2
City: ERWIN State: TN
County: UNICOI
License #: SNM-124
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07000143
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL C. TESTER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 03/04/2016
Notification Time: 10:26 [ET]
Event Date: 03/03/2016
Event Time: 21:23 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/04/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.1906(d)(1) - SURFACE CONTAM LEVELS > LIMITS
Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

CONTAMINATED RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL SHIPMENT

"On March 3, 2016, at approximately 1745 [EST], a radioactive material shipment was received at NFS from the Westinghouse Electric Company in Hopkins, South Carolina. Receipt contamination and radiation surveys were completed at approximately 1905. Results indicated removable surface contamination on two of the nine radioactive material packages that exceeded the criteria of the cited regulations.

"The radioactive material shipment left the Westinghouse Electric Company facility at 1300 [EST] on March 3, 2016. It was received at the NFS receiving facility at approximately 1745 on March 3, 2016. Surface contamination and radiation surveys were initiated immediately upon receipt. Removable surface contamination in excess of 10 CFR 20.1906(d) limits was verified to be present on the external surface of two of the nine shipping containers in the shipment at 1905. Contamination was controlled at the receiving facility and successfully decontaminated below criteria of 10 CFR 20.1906(d) by approximately 2030 on March 3, 2016."

This was an exclusive shipment. The alpha contamination measured 4278 dpm/100 sq. cm. and 6345 dpm/100 sq. cm., respectively. The licensee informed Westinghouse who is conducting an investigation into this incident.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Agreement State Event Number: 51768
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: LA PIGMENT COMPANY, L.P.
Region: 4
City: WESTLAKE State: LA
County:
License #: LA-6491-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH NOBLE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 03/04/2016
Notification Time: 13:28 [ET]
Event Date: 03/03/2016
Event Time: 13:27 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/04/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RICK DEESE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOACTIVE GAUGE SHUTTER STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION

The following information was summarized from the State of Louisiana via email:

"[On 03/03/16, the licensee] RSO e-mailed [Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ)] at approximately 1330 [CST] to report that a gauge installed on a process at the LA Pigment Company facility in Westlake, LA, had a shutter malfunction. The gauge is installed on a routing process for material at the facility. The gauge shutter is stuck in the open position.

"The gauge is a Berthold Technologies, Model: Berthold Systems, LB-330 utilizing a 12 mCi Cs-137 source, S/N1768-5-90, Model: Lab. Prof. Dr. Berthold Dwg. #2653.100-001.

"On 03/04/2016, a Service Engineer with Berthold Technologies evaluated the situation and stated the source holder/shield will be replaced and the same Cs-137 source will be installed in the new source holder. The cause of the operational failure appears to be corrosion, extended wear and tear and age of the device. The service holder order was placed and anticipated delivery is 4 to 6 weeks. The device will be shipped from Germany.

"There are no exposure or health and safety issues involved with this event. The gauge and rod source will remain installed on the functioning process. The areas are posted with 'Do Not Enter or Operate' since the source cannot be locked out for human entry. The resolution of the situation will be directed by the ability to be repaired or if the gauge should be uninstalled and sent for disposal.

"The corrective action: The repairs and/or corrective actions were determined on 03/04/2016 by [the Service Engineer] and will be completed when the replacement source holders arrive."

LADEQ considers this incident closed.

State Event Report ID No.: LA 160004

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Agreement State Event Number: 51774
Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: ALLEGHENY GENERAL HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: PITTSBURGH State: PA
County:
License #: PA-0031
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOESPH MELNIC
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 03/07/2016
Notification Time: 14:56 [ET]
Event Date: 03/02/2016
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/07/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JON LILLIENDAHL (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (NMSS)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CONTAMINATION EVENT WITH POSSIBLE SHALLOW DOSE EXCEEDING FEDERAL LIMITS

The following report was received from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via facsimile:

"Notifications: The event occurred on March 2, 2016, the licensee discovered the event on March 3, 2016, and notified the Department [Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection] on March 4, 2016, via a phone call. The event is reportable per 10 CFR 30.50(b)(1)(i) and 10 CFR 20.2202(b)(1)(iii).

"Event Description: On March 2, 2016, a technologist was injecting a samarium-153 'Quadramet' dose (approximately 81 milliCuries) when there was a problem with the syringe/tubing connection. A 'blowback' occurred and a small amount, believed to be approximately 1-2 mCi, of the dose spilled. The patient was released [and sent] home. The technologist stated that he had gloves on, washed his hands, surveyed the area and called the lead technologist to notify her of the incident. Radiation Safety [at the hospital] was not notified until March 3rd. The technologist was surveyed and found to have contamination on his hands and forearms. An initial calculation indicated a skin dose above 50 rem. Radiation Safety then took smears throughout the department and contamination was found on various surfaces including the floor, other technologist's hands, gloves, shoes, survey meters, chairs, and clothing. Removable contamination was also found in a technologist's vehicle. Radiation Safety has decontaminated most areas. Surfaces and rooms that were not able to be decontaminated were closed off (for decay) or covered with paper to prevent any further spread of contamination. It is believed that after the spill, the technologist attempted to clean up the area. Apparently it was not sufficient, for when housekeeping did their routine cleaning, they may have unknowingly further spread the contamination with floor mopping and other cleaning. No biological effects are expected with any individual. The RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] feels that a 'medical event' did not occur with the patient. The patient returned for a scheduled scan on March 3rd, and that scan appeared normal. The patient did not show any signs of detectable contamination on her skin.

"Cause of the Event: Human error. The technologist may not have followed proper procedures, and contributed to the contamination spreading beyond initial spill area.

"Actions: A reactive inspection is planned by the Department [Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection]. More information will be provided upon receipt."

Event Report ID No: PA160008

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 51776
Facility: LOUISIANA ENERGY SERVICES
RX Type:
Comments: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
                   GAS CENTRIFUGE FACILITY
Region: 2
City: EUNICE State: NM
County: LEA
License #: SNM-2010
Agreement: Y
Docket: 70-3103
NRC Notified By: CHARLES SLAMA
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 03/07/2016
Notification Time: 19:17 [ET]
Event Date: 03/07/2016
Event Time: 16:15 [MST]
Last Update Date: 03/07/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (a)(4) - ALL SAFETY ITEMS UNAVAILABLE
Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
SHANA HELTON (NMSS)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

ADMINISTRATIVE ITEMS RELIED ON FOR SAFETY (IROFS) NOT PERFORMED

"During the afternoon of March 7, 2016, UUSA [Urenco USA] operators moved drums containing uranic material into an IROFS [Items Relied On For Safety] controlled array. This IROFS requires initial and independent operator verification to ensure a subcritical geometry exists prior to adding any new material to the array. The operators moving the drums did not perform the administrative IROFS; that is, neither an initial nor an independent
verification were completed prior to adding five additional drums to the array.

"UUSA management and nuclear criticality staff have ensured the drums are in a safe and subcritical configuration.

"The drums contain clean up materials contaminated with UF6 at unknown levels of enrichment. A nuclear criticality did not occur. The array is in a subcritical geometry. No external events are affecting this event. No emergencies have been, nor will any be declared.

"No state or other federal agencies will be notified. No press releases are planned.

"Number and types of controls necessary under normal operating conditions: One enhanced sole IROFS. The enhancement is an initial verification and an independent verification of geometry prior to movement of material into the area.

"Number and types of controls which functioned properly under upset conditions: Neither the IROFS initial verification, nor the independent verification of geometry were performed before movement occurred.

"Number and types of controls necessary to restore a safe situation: A member of operations management passed through during a routine plant tour, questioned the operators, and determined that the drums had been placed in a safe geometry in the array without performing the required IROFS surveillance.

"Safety significance of events: Loss of geometry controls preventing criticality.

"Safety equipment status: The array is in a subcritical geometry.

"Status of corrective actions: Corrective actions to be developed."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51787
Facility: SOUTH TEXAS
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM HERZOG
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 03/14/2016
Notification Time: 04:52 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2016
Event Time: 02:47 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/14/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF OFFSITE EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SIREN

"A South Texas Project, Offsite Emergency Notification Siren, was inadvertently going off. The Matagorda County Sheriff's Office notified Site Security that a siren had actuated for no apparent reason. Station personnel are addressing the issue with the siren.

"The Matagorda County Sheriff's Office was the only offsite agency that was contacted during the event."

The siren was tested and is considered functional at this time. Additional testing will be completed during daylight hours.

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Part 21 Event Number: 51788
Rep Org: ANVIL ENGINEERING PIPE SUPPORT
Licensee: ANVIL ENGINEERING PIPE SUPPORT
Region: 1
City: NORTH KINGSTOWN State: RI
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK R. WARD
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 03/14/2016
Notification Time: 14:07 [ET]
Event Date: 10/01/2015
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/14/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES NOGGLE (R1DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 - HYDRAULIC SNUBBER SEAL MATERIAL DEVIATION INTERIM REPORT

"Anvil Engineered Pipe Supports (EPS) supplied 14 Fig. 200N Configuration 'A' style hydraulic snubbers to the Exelon owned and operated Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS) in 2013. During the course of routine refueling outage activities in October 2015, it was discovered that 9 of these 14 snubbers had no hydraulic fluid in the reservoir. The cause of the hydraulic fluid loss was premature aging of the reservoir piston seal due to vibration induced frictional heat. Subsequent laboratory testing of both replacement and degraded seal material by Exelon Power Labs suggested that a material substitution had been made from the Anvil approved Ethylene Propylene (EP) compound to a different grade of EP rubber.

"On February 17, 2016, Anvil determined that a material substitution was made by the seal vendor. A machined seal that was fabricated by the manufacturer was substituted for a seal molded with the approved Anvil compound. Prior to its installation in Fig. 200N/201N Configuration 'A' hydraulic snubbers, the machined seal compound was not tested to establish a service life for the compound.

"Anvil has bounded the extent of condition to 4 specific seal batches of 4" and 5" Fig. 200N/201N Configuration 'A' reservoir piston seals provided after January 1, 2013. Based on its Part 21 investigation, Anvil has yet to determine that a specific defect exists, based on the demonstrated operability of the snubbers at PBAPS despite severe service conditions beyond their published operational limits, and the compatibility of the EP base polymer with Anvil hydraulic fluids.

"Anvil is conducting a test campaign to approve and establish a service life for the machined seal compound. This testing will either qualify the machined compound for use at currently published Anvil service conditions (157 degrees F for 25 years with a total lifetime dose not to exceed 2e8 rads), or establish a reduced service life for the snubbers in which a material substitution was made. This testing is being conducted on an assembled reservoir with the substitute machined compound. It will include irradiation of the reservoir to 6.4e7 rads, accelerated temperature aging, and a final radiation exposure to bring the cumulative dose to 2e8 rads. As of 3/14/16, the reservoir specimen had been irradiated to 6.4e7 rads with no effect on the seal.

"Anvil expects to have this testing complete by May 1, 2016, with a formal evaluation to follow. PBAPS has been notified of the material substitution, and a full accounting of the affected snubbers by serial number, PO number, site, and utility is being assembled. Anvil will notify affected sites when the testing and equivalency evaluation is complete.

"Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions or require any additional information.

"Sincerely,
Mark R Ward
Operations Manager
Anvil Engineered Pipe Supports
160 Frenchtown Road
North Kingstown, Rl, 02852"

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Research Reactor Event Number: 51789
Facility: GENERAL ELECTRIC OF PLEASANTON
RX Type: 100 KW NTR (TANK)
Comments:
Region: 0
City: PLEASANTON State: CA
County: ALAMEDA
License #: R-33
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000073
NRC Notified By: DANIEL THOMAS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 03/14/2016
Notification Time: 14:59 [ET]
Event Date: 03/10/2016
Event Time: 10:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 03/14/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
RESEARCH AND TEST REACTOR EVENT
Person (Organization):
DUANE HARDESTY (NRR)
BETH REED (NRR)
ALEXANDER ADAMS (NRR)
ANTHONY MENDIOLA (NRR)

Event Text

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION DEVIATION WHEN OPERATORS MANIPULATED PLANT ON EXPIRED LICENSES

On March 10, 2016, it was discovered that two operators at the facility had manipulated the plant with expired NRC licenses. The licenses expired in January, 2016. This constitutes a deviation from the facility's Technical Specification 6.1.3.1 - 'Minimum staffing'. Preliminary investigations have determined that the operators performed licensed activities at least 16 times since the expiration of their licenses.

The cause of this event in under investigation.

The licensee has notified their NRC Project Manager.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, March 15, 2016
Tuesday, March 15, 2016