| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
03/09/2016 - 03/10/2016 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 51761 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: TICONA POLYMERS INC
Region: 4
City: BISHOP State: TX
County:
License #: 02441
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GENTRY HEARN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO | Notification Date: 03/01/2016
Notification Time: 13:22 [ET]
Event Date: 02/29/2016
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/01/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RICK DEESE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE - STUCK SHUTTER IN THE NORMALLY OPEN POSITION
The following Agreement State Report was received from the State of Texas via email:
"On March 1, 2016, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] received notice that on February 29, 2016, the licensee had discovered that a Berthold fixed gauge model MB7442D containing 30 milliCuries of cesium-137 had malfunctioned. The shutter was stuck in the open position. The gauge is normally left in the open position, and no exposure to the public is likely. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I 9383 |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 51763 | Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: NVI, NONDESTRUCTIVE & VISUAL INSPECTION, LLC
Region: 4
City: CUTOFF State: LA
County:
License #: LA-5601-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE NOBLE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO | Notification Date: 03/02/2016
Notification Time: 17:06 [ET]
Event Date: 02/01/2016
Event Time: 16:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/02/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RICK DEESE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNABLE TO RETRACT SOURCE DUE TO CRIMPED TUBE
The following information was provided by the State of Louisiana via email:
"On February 1, 2016, a crew from NVI [Nondestructive & Visual Inspection, LLC] was performing radiography at a temporary jobsite located at the Loop Clovelly Facility on Highway 1 in Cutoff, LA. The crew was working in an area only accessible by boat. The crew made some exposures and did not notice the 'crank out' cable became wedged between the boat and the vessel support. The crew set [four] boundaries for the duration of the 'shots'/exposures. When the crew tried to retract the source into the shielded position, it would not [retract] because the 'crank out' tube was crimped, but was still connected to the exposure device. The source assembly remained out of the shielded position. When it was determined the source was not retractable, immediately the crew cleared the area and boundaries were established by distance and for unnecessary exposures.
"The lead radiographer contacted the RSO and received instructions on how to secure/shield the area from potential/unnecessary exposures. This was after the crew had submerged the source in the water to provide shielding for the source. This was the initial notice and was not received until the source was secured in the shielded position and the event was over. The RSO did the actual retrieval and securing of the source. His direct reading pocket dosimeter reading was 593 mR and the crew's readings were 230 mR and below.
"The exposure device and associated equipment ('crank out' control and source guide tube) were SPEC 150 exposure device S/N 1764 and a SPEC G-60, S/N WI1508 source. The source was 42 Ci of Ir-192. The equipment, the exposure device and source assembly were brought to SPEC [Source Production & Equipment Company] in St. Rose, LA and was evaluated and passed the quality assurance requirements.
"The radiography crew was suspended from radiography work until they can be reinstructed in the NVIs' Operation Emergency and Safety Manual. The crew was sent to an Occupational Medicine Facility for blood-work. The test results were within normal limits. This is the corrective action. THIS EVENT IS CONSIDERED CLOSED.
"NVI, Nondestructive & Visual Inspection, LLC is Departmentally [Louisiana Radiation Protection Division] approved and licensed to perform source retrievals. This is being reported as 10CFR Part 34.101(a)."
Louisiana Event Report ID # LA-160002 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 51780 | Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN MCILNAY
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 03/09/2016
Notification Time: 04:01 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2016
Event Time: 03:42 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/09/2016 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
| Person (Organization):
LADONNA SUGGS (R2DO)
CATHY HANEY (R2)
JOHN LUBINSKI (NRR)
JEFFERY GRANT (IRD)
SCOTT MORRIS (NRR)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO A FIRE GREATER THAN 15 MINUTES
Watts Bar Unit 2 declared an Unusual Event at 0342 EST based on a fire greater than 15 minutes in the turbine building - 2B Hotwell pump motor. The fire was extinguished by 0401 EST, at the time of notification. Unit 2 is currently shutdown in Mode 5 making preparations for startup. No offsite assistance was requested. All personnel are accounted for and there are no personnel injuries reported.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified DHS SWO, DOE, FEMA OPS, FEMA National Watch (email), DHS NICC, and Nuclear SSA (email).
* * * UPDATE AT 0512 ON 03/09/16 FROM BRIAN McILNAY TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 0508 EST based on verification that the fire was out and that the fire response team had been secured.
The licensee notified the State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Suggs), NRR EO (Morris) and IRD (Grant).
Notified DHS SWO, DOE, FEMA OPS, FEMA National Watch (email), DHS NICC, and Nuclear SSA (email). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 51784 | Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DAN PIPKIN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 03/09/2016
Notification Time: 16:53 [ET]
Event Date: 01/10/2016
Event Time: 02:43 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/09/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text INVALID ACTUATION OF THE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION LOGIC
"On January 10, 2016, at 0243 CST, with the plant in cold shutdown, the primary containment isolation logic was actuated as the result of an invalid signal. This condition occurred while operators were installing electrical jumpers designed to bypass certain isolation signals for the suction valves in the residual heat removal (RHR) system that comprise the shutdown cooling flow path. These jumpers are installed under procedural guidance for the purposes of increasing the reliability of the shutdown cooling loop by disabling isolation signals that are not required to be operable in certain plant operating modes. Although it could not be proven, it appears that inadvertent contact with an energized circuit occurred during the jumper installation, causing a fuse to blow, de-energizing part of the primary isolation logic. This caused the automatic closure of Division 1 suction and return valves in the shutdown cooling loop, as well as valves connecting the reactor plant sampling systems to the RHR system. The main control room crew implemented recovery procedures to restore shutdown cooling to service at 0401 CST, prior to exceeding any temperature limits.
"This event resulted from the failure to maintain corrective actions in place that were develop after a similar event in 1994. Additionally, the operators were not using the type of jumpers required by the procedure, which likely contributed to the blown fuse.
"The RHR system operating procedure has been revised to require that the potentially affected valves in the shutdown cooling loop will be de-energized during jumper installation to eliminate the possibility of inadvertent isolation.
"This is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) as an invalid actuation of the primary containment isolation logic."
During this event, the RCS temperature increased from approximately 130 to 190 degree F.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. | |