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Event Notification Report for February 1, 2016

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
01/29/2016 - 02/01/2016

** EVENT NUMBERS **


51595 51671 51672 51673 51675 51694 51695 51696 51697 51700 51701 51702

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 51595
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID A. RICHARDSON
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 12/09/2015
Notification Time: 22:28 [ET]
Event Date: 12/09/2015
Event Time: 14:43 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/29/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

REACTOR RECIRCULATION LOOP FLOW TRANSMITTERS OUT OF TOLERANCE

"During surveillance testing, 2 reactor recirculation loop flow transmitters, which input to the Average Power Range Neutron Monitors (APRM's) associated with the 'A' Reactor Protection Trip System (RPS), were found out of tolerance in the non-conservative direction.

"Non-conservative reactor recirculation flow setpoints for all 'A' side APRM's results in a loss of safety function for the APRM Neutron Flux High (Flow Biased) trip function of RPS.

"All instruments were adjusted back to within tolerance as allowed by the procedure, restoring the RPS safety function. Extent of condition and instrument drift issues are under evaluation via the corrective action process.

"This is an 8 hour reportable event under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (A) Shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * RETRACTION ON 1/29/16 AT 1414 EST FROM DUSTIN SCURLOCK TO DONG PARK * * *

"On the basis of a subsequent engineering evaluation, which reviewed the uncertainties considered within the setpoint calculations and the sequencing of the transmitter calibrations, it was determined that the APRM channels and Control Rod Block Monitor instrumentation associated with the Neutron Flux High (Flow Biased) function were unaffected by the out of calibration condition.

"Technical Specification (TS) Table 3.3.1.1 FUNCTION 2.b requires two (2) APRM Neutron Flux High (Flow Biased) channels per RPS trip system. TS Table 3.3.2.1 FUNCTION 1.a requires two (2) Rod Block Monitor [RBM] Upscale channels. These TS requirements were met upon discovery of this condition. The past-operability of the RPS and RBM instrumentation was unaffected by this condition. In addition, the engineering analysis confirmed that the Neutron Flux High (Flow Biased) allowable values in the Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) and the TRM were not exceeded.

"Therefore, there was no loss of safety function, and this condition was not reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. FitzPatrick is retracting ENS 51595.

"The degraded flow transmitters have been replaced, and the operability determination for the condition has been revised. All RPS and RBM instrumentation remain operable."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R1DO (Bickett).

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Agreement State Event Number: 51671
Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: CLARION BOARDS, INC
Region: 1
City: SHIPPENVILLE State: PA
County:
License #: PA-G0084
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE MELNIC
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 01/21/2016
Notification Time: 13:06 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/2016
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOACTIVE GAUGE SHUTTER FAILURE

The following information was obtained from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via facsimile:

"The roll pin on the shutter handle of a Ronan Engineering gauge broke, most likely due to environmental conditions. The shutter is in the closed position and the gauge is out of service. The licensee plans to contact the manufacturer for repair. No overexposures have occurred.

"Manufacturer: Ronan Engineering
Model: SA1-F37
Serial #: M7255
Isotope: Cs-137
Activity: 10 mCi

"Cause of the Event: The gauge is located in a harsh and dirty environment. In the past, they designed and installed a cover to shield the gauge. When inspecting the gauge after the event, it was noticed that this cover had fallen off.

"Actions: A reactive inspection is planned by the Department [Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection]. More information will be provided upon receipt."

PA Report No.: PA160005

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Agreement State Event Number: 51672
Rep Org: TENNESSEE DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: APPLIED TECHNICAL SERVICES, INC.
Region: 1
City: GREENVILLE State: TN
County:
License #: R-33172-C19
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ANDREW HOLCOMB
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 01/21/2016
Notification Time: 16:23 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/2015
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNABLE TO RETRACT SOURCE DUE TO DAMAGED GUIDE TUBE

The following information was obtained from the State of Tennessee via email:

"On December 6, 2015 at approximately 1300 EST, an exposure device D6032, (880 Delta) containing Source S/N SE4869, 50 Ci of Se-75, fell from its position on top of a flange assembly approximately six feet to the finished floor. Upon impact, the guide tube was crimped preventing the source from being able to return to the camera. The source was able to be returned to the collimator reducing the radiation present. Technicians secured a true two mR boundary and notified plant safety personnel and the RSO. The lead technician onsite was source retrieval certified and took charge of the retrieval process. The source was further shielded in a larger diameter pipe and covered with sand bags to reduce radiation levels. Using a pair of pliers, the technician was able to 're-round' the guide tube opening to allow the source to be returned to the camera. The guide tube, camera and control assembly was taken out of service pending inspection. The guide tube was damaged beyond use; the source 'pigtail' and control cable were inspected and tested using a no-go gauge. The guide tube was removed from service and the control assembly will be sent to the manufacturer for further evaluation (ball end connector). Source retrieval technician received a total dose of 150 mR during the event."

Tennessee Report No.: TN-16-012

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Non-Agreement State Event Number: 51673
Rep Org: UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI
Region: 3
City: COLUMBIA State: MO
County:
License #: 24-00513-32
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JACK CRAWFORD
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 01/22/2016
Notification Time: 12:37 [ET]
Event Date: 01/19/2016
Event Time: 10:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

LEAKING NI-63 SOURCE

A 15 mCi Ni-63 source (Sealed Source Device Registry # CA0406S214S), used for research and development, was determined to be leaking greater than the 0.005 microCi limit. The leakage contaminated the desktop where it was being used. No personnel contaminations or overexposures occurred. The source was removed from service and is awaiting proper disposal.

Decontamination of the desk, which is in a secure area, is in progress. An investigation into the event is in progress.

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Agreement State Event Number: 51675
Rep Org: OK DEQ RAD MANAGEMENT
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 4
City: OKLAHOMA CITY State: OK
County:
License #: OK-21035-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEVIN SAMPSON
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 01/22/2016
Notification Time: 16:41 [ET]
Event Date: 01/22/2016
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PACKAGE WITH EXTERNAL CONTAMINATION

The following information was received from the State of Oklahoma via email:

"[The Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality (OKDEQ)] has been informed that a package sent from University of Oklahoma Medical Center (OK-21035-01) to the University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center pharmacy (OK-03176-04MD) was found to have approximately 2.1 X 10^6 DPM of removable contamination when it was received by the pharmacy. The package was empty and the contamination appeared to be confined to an area about 3 cm in diameter on a plastic sleeve which enclosed the shipping label. The nuclide has been identified as Tc-99m. OKDEQ will perform a reactive inspection next week."

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 51694
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DUSTIN R. SCURLOCK
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Notification Date: 01/29/2016
Notification Time: 11:02 [ET]
Event Date: 01/29/2016
Event Time: 08:12 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/29/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
BRICE BICKETT (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Startup 0 Startup

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION - SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANT DISCHARGE LIMIT EXCEEDED

"On January 29, 2016 James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) received notification from the site Sewage Treatment Plant (STP) operators that the January 6, 2016 monthly settleable solids result for the STP was 0.2 ml/L/hr [milliliter/liter/hour]. This value exceeds the State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (SPDES) permit limit of 0.1 ml/L/hr (daily maximum).

"The STP operators conduct daily process control tests at the STP and did not identify any system upset issues around the January 6, 2016 sample date, or any time since, that would be symptomatic of the slightly elevated settleable solids result.

"The JAF environmental engineer concluded that a notification to the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC) was not required for this event; however, a courtesy notification for permit noncompliance was made. The NYSDEC has been notified.

"Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), this condition is being reported as an event or situation for which notification to a government agency has been made. The NRC resident has been notified.

"JAF is currently at 0 percent power in Mode 2 following a forced outage resultant of events on January 23, 2016."

* * * RETRACTION ON 1/29/16 AT 1630 EST FROM DUSTIN SCURLOCK TO DONG PARK * * *

"Based on further review of the NRC reporting guidance relative to this criteria, JAF has concluded that this condition is below the reporting threshold outlined in NUREG-1022 Revision 3. NUREG-1022 states the following (page 54), 'Licensees generally do not have to report media and government interactions unless they are related to the radiological health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protection of the environment.'

"The condition originally reported in ENS 51694 is considered a minor deviation in sewage process limits, and has no impact on the radiological health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protection of the environment. Therefore, JAF is retracting ENS 51694."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R1DO (Bickett).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51695
Facility: THREE MILE ISLAND
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: JEFF FLOWERS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 01/29/2016
Notification Time: 15:06 [ET]
Event Date: 12/01/2015
Event Time: 21:19 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/29/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BRICE BICKETT (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

INVALID EMERGENCY FEEDWATER ACTUATION

"On December 1, 2015, at 2119 EST, with Unit 1 in power operation mode, during a planned maintenance activity, an invalid Heat Sink Protection System (HSPS) actuation occurred. At the time of the event, electrical maintenance technicians were verifying a HSPS relay contact state using an electrical test meter. The contact was being verified open by recording both voltage and resistance readings across the contact. The technicians first measured voltage. No voltage was found, indicating the relay contact was open, as expected. The technicians then measured for resistance across the open contact. Test meters have lower circuit impedance when measuring resistance as opposed to voltage, which can result in electrically bridging across open contacts. When the meter was installed across the open contact to obtain the resistance reading, the HSPS actuation circuit logic was completed and the inadvertent HSPS actuation occurred. The HSPS actuation resulted in the steam driven Emergency Feedwater (EFW) pump automatically starting and control valves receiving actuation set point signals. There was no emergency feed water injection into the steam generators. At the time of the inadvertent HSPS actuation, steam generator operating levels were above the HSPS actuation setpoint.

''The specific train and system that actuated was the Heat Sink Protection System, Emergency Feedwater System Actuation on Loss of All Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP) Train A.

''The HSPS Loss of all RCP Train A actuation was complete.

''The EFW valves and EFW steam driven pump started and functioned successfully.

"This is reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of HSPS Loss of all RCP Train A and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), this notification of the invalid actuation is provided in lieu of a written LER.

"The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51696
Facility: DAVIS BESSE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: THOMAS PHILIPS
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 01/29/2016
Notification Time: 16:43 [ET]
Event Date: 01/29/2016
Event Time: 13:22 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/29/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BILLY DICKSON (R3DO)
SCOTT MORRIS (NRR)
JEFFERY GRANT (IRD)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM ACTUATION

"At 1322 EST, with the unit operating at approximately 100% full power, an automatic reactor trip occurred due to actuation of Reactor Protection System (RPS) Channel 4. The cause of the RPS actuation is being investigated at this time. Nuclear Instrumentation calibration for RPS Channel 2 was in progress at the time of the trip, with Channel 2 in bypass and Channel 1 in trip. All control rods fully inserted. Immediately post trip, the Steam Feedwater Rupture Control System actuated due to high Steam Generator 1 level due to unknown causes. The Main Steam Isolation Valves closed and Auxiliary Feedwater started as expected. Secondary side relief valves lifted in response to the trip, with two of the relief valves (one on each header) not properly reseating until operators manually lowered Main Steam Header pressure. The Bayshore 345 kV Offsite Electrical Distribution Circuit automatically isolated at the time of the unit trip. This was unexpected. The remaining offsite circuits remain in service.

"The unit is currently in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) and stable, at approximately 550 degrees F and 2155 psig. Steam is being discharged through the Atmospheric Vent Valves for decay heat removal. There is no known primary to secondary leakage, and all safety systems functioned as expected.

"Both primary Source Range nuclear instruments automatically energized, however, they were previously declared inoperable due to an administrative issue. Both Source Range instruments are functional and indicating properly. Both alternate Source Range instruments are operable, and all required Technical Specification actions have been completed.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the event."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51697
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TERRY BRANDT
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 01/29/2016
Notification Time: 17:09 [ET]
Event Date: 01/29/2016
Event Time: 09:20 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/29/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
BILLY DICKSON (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE POWER DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO LOWERING GENERATOR VOLTAGE

"At 0920 CST on 1/29/16, while performing main generator voltage adjustments at the direction of the transmission operator, Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) switchyard voltage lowered to the calculated point where offsite sources were considered inoperable. During this event, both onsite emergency diesel generators were fully operable and capable of performing their intended safety function.

"While no safety concerns arose, Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operability (LCO) 3.8.1.a Condition C was entered due to two offsite electric power circuits being inoperable. Immediate actions were taken to adjust main generator voltage to restore switchyard voltage. In less than 10 minutes, both offsite circuits were declared operable and LCO 3.8.1.a Condition C was exited. This resulted in a reportable event pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

"During the time of reduced grid voltage, no bus low-voltage alarms nor any equipment issues occurred. The cause of this event is under investigation, and there are not any current operability concerns with the offsite power circuits."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Part 21 Event Number: 51700
Rep Org: EMERSON PROCESS MANAGEMENT
Licensee: FISHER CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL, LLC
Region: 3
City: MARSHALLTOWN State: IA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GEORGE BAITINGER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 01/29/2016
Notification Time: 16:56 [ET]
Event Date: 01/05/2016
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/29/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
ERIC MICHEL (R2DO)

Event Text

PART 21 - IMPROPER ACCESSORY MOUNTING BRACKET PROCESSING

"Equipment Affected by this lnformation Notice: Accessory mounting brackets subject to this Fisher Information Notice (FIN) were provided to Sanmen Unit 1 and Haiyang Unit 1 per Change Notice 32 to Westinghouse Electric Company PO 4500280610, and the Fisher Controls International LLC (Fisher) orders noted below. These orders pertain to Westinghouse Electric Company AP1000 units currently under construction in the Peoples' Republic of China.

"Fisher Order 004 - B001252772, Sanmen Unit 1, S/N: 19073505
"Fisher Order 004 - B001252773, Haiyang Unit 1, S/N: 19073506

"Purpose: The purpose of this FIN is to alert Westinghouse Electric Company that as of 5 January 2016, Fisher became aware of a situation which may affect the performance of the mounting brackets including their safety-related function. Fisher is informing Westinghouse Electric Company of this circumstance in accordance with Section 21.21 (b) of 10CFR 21.

"Applicability: This FlN applies only to the subject mounting brackets supplied by Fisher to Westinghouse Electric Company via the aforementioned orders.

"Discussion: Change Notice 32 to Westinghouse Electric Company PO 4500280610 was issued to add commercial grade electronic transmitters to the above referenced serial numbers, which were previously shipped to the Sanmen and Haiyang sites. During the mounting design, it was decided to incorporate the transmitter mounting with an existing switch magnet mounting bracket. Because the transmitter was commercial grade, its mounting parts could also be commercial grade and were processed as such. At that time, Fisher failed to recognize that the existing switch magnet mounting plate was a safety-related item, meaning that the new dual purpose transmitter / magnet mounting bracket should have also been supplied as a safety related item. This resulted in the dual purpose brackets being shipped as a commercial grade item. This oversight was discovered during the processing of other items utilizing the dual purpose bracket for other AP1000 sites.

"Action Required: Fisher will provide properly processed safety-related mounting brackets to Sanmen Unit 1 and Haiyang Unit 1. Unshipped AP1000 items having these brackets for Sanmen Unit 2, Haiyang Unit 2, Summer Units 2 & 3 and Vogtle Units 3 & 4 have been identified and will be verified as having the proper safety-related mounting brackets prior to shipping. Corrective Action Request (CAR) 1793 has been opened to identify root causes and corrective actions required to prevent reoccurrence.

"10 CFR 21 Implications: Fisher requests that the recipient of this notice review it and take appropriate action in accordance with 10CFR 21. If there are any technical questions or concerns, please contact:
Ben Ahrens, Quality Manager
Emerson Process Management
Fisher Controls International LLC
301 South First Avenue
Marshalltown, IA 50158
Phone: (641) 754-2249
Benjamin.ahrens@emerson.com"

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51701
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: ROB MELTON
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 01/29/2016
Notification Time: 23:00 [ET]
Event Date: 01/29/2016
Event Time: 15:18 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/29/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown

Event Text

SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION AFTER LOSS OF ONE OFFSITE POWER SOURCE

"On January 29, 2016, at 1518 CST, with the plant in cold shutdown, power was lost on reserve station service (RSS) line no. 1. This is one of two sources of offsite power required by Technical Specifications. The power loss de-energized the Division 1 onsite AC safety-related switchgear, causing an automatic start of the Division 1 emergency diesel generator (EDG). The Division 1 reactor protection system (RPS) bus was also de-energized, causing a half-scram signal. Approximately 8 minutes later, a full actuation of the RPS occurred due to a high water level condition in the control rod drive hydraulic system scram discharge volume header. All reactor control rods were already fully inserted.

"The loss of Division 1 RPS also caused the actuation of the Division 1 primary containment isolation logic. The Division 1 isolation valves in the balance-of-plant systems closed as designed. Both trains of the standby gas treatment system actuated.

"The loss of RSS no. 1 occurred during post-modification testing on relays at the local 230kV switchyard. The exact cause of the event is under investigation. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

"The unit remains in cold shutdown with 1 source of offsite power and all 3 [EDG] available.

"The [NRC] Resident Inspector has been notified."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51702
Facility: DAVIS BESSE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: MARK HELLE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 01/30/2016
Notification Time: 07:32 [ET]
Event Date: 01/30/2016
Event Time: 01:23 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BILLY DICKSON (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Hot Standby 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

UNANTICIPATED SFRCS ACTUATION WHILE RESTORING MAIN FEEDWATER TO STEAM GENERATORS

"At 0123 EST, with the unit shutdown in Mode 3 (Hot Standby), during the performance of procedure DB-OP-06910, 'Trip Recovery,' while attempting to restore main feedwater to the Steam Generators, Davis-Besse received a Steam Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS) 'reverse delta pressure' signal to the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW). The Auxiliary Feedwater System was operating at the time, feeding the Steam Generators.

"The SFRCS signal did result in actuation/closure [of] several valves in the Main Steam System, as the SFRCS signal is designed to do. This SFRCS signal/valve actuation was not anticipated.

"The unit remained in Mode 3 and is stable. This actuation did not have any negative impact to the AFW system and the ability to feed the steam generators.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the event."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Monday, February 01, 2016
Monday, February 01, 2016