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Event Notification Report for March 18, 2015

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
03/17/2015 - 03/18/2015

** EVENT NUMBERS **


50351 50876 50877 50899 50900

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50351
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KENNY HUNTER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 08/07/2014
Notification Time: 20:00 [ET]
Event Date: 08/07/2014
Event Time: 17:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/17/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 90 Power Operation 90 Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO DISCOVERY OF DEGRADED FIRE BARRIER WALLS

"During a fire inspection activity involving inspection of fire walls that serve as Appendix R barriers, degradation of some fire walls was identified that was sufficient to prevent these walls from meeting Appendix R requirements as 3-hour fire barriers. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas, both safe shutdown paths on the affected unit could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions can be corrected.

"Condition Reports: 850802, 850819"

In addition to automatic fire protection features, the licensee has posted fire watches as a compensatory measure.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


* * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1814 EST ON 11/24/2014 * * *

"As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls for conditions similar to those reported on 8/7/2014. During this inspection, another condition was identified involving some degradation of the fire wall between Fire Area 1023 - RPS MG Set Room and Fire Area 1015 - Annunciator Room. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS update report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"Condition Report: 898908."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).


* * * UPDATE FROM KENNY HUNTER TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1758 EST ON 11/25/2014 * * *

"As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls for conditions similar to those reported on 8/7/2014. During this inspection, another condition was identified involving some degradation of the fire wall between Fire Area 1016 - 600 Volt Switchgear Room 1C and Fire Area 1017 - 600 Volt Switchgear Room 1D. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas, both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS update report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO (Ernstes).


* * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1706 EST ON 12/4/2014 * * *

"As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls for conditions similar to those reported on 8/7/2014. During this inspection, additional conditions were identified involving multiple fire barriers in the control building that affected both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and Unit 2 based on the respective inspection results. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and 2 could be compromised.

"Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS update report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO (Freeman).


* * * UPDATE AT 1842 EST ON 12/12/2014 FROM G.S. GRIFFIS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

"As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN# 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls and associated penetrations for conditions similar to those reported on 08/07/2014. During this inspection, nonconformances of multiple fire barriers were identified that bring into question the functionality of the affected fire barriers that can compromise safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and 2 based on the respective inspection results. Since additional time is required to further evaluate each nonconformance to conclusively determine if the nonconformance is sufficient to consider the barrier nonfunctional, interim conservative fire actions were taken by considering these fire barriers as nonfunctional. Based on this conservative conclusion, in the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and 2 could be compromised. Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations and fire walls in most of these same fire areas and will remain in place until the barrier(s) are repaired. Additional fire actions were taken as required to address the additional fire areas identified. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"Unit 1 is entering a planned outage due to unrelated activities."

Condition Report: 10000607

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R2DO (Desai).


* * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 2315 EST ON 1/15/2015 * * *

"As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the conditions identified in EN# 50351, an inspection activity was performed of a fire wall for conditions similar to those reported on 12/12/2014. During this inspection, another condition was identified involving some degradation of the fire wall between Fire Area 1008 - Unit 1 AC Inverter Room and Fire Area 0001 to consider the barrier nonfunctional. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded fire barriers in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity."

Condition Report: 10013077

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R2DO (Musser).

* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO JEFF HERRERA AT 2025 EST ON 1/21/2015 * * *

"During review and closeout of fire barrier and penetration seals work orders and surveillance procedures performed as part of the 'extent of condition' inspection activity initially described in Event # 50351, the following conditions were identified that in the event of a postulated fire in the respective fire areas listed both safe shutdown paths could be compromised.

"Unit 2 Control Bldg. el. 130', gap in the grout around conduit penetration between fire areas 2013 and 2015
"Unit 1 Reactor Bldg. el. 130', open conduit between fire areas 1203C and 1105

"Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded fire barriers in the Unit 2 fire area and will remain in place until the affected barrier areas are repaired. Compensatory measures were established for the Unit 1 areas and will remain in place until the affected barriers areas are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. Subsequent similar condition(s) found when performing remaining inspections that meet the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"Condition Report 10015417
"Condition Report 10015437"

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R2DO (McCoy).

* * * UPDATE FROM G.S. GRIFFIS TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1714 EST ON 2/4/15 * * *

"During the review of fire barrier surveillance procedures performed as part of the 'extent of condition' inspection activity for the event initially identified in EN# 50351, some degradation was observed on the east wall of fire area 2006. These nonconforming issues observed on the affected fire wall were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Therefore, in the event of a postulated fire for the affected area, both safe shutdown paths on Unit 2 could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire area and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The extent of condition inspection activity is continuing, and this, and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements, will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity."

CR 10021623

Notified R2DO (HAAG).

* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1823 EST ON 2/18/15 * * *

"During performance of work package closeouts to support the 'extent of condition' inspection activity for the event initially identified in EN# 50351, the following fire barriers were identified as failing to meet the procedure acceptance criteria:
- Three penetrations separating Unit 1 Fire Areas 1013 and 0040
- A fire wall deficiency in the wall separating Unit 1 Fire Areas 1015 and 1013

"These nonconforming issues observed on the affected penetrations and fire wall were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Therefore, in the event of a postulated fire for the affected area, both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire area and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The extent of condition inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10028364
"CR 10028366"

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Rose).

* * * UPDATE AT 2035 EST ON 02/25/15 FROM SCOTT BRITT TO S. SANDIN * * *

"During the review and closeout of a work package performed as part of the 'extent of condition' for the inspection activity initially described in EN #50351, a fire penetration seal was identified as failing to meet the procedure acceptance criteria. This penetration seal is located in the 2C Diesel Generator (DG) room and passes between Fire Area 2407 and 2408.

"The nonconforming issue observed on the affected penetration was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were established for the Unit 2 Areas and will remain in place until the affected barriers areas are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The extent of condition inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10032202"

The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Seymour).

* * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2000 EST ON 3/4/15 * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, two deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional:
- Small imperfections and a hole through Penetration 1Z43-H116C that passes between Fire Area 1101G (Unit 1 Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) Room) and Fire Area 1006 (Unit 1 Water Analysis Room), and
- Gaps in a civil/architectural joint at the top of the south wall leading from Fire Area 1006 (Unit 1 Water Analysis Room) to Fire Area 0007A (East Corridor in the Control Bldg.).

"These nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetration and fire barrier were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire area and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS update report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10035730"

The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Sykes).

* * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO DANIEL MILLS AT 2047 EDT ON 3/16/15 * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional:
- Imperfections in three penetration seals (2Z43-H037C, 2Z43-H038C, and 2Z43-H177C) located in the 2A Battery Room separating Unit 2 Fire Areas 2004 and 2005
- Imperfections in fire penetration seal 2Z43-H644C located in the U2 Water Analysis Room separating Fire Area 2006 and 0007A
- Imperfections in the grout between two tiers of concrete masonry wall and at the intersection of the walls in the upper northeast corner of the U2 Water Analysis Room separating Fire Areas 2006 and 0007A

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations and fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10041392, CR 10041394, and CR 10041397"

The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. Notified R2DO (Shaeffer)

* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1619 EDT ON 3/17/15 * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, a fire penetration seal was observed to contain imperfections that did not meet acceptance criteria. Penetration seal 1Z43H542C is located between the U1 Corridor, Fire Area 0001, and the Unit 1 AC Inverter Room, Fire Area 1008, in the Unit 1 Control Building.

"The nonconforming issue observed on the affected penetration was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until all associated non-functional fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The extent of condition inspection activity is continuing and this, and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements, will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10041766"

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Desai).

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Agreement State Event Number: 50876
Rep Org: TENNESSEE DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: EASTMAN CHEMICAL COMPANY
Region: 1
City: KINGSPORT State: TN
County:
License #: R-82007-H18
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RUBEN CROSSLYN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 03/10/2015
Notification Time: 16:23 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2015
Event Time: 10:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/10/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL GAUGE SOURCE NOT FULLY RETRACTED

The following report was received from the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation Division of Radiological Health via email:

"The licensee called to report a radioactive material gauge with stuck source in the closed position. The gauge is a Vega Model SHLM-C2, with three 37 millicurie Cs-137 rod sources, SNs 2609, 2611, and 2612. Radiation measurements indicated the source was in the shielded position. On March 9, 2015, a Vega service representative visited the site and inspected the gauge. It was discovered the source was not completely retracted. The gauge remains bolted to the process vessel, and is scheduled for replacement after additional retraction or equivalent means to secure the source has been implemented. No additional radiation exposure to personnel occurred. Current radiation levels are the same as found under normal conditions when the source is in the retracted position."

TN State Event Report ID No: TN-15-031

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Agreement State Event Number: 50877
Rep Org: ARIZONA RADIATION REGULATORY AGENCY
Licensee: PHOENIX BAPTIST HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 4
City: PHOENIX State: AZ
County:
License #: 07-146
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: AUBREY GODWIN
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 03/10/2015
Notification Time: 16:50 [ET]
Event Date: 02/27/2015
Event Time: [MST]
Last Update Date: 03/10/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
PATRICIA MILLIGAN (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - NUCLEAR MEDICINE TECHNOLOGIST RECEIVED OVEREXPOSURE

The following was received from the State of Arizona via email:

"On February 27, 2015, the licensee received notification from Landauer that one of their nuclear medicine technologists received a dynamic whole body dose of 11 Rem for the wear period of September 1, 2014 to October 31, 2014. The technologist only works at the hospital 1 day a week.

"The Agency [State of Arizona] continues to investigate the event."

Arizona First Notice: 15-006

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50899
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DANA ANTON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 03/17/2015
Notification Time: 02:57 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2015
Event Time: 18:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/17/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 95 Power Operation 95 Power Operation

Event Text

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECT DECLARED INOPERABLE FOLLOWING SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE

"At 1820 on March 16th, 2015, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system steam lines were re-pressurized following scheduled maintenance. Upon restoration, an alarm was received that indicated condensate may exist in the steam line. The system responded as designed but the alarm did not clear as expected. Without assurance that the condensate has been removed from the HPCI steam line, HPCI remains inoperable for reasons other than the planned maintenance. As a result, this condition is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function at the time of discovery.

"The health and safety of the public was maintained as the plant was in a normal condition with no initiating event in progress.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The licensee will also notify the State of Minnesota.

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Part 21 Event Number: 50900
Rep Org: CURTISS WRIGHT FLOW CONTROL CO.
Licensee: CURTISS WRIGHT FLOW CONTROL CO.
Region: 1
City: EAST FARMINGDALE State: NY
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN DeBONIS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 03/17/2015
Notification Time: 09:59 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/2015
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/17/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)

Event Text

INTERIM PART 21 REPORT - POTENTIAL TEST INDUCED DEFECT IN A 0867F MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVES

The following report was received from Curtiss - Wright via email:

"This letter provides interim notification of a potential test induced defect in a 0867F Series Main Steam Safety Relief Valves (MS-SRVs) manufactured and supplied by Target Rock (TR). The information required for this notification is provided below:

"(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

William Brunet
Director of Quality Assurance
James White
General Manager
Target Rock, Business Unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corporation
1966E Broadhollow Road
East Farmingdale, NY 11735

"(ii) Identification of the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which may fail to comply or contains a potential defect.

Target Rock 0867F Series of Main Steam-Safety Relief Valves Manufactured by Target Rock. This is a 3-stage piloted valve consisting of a main valve (the 'Main') with an actuator mounted to it (the 'Topworks'). The 0867F is the latest generation of the 67F line of MS-SRVs, including the original 3-Stage and 2-Stage designs, and this product line has over 40 years of plant operational experience. Only the 0867F is under investigation. This is due to the differences between the 0867F design and the other designs.

"(iii) Identification of the firm supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Target Rock, Business Unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corporation
1966E Broadhollow Road
East Farmingdale, NY 11735

"(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

As we understand it, the Pilgrim Station recently manually opened the Target Rock Main Steam Safety Relief Valves (MS-SRVs) as part of cooling down the reactor following a loss of offsite power. One of the four installed MS-SRVs may not have fully opened. As-found steam testing of the affected MS-SRV did not duplicate this failure; the valve opened on demand. However, the valve did not re-close as expected. Internal inspections found damaged parts in the main stage subassembly that could potentially affect the ability of the MS-SRV to operate as designed.

We are investigating potential root causes for this damage. However, we are still unable to determine if a specific defect exists. GE SIL-196, Supplement 17 determined Main Spring relaxation was caused by 'extreme dynamics encountered during limited flow testing . Valve dynamics under full flow conditions (i.e. discharge not gagged) are much less severe than those under limited flow conditions.' These extreme dynamics, under limited flow test conditions, are the focus of our investigation. Specific areas of investigation include;

a) Testing of materials to verify they are consistent with our material specifications,
b) evaluation of differences between the 0867F and earlier designs, and
c) evaluation of the differences between different limited flow test loop configurations and test procedures

"(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

The Pilgrim event occurred on January 27, 2015. As-found testing occurred on February 2, 2015.

"(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

While we have yet to determine if a specific defect exists, the following plants were supplied 0867F MS-SRVs:

- Pilgrim (Model 09J-001) Quantity Shipped = 8
- Fitzpatrick (Model 09H-001) Quantity Shipped = 4, Quantity on order= 8
- Hatch 1 and 2 (Model 09G-001) Quantity Shipped= 24, Quantity on order= 12

The following plants will be supplied 0867F MS-SRVs:

- Hope Creek (Models 14J-001, 14J-002) Quantity on order = 7

"(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.

The root cause of the potential test induced defect has not yet been confirmed as of the date of this report. Therefore, no specific corrective actions have been initiated. Target Rock Problem Report 080 will document the corrective actions when they are determined and complete the 10 CFR Part 21 evaluation of the potential test induced defect. This determination will be based on further mechanical and material evaluations. TR anticipates completing these evaluations within 45 days; however, in the event the evaluations are not completed, TR will forward another interim report within 45 days.

"(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.

We are working with all three (4) sites to identify appropriate precautions.

"(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

Not applicable.

"Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Michael Cinque, Director of Program Management at (631 ) 293-3800."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 18, 2015
Wednesday, March 18, 2015