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Event Notification Report for March 4, 2015

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
03/03/2015 - 03/04/2015

** EVENT NUMBERS **


50752 50843 50844 50845 50858 50859 50860

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 50752
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: BOB MARTIN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 01/22/2015
Notification Time: 18:51 [ET]
Event Date: 01/22/2015
Event Time: 17:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/03/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
RAY MCKINLEY (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED HEAT EXCHANGER LINEUP COULD EXCEED DESIGN BASIS TEMPERATURES

"On 1/20/15, it was determined that a certain line up of component cooling heat exchangers and shutdown cooling heat exchangers could exceed the design basis temperatures for the component cooling water system following a design basis accident. Although not a safety concern at this time because of low ultimate heat sink temperatures (which cools component cooling water), in the past the ultimate heat sink temperatures have been high enough to create this condition. This particular heat exchanger line up was unanalyzed in that the ultimate heat sink temperature limits were not known until 1/22/15. This issue has been entered into the corrective action program.

"A review of Control Room logs for 2014 showed that in 1 instance for Unit 1 and 1 instance for Unit 2, the Units were in an unanalyzed lineup with ultimate heat sink temperature greater than the maximum now calculated. During these instances, both Units had an unanalyzed condition that had potential to significantly degrade plant safety and is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * RETRACTED ON 03/03/15 AT 1410 EST FROM CHARLES MORGAN TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

"Further engineering analysis has refined the ultimate heat sink temperature that provides an acceptable safety system response with the component cooling water and shutdown cooling heat exchanger lineups in question. The revised information demonstrates that the system lineups that occurred in the last 12 months did not result in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. This event notification is retracted."

The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.

The R1DO(Burritt) was notified.

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Agreement State Event Number: 50843
Rep Org: TENNESSEE DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: TOXCO, INC.
Region: 1
City: OAK RIDGE State: TN
County:
License #: R-01037
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RUBEN CROSSLIN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 02/23/2015
Notification Time: 16:34 [ET]
Event Date: 02/23/2015
Event Time: 07:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/23/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SPRINKLER PIPE BREAK OVERFLOW FROM CONTROLLED AREA

The following information was received from the Tennessee Division of Radiological Health via facsimile:

"[A] sprinkler pipe break in the Waste Water Treatment Plant of Building B [resulted] in water accumulation in [the] berms overflowing [the] berms and [flowing] from a controlled area [into a] storm water collection basin and runoff system."

The State is performing sampling to determine if there is any contamination of the water that passed through the controlled area.

TN Event Report: TN-15-023

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Agreement State Event Number: 50844
Rep Org: WISCONSIN RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: TEAM INDUSTRIAL SERVICES
Region: 3
City: MILWAUKEE State: WI
County:
License #: 079-2005-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MEGAN SHOBER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 02/23/2015
Notification Time: 16:59 [ET]
Event Date: 02/23/2015
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/23/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
ROBERT ORLIKOWSKI (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED GUIDE TUBE ON RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA PREVENTING SOURCE RETRACTION

The following information was received from the State of Wisconsin via email:

"The Wisconsin Radiation Protection Section received notice from the licensee's Corporate Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) that a radiography crew working at a temporary jobsite on February 23, 2015 had a source become stuck during radiography operations. The crew was using an Ir-192 source in a QSA Global 880 Delta camera. While the source was cranked out in the collimator, a pipe fell on the guide tube and crimped the tube such that the radiographers were unable to retract the source. Two radiographers who are trained in source retrieval were dispatched to the jobsite. They cut out a one-inch section of the guide tube and were able to retract the source into the camera. As indicated by pocket dosimeters, radiation doses received by the radiographers were beneath regulatory limits.

"The Wisconsin Radiation Protection Section will follow up with the licensee after receiving its 30-day written report. Additional updates will be provided through NMED."

The licensee is sending the camera drive cable to the manufacturer for evaluation and has disposed of the damaged guide tube.

Wisconsin Event Report ID No.: WI150004

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Non-Agreement State Event Number: 50845
Rep Org: SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY
Licensee: SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY
Region: 3
City: SAINT LOUIS State: MO
County:
License #: 24-00196-07
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK HAENCHEN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 02/23/2015
Notification Time: 17:04 [ET]
Event Date: 02/23/2015
Event Time: 12:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/23/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(1) - DOSE <> PRESCRIBED DOSAGE
Person (Organization):
ROBERT ORLIKOWSKI (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

MEDICAL UNDER DOSE DUE TO EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION

A patient was under dosed approximately 21.9% due to an equipment malfunction (SIR-Spheres). The isotope is Yttrium 90, the prescribed dose was 13.23 mCi and the delivered dose was 10.3 mCi. The prescribing physician and patient will be informed. The manufacturer will follow up and investigate the hardware issue and subsequent corrective actions.

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 50858
Facility: HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
Comments: UF6 CONVERSION (DRY PROCESS)
Region: 2
City: METROPOLIS State: IL
County: MASSAC
License #: SUB-526
Agreement: Y
Docket: 04003392
NRC Notified By: SEAN PATTERSON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 03/03/2015
Notification Time: 09:33 [ET]
Event Date: 03/02/2015
Event Time: 09:20 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/03/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
40.60(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
DENNIS DAMON (NMSS)

Event Text

VACUUM PUMP SEAL WATER SUPPLY FAILURE

"The air monitoring vacuum pumps were disabled for approximately 70 minutes. The soft water supply to the air monitoring vacuum pump seals on the 2nd floor of the Feed Materials Building (FMB) was shut down for annual shut down. These pumps provide vacuum for the stack monitoring and personnel area monitoring systems in the FMB. While the soft water system was shut down a sanitary well water supply was being used for the vacuum pump seals. A restriction in the sanitary water supply line interrupted the flow to the pump seals. This caused the vacuum pumps to be shut down until a temporary water supply could be established. A temporary water supply was reestablished to the pump seals. The pumps were restored to service at approximately 1030 CST on 03/02/2015."

The licensee notified NRC Region II (Hickey) and will notify the state.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50859
Facility: BYRON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CHARLES BERGER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 03/03/2015
Notification Time: 14:21 [ET]
Event Date: 03/03/2015
Event Time: 11:01 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/03/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO MAIN POWER TRANSFORMER BUSHING SHORT

"In accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), this notification reports an automatic reactor trip on Byron Unit 1. The trip occurred following a trip of the Byron Unit 1 East Main Power Transformer (MPT). Initial indications appear that the MPT trip was caused by a large (~ 5 foot) section of ice that fell from a bus bar over the 1E MPT. This ice shorted out a MPT bushing, resulting in the unit trip. Reactor operators performed a manual start of the Auxiliary Feedwater System in response to the unit trip. All other safety systems responded as expected.

"The plant trip occurred at 1101 CST on March 03, 2015. Unit 1 is presently in Mode 3 and stable. Unit 2, the opposite unit, is operating at 100% power and stable. This condition was entered into the Byron CAP Program. An investigation is in progress to determine the extent of required repairs, if any, required prior to unit restart.

"This event resulted in the actuation of the Reactor Protection System with a subsequent Reactor Trip and therefore, requires notification to the NRC within 4 hours of discovery in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event resulted in the manual actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System and therefore, requires notification to the NRC within 8 hours of discovery in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

"This ENS call will be followed up with a Licensee Event Report (LER) within 60 days."

All rods inserted during reactor trip, offsite power and emergency power sources are currently available and decay heat is being removed via the startup feedwater systems. No safety relief valves lifted as a result of the transient.

The NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Illinois were notified.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50860
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JOHN RIZZO
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 03/03/2015
Notification Time: 15:18 [ET]
Event Date: 03/03/2015
Event Time: 08:37 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/03/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 93 Power Operation 93 Power Operation

Event Text

MOMENTARY LOSS OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DUE TO BOTH AIRLOCKS OPENING AT SAME TIME

"Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1) had a momentary loss of Secondary Containment due to both Reactor Building Airlock doors being opened at the same time.

"At 0837 [EST] on 03/03/2015, both Reactor Building Airlock doors at NMP1 were opened simultaneously for approximately 2 seconds. This results in a momentary loss of Secondary Containment operability (TS 3.4.3). The doors were closed and operability was restored.

"Secondary Containment being inoperable is an 8 hour notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.'

"The condition has been entered into the station's corrective action program and the Senior Resident NRC Inspector was notified."

The licensee notified the State of New York.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021